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CHAIRMAN LEROY GREENE: All we will come to order. I have some with the 
other members of the Subcommittee right now who have other ttee 
so do I, for that matter. But we're scattered at our at a 
the other one's at another committee meeting, and so forth. 
any case, we are recording all the remarks at this hearing so that we will be able to review 
them when and if we can find some leisure time for that purpose. In fact, it won't be leisure time; it 
will be working time. 
This is the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Facility Safety and Emergency Preparation. The 
members of the committee are myself, Senator Leroy Greene, as chairman; Senator Hersch Rosenthal 
and Senator Newton Russell are the other members of the committee. And we all serve on the parent 
committee which is the Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities, which Senator Rosenthal 
chaired. 
m 
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant tragedy in Russia not only sent nuclear fallout all around the 
world, but it once again opened the question of safety of nuclear generating facilities in California 
and other parts of our nation and, in fact, the world. Presently, the United States meets 15% of its 
nuclear energy needs from the nuclear option. 
California is the most populous state in our country and is still growing. Sacramento and 
vicinity are considered to be one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the country. Thus, 
there will be a growing demand for electrical power to meet the population and business growth in 
this specific area. 
The state currently meets its energy needs with a mix of options: solar energy, hydroelectric 
power, combustion power plants using gas or oil, geothermal, cogeneration, and nuclear power. There 
are three nuclear plants currently producing electrical power in California and one that is no longer 
in service. 
All power plants, other than nuclear, are under the direct control of the state of Calihrnia. 
However, nuclear power is controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Consequently, there is a limited role for the state in the design, the 
of a nuclear facility. 
Now the question is, what is the state's role in nuclear power? 
a feder8l agency. 
and the operation 
The best way that it can be described is that what happens inside the fence of a nuclear facility 
is under control of the federal government. What happens outside the fence is under state control. 
That's a gross oversimplicification, of course; but the state is concerned about the total situation. 
However, the state does not have any control inside the facility other than setting the rates that a 
regulated utility can charge for electrical power. 
The hearing that is being held at this time is targeted on establishing a basis of understanding of 
what options exist to ensure that nuclear power facilities are safe for operation in the state of 
California. We also want to examine the status of state, local, and plant emergency preparation in 
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and are the exclusive concern of the 
Mr. 
VIC AllO: Mr. Mr. nice to be with you. <'!!so t~ith 
you, Mr. Rosenthal. It's nice to be back in the Capitol with rny former colleagues in 
as they now in the other as we call the Senate in Washington. 
And I want to thank you, Mr. for this meeting because I think it couldn't be 
more not because of the concerns from the disaster at C::hernob but because of 
the the people in the Sacramento area to the Rancho Seco 
is located in my district. Half of my constituents are of 
power but even those who are across the river who are PGr3cE 
customers share a common regional concern with and I certainly want to 
the committee for this afternoon's session and other sessions that you to 
have on such an issue. And I add, while I know you're specifically focusing on issues 
emergency a ten-mile I wonder if you might not wish to look somewhat 
because we know from the accident we've seen m the Kiev area that ten miles ts 
for concern. l\nd as one who represents who are at 
would without an alarm we would broaden our coverage and concern of other regions 
counties further to the west and north. 
CHAIRivlAN GREENE: Well, I assure you that if Polaf1d could be concerned, so can Ne,·ada, 
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CONGRESSMAN FAZIO: I understand. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Or DC or New York 
CONGRESSMAN I think we very circumstances. 
and not containments the case of that are 
in use. iously, we have different y 
be far broader than perhaps the traditional close circumference the 
But I particularly want to focus my brief period before you, because I do another 
appointment that I had to make prior to invited here at the iJurcau of on 
relationship between the federal government and the local -- in this case, SMUO. I have a real 
belief that we now have at NRC a highly sensitive commission and staff who have decided under a 
great deal of public pressure, from a variety of individuals and interest groups, to pay y 
close attention to the two Babcock and Wilcox plants that are currently shut down: the one, in 
in the Ohio area, Davis-9esse, as well as Rancho Seco. These are particularly plants 
mechanically. Somebody analogized them to a hot rod -- high performance but very sensitive to 
operate. 
And think it's fair to say that while there are so:ne very successful with 
and Wilcox designs -- the Duke Power Company, for example, has used them with very little 
trouble -- it has become of national concern. And we in this area, not only concerned about 
but also about the rates that we pay for power, are in the middle of this \J/e have to be 
perhaps, and I think that's healthy, more aware of the problems at the and more sensitive to 
what we can do as citizens and what we can see our and our 
management, appointed, doing in the to resolve these 
I am particularly concerned with what I think has been an attitude over time at the at 
SMUD generally, that might be described as macho or a defiant toward who want to 
interfere in their business. I think there's been a certain blend of arrogance and defensiveness in 
terms of how that plant has been managed. I think there has been an experience over time of people 
doing what could be said to be a relatively minimum compliance with NRC I think 
there's been an overreliance on contractors and an number of managers 
employed by SMUO to function in the control responsib ty they have. 
But I think it's also fair to say that SlvlUD has seen the error of it~3 ways to a large not 
always because of their own insights; in part, because of criticism from a of sources. I think 
under the new management, personified with the appointment of Dewey Lowe, and under a number of 
moves that have been made both in terms of zational structure and new there is an 
effort to change, not only the methods and procedures of managing Rancho Seco, but the 
attitudes which govern their relationship with the NRC and with the and with the state 
and others who are obviously having an effect on their O;Jerations out there. 
Now, the community may be focusing more criticism today and perhaps might have focused 
even ;nore a few years ago or months ago; and that is a healthy and to be expected puhlic 
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ut to in effect provide the 
guide the recovery of this 
think we've had the of very close attention 
of Nuclear and Mr. the of 
can on behalf their staffs 
I don't tnink we have found it easy for SMUD, its managers, etc., to satisfy the demands the 
NRC and I'm sure that the people of this community, even rnore than national 
constituency concerned about nuclear power would not want it any other way. I'rn 
Rancho people in this community who will under no circumstances 
I'm sure there are many who will be adamantly in favor. But I think most of us would take the 
that we under any circumstances want to know that we have a one 
that has co;ne through the tough times and is not likely to have the kind of errors that 
brought about the rapid cooldown, the most recent serious incident, that brought about the shutt 
down of the facility. 
I think, on the other hand, there are many people concerned about safety who roalu:e ,.vhat the 
stakes are for Sacramento and for S:v1UD in the investment that's been made at Rancho Seco. t\nd 
should the facility go down again with any serious kind of incident or problem, I think many people 
realize it may well stay down. That means that 913 mcgaN3tts of power, 57 percent of the 
generating capacity of the utility, would not be available to the people who paid to have it built. Its 
Joss would result in approximately a 50 percent time rate increase to buy replacement generation. 
/\nd that, under any circumstances, would not be easy when you consider the difficulty of siting a 
fossil fuel plant, a coal plant, a gas plant. Any of these may have air quality and 
certainly tremendous cost implications in the $2-3 billion range. The kinds of rate increases that 
have beco:ne all too familiar for Sacramento ratepayers would be dyvarfed by the kind of 
that would be required to replace the kind of power that we can currently generatfl out of this 
which has an amortization cost to us I believe of $30-40 million a year at this point. kinds 
debt services can't be ignored and will continue until the plant is paid off. And so, we not nave 
the plant available to provide the power to us, SMUD is in position 
alternative sources. 
to look to very 
I've been one of those who has been very active in attempting to make more 
hydroelectric power, of fighting against the sale of WAPA, for example, or the poNer 
administrations that the Administration has proposed, for the and i 
the existing intertie, creation of now capacity, so that we can import poNer from the \Jorthwest 
where it is still in surplus, wasted annually. These are options that s:v1UD has looked to 
in order to cut some of tho costs that are involved in keeping up with their 8-10 rate 
increases that are simply required to serve as future growth. 
As you indicated in your introductory remarks, this is a high growth area. estimated 2.4 
percent annual rate generation mix occurs. We are in a position of having constantly to fight to keep 
up with the kind of growth that's occurring in our community. And this cannot be handled by 
diminishing resources in the hydro area, particularly at the prices that Pm afraid so:ne of our friends 
in the Northwest wish to charge us. And I look at Mr. Rosenthal because 98 of all the 
ratepayers in the state have a stake in making these alternatives make sense. 
'Ne all understand then that the NRC has a terribly job here in 
appropriately. Their reputation is on the line as well as Sl'v1UD's. I think it's possible that NRC can 
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CONGRESSMAN FAZIO: Thank you very Mr. and I my remarks in 
if you don't mind. 
CHAIRMAN Yes, I do want them. Thank you. 
CONGRESSMAN FAZIO. Thank you. 
CHAIRiv1AN GREENE: Now, is there is a 
MR. DAVID N. MILLER: afternoon, Mr. 
ve 
district representative for Congressman Robert Matsui, 
Congressman 
My name is David M I am the 
y, the 
Congressman cannot be here today. He had wanted, when he did find out you were 
schedule a hearing, to be here. I do have a statement that he had prepared to be presented if he 
get an opportunity to come here today, and I'd like to read it to you members of the committee. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Can you tell me how long it is? Because we can put it in the record. 
We will be transcribing all our stuff here. Can you simply tell us about it and we will have the actual 
verbiage there? 
MR. MILLER: Sure. It's very brief. Basically the Congressman's concerns reflect around the 
oversight that the NRC has provided to nuclear generating plants particularly those that have 
designed by Babcock & Wilcox. Congressman initiated a number of wi try 
to---particularly after the latest shutdown at Rancho Seco in late December. I can 
excerpts from his statement that I believe capsulize ~is concerns. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. 
you a few 
MR. MILLER: ''Last January, I was skeptical when the NRC announced its intention to conduct 
a long-ter~n safety review of all B&Vv reactors. While I welcomed the the motives 
of the action. I had discovered a pattern of at the NRC. When public or 
concern is highest, there is a of activity. But when the furor NRC seems to 
subside as well. 
"This particular safety review seems to me to be no more than a public relations As a 
result of my own investigation, I found that the NRC already knew that B&W reactors have 
flaws that make them more vulnerable to operationaL transients. I found that the NRC 
that design vulnerabilities coupled with poor management were a 
one Commissioner tell me that the NRC had simply failed to take 
problems. 
trouble. I also had 
action to correct these 
"A quick look at the current status of ••. NRC's long-ter~n safety review I think bears out my 
original observation. First of all, little has actually been accomplished besides the obligatory 
relations. But second, the NRC has turned over that safety review to the owners of the reactors 
themselves. I am not reassured when the industry is responsible for its own safety review, and I fail 
to see the objectivity in self-regulation. 
"What concorns 1ne rnost," however, "is the fact that there is di:lsonsion within tho Commission 
itself on this matter. Commissioner James Asselstine has called for an independent safety revie'N 
group, including experts from outside the NRC, to conduct a thorough review of the safety 
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"When the NRC says that there has been no undue risk to the public at any U.S. nuclear plant, 
what they are really saying is that no one has been radiated. In other words, if it works, there is no 
need for concern. That, in my opinion, is the space shuttle excuse. We to redefine what an 
acceptable risk and double our safety efforts to match 
"Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to the record my 
and the NRC documents relating to emergency plans at Rancho Seco. 11 
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you and inform the Congressman that we're 
remarks and his enclosures as well. We do want them for our record and for our 
issue is before us. Thank you very much. 
MR. MILLER: Thank you. 
the NRC 
to have his 
as the 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: At this time, I'd like to call on Darrell Eisenhut from the ~--luclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). And while you're getting yourself ready here, we have, course, 
been joined by Senator Hersch Rosenthal from Los Angeles. Senator Rosenthal is the Chairman of 
the parent Committee on Energy and Public Utilities and serves with me on this Subcommittee as 
does Newton Russell, who has not been able to join us yet. Sir. 
MR. DARRELL EISENHUT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My 
name is Darrell Eisenhut. I'm the deputy director for Reactor Regulation with U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
With me here today is Frank Miraglia, who is a division director in the office of Reactor 
Regulation. He is in fact the division director who has the overall responsibility for overseeing the 
safety of the B&W reactors around the United States as well as a number of other things. 
It's a pleasure being here today and to address this committee, to address several of the issues 
surrounding both Chernobyl and, in fact, the NRC's oversight of plants in the United States, 
particularly Rancho Seco. 
The letter of invitation specifically referred to the Chernobyl disaster. So, let me first make a 
couple of comments about that. We certainly have expressed our sincere re to the 
the disaster. Clearly, it was an accident of a very large magnitude; but we all rnust le:irn from that 
event. 
The U.S., of course, has been tracking the event very closely. Over the first of weeks 
we tracked it through an interagency group, the task force appointed by the President. Since that 
time, when the activities have evolved and changed following the event, we have been y 
following it through an NRC tracking team that we've been working with. We've also been 
participating with the IAEA. That's the International Atomic Energy Agency headquartered in 
Vienna, Austria. We also have participated, of course, through our exchange agreements with a 
number of the other countries around the world that are part of the OECD organization 
headquartered out of Paris. So we've had quite a bit of activity in the international 8rona through 
and including rneetings that have been held last week aml that lire ongoing this week ab3o in Vienna. 
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i1tit t'o; n brqn dotnr: 
over the facility. 
y didn't read the newspapers that the event because we were 
up with other---with understanding with what was 
SENATOR RUSSELL: If you you have been very 
MR. EISENHUT: I did see a In a few newspaper on the 
out also. And I can understand sir. 
I initially following the Soviet many didn't have any idea what this 
facility really looks like. We have never been there. We don't have firsthand of actually 
what the facility looks like. To the best of my knowledge, no one in the United States does. 
have been people who have been to the facility and have worked there from time to and we 
have pieced together everything we have today. The facility does not have anything like this 
containment structure. 
What leads to the confusion is the reactor core, if you will, is a very graphite structure. 
It has individual tubes, pressure tubes, running through the reactor. Some 1600 tubes through the 
reactor. Each one of those tubes that goes through the actual graphite reactor has a pipe that goes 
off on the top, puts water through the steam generators and back in the bottom. So there are 
literally 1600 pipes that run in loops at this facility. Portions of those pipes appear to be encased in a 
structure, a concrete and steel structure. The principle being, apparently, to keep water from any of 
those pipes if it should rupture from getting into the reactor because this is a graphite reactor. It's a 
very large mass of graphite. There doesn't---over the reactor as best as we from all the 
information we have on the reactor design, there is a confinement over the of the 
reactor. But based on everything we know, it doesn't appear to be an like the concrete 
and steel structures in the United States. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Now, Mr. Eisenhut, if I may---are 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, if he let him finish my 
to move on. 
CHAIRtv1AN GREENE: It's on this point. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Go ahead then. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Because we are concentrating on the 
unless you want 
as to whether or not 
was containment on the Russian event. It's obvious that blew a hole the 
according to the pictures we saw and I assume it was the plant. You know, so 
didn't contain, OK? You blew a hole through the roof. 
had, it 
But we keep on talking about that. At the same time you have made mention of the fact that 
all our commercial nuclear plants in this country have containment. using the word 
commercial, Which leads me to believe that at the same time you're saying all our nuclear 
plants in the United States do not have containment building. 
MR. EISENHUT: If I could reserve on that question just one second and I'll add two qualifiers to 
this. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Surely. 
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MR. EISENHUT: Certainly, sir. The very vast amount of electric power that's 
in the U.S. is under our control. There is only one facility that I'm aware at 
lit y in Washington, that in is used to The rest are used as 
ties. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Well, in in 
MR. EISENHUT: The plant---I'm sorryt 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Isn't 
MR. EISI::NHUT: There are other DOE/DOD facilities, both at 
some in Savannah River, Georgia. Those are the two large groups of 
Washington; there are 
where there are 
military facilities. We have not done a review of those facilities, and we have not asked to do a 
review of those facilities. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: But you would think that the major portion of the nuclear plants are in 
commercial use? 
MR. EISENHUT: The major portion of the DOE facilities, I believe, are not in power use. 
CHAIRMAN Gf~EENE: No, they're not in power use. 
MR. EISENHUT: That is, they do not produce electricity as I'm using power. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Well, I know, you've got nuclear plants and they're generating for 
whatever purpose, OK? And I'm suggesting---I'm trying to get at the question of what of 
that generation, that nuclear generation is something that you review as opposed to what percent you 
do not review. How big is the noncommercial facilities, whether they're producing Willkie buttons or 
whatever the heck it may be? 
MR. EISENHUT: OK, let me try to put it in a different framework. There are 
in the United States a hundred power plants that are that are under our purview. 
There are on the order of five, about five, reactors---facilities that are not under our purview that 
are large scale facilities. There are also under our responsib fall the what I will call research and 
test facilities. There are facilities---even in the Washington, DC area, there's the National Bureau of 
Standards, which is a part of the Department of Commerce, has a 20-megawatt facility that we do 
regulate. So those kinds, sir, we do regulate. 
CHAIRMAN Let me ask you this question, a different different 
relating to the personnel operating these plants, OK, the technical help that's inside the be the 
engineers or other levels of technicians. Does the state in your opinion have any role to play in, say, 
licensing, for example, of nuclear engineers or technicians and so on? Could the state say that you 
would have to have such-and-such a kind of license to pursue---or prove this level of competency 
before you could operate in the plant? Or are we not able to do that because it's under the federal 
jurisdiction? 
MR. EISCNHUT: Well, sir, I really am not going to embark and to try to attempt to answer 
that. It's really not rny area of expertise and 1 think it goes really into the legal aspects of state's 
rights versus the federal authority. 
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CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yeah, Congressman Fazio. 
MR. EISENHUT: ... referred to one of the Duke facilities which just set a 
it around the 
record. 
believe they operated for some 400 days straight with no interruptions. In fact, I think it was in 
excess of 400 days. They can be made to operate safe and reliable. 
~ow, this utility has undergone a number of management changes. They started making 
management changes before the December 26 event. And they've certainly made major changes 
since the December event. And in our opinion, management clearly is one of the keys to the overall 
performance. The actual board of directors has made some changes. They've started taking more 
interest in the plant, in my personal opinion. They've started to look at it harder. And I think they're 
going to have to continue to demand from their management that high level of performance. The 
utility has a new program in place. They are taking a retrospective look at what's going on at the 
facility. They have made a commitment to go back and look at tho design, look at the detail 
management through the organization, the maintenance, the training of the personnel. All of those 
things need to be looked at. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You have the same plant. And during a period of 
problems. Now you say that the thing is turning itself around and I think I heard you say basically it's 
different or new management, whatever. Is that basically what you're saying? 
MR. EISENHUT: I think a key ingredient is that they have brought in new management and 
have made some changes. The very next thing I was going to say though is that there will 
undoubtedly be even more management changes. There will be design changes. There will be changes 
to the procedures and the training at the facility. There will be more of those that will be needed 
prior to the plant starting up, and there will undoubtedly be more that will be deferred until after it 
starts up. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And none of that is under state purview, is it? The training, the 
requirements for safety or this widget or that widget? 
tv1R. EISENHUT: I think that's correct, Senator. It's directly under federal statutory 
responsibility given to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Will your testimony include any observations as to what you think---how 
you think we can assist or help or implement or intervene or interfere or whatever? 
MR. EISENHUT: I don't know, but let me be very candid. I've talked to a number of concerned 
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the passage of time that increase in sensitivity on the part of the ,11anagement of the utili 
district, as to the problems related to this plant. The particular thing that happened last 
-- I know when Senator Rosenthal and I were out at the plant just within the last several 
showed us that there in that cabinet is wire on that terminal, that 
equipment was brought in here x years ago, whatever it was, years back. And over 
that connection came lose and it became an intermittent rather than a constant connection. 
The signal goes through the computer system here that says shut her down. And here we were, you 
know, in trouble with that thing cycling through. They then had to go back there and start off and 
check every single connection of every single wire in the whole damn plant, by the you 
know. And found little problems here and there that suggested that the maintenance was not Nhat it 
ought to have been, you know, from the word go. Senator Rosenthal. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Veah, I guess I'm a little confused by what I'm hearing you say after 
having read these, you know---every couple of years I guess we do a systematic assessment of 
licensing performance called SALP. 
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, sir, we do that about every 18 months. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: 01<. I looked at the one that was done through May 31 of 1985. Let 
me just read what you said, or what the agency said. 
Now, this is looking at the plant from December 1, 1983 through May 1985. "Summary of 
Results. Overall, the board found the licensee's performance to be acceptable and directed toward 
safe facility operation. The board found that the licensee's overall performance has 
somewhat since the last SALP evaluation period. Individual areas which contributed to overall 
improvement were plant operations, surveillance, and licensing activities. In addition, the board 
found management attention and the licensee's level of performance had improved in the areas of 
radiological controls in engineering and construction during the latter part of this evaluation period. 
A licensee's performance in the areas of emergency preparedness, security and safeguards and 
refueling were found to be unchanged. Some improvement was noted in the areas of maintenance and 
fire protection." And then you go through functional areas and you point out which were improving 
and which were unchanged. 
Now, in the light of that, how does that general evaluation mesh with the recent event at 
Rancho Seco, particularly since in the period before December 26, the plant was done for almost 250 
days that year? Don't positive evaluations like this give support to Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
critics' claims that there is a lax federal regulation of nuclear facilities? 
:v1R. EISENHUT: Yeah, they can if they read them out of context. For exampie, let me give 
you some insights into what we call the SALP process. I'm not specifically familiar with that exact 
piece of paper, but I can certainly understand the bottom line. 
If a plant ever is unacceptable, the plant gets shut down. 1-\ll right? So, we would formally 
order the plant shut down. So that is the bottom-line level, is the plant acceptable? And anyone who 
gets one that says it's acceptable, every utility tho country knows they're at the very bottom 
edge. So that part of it you could understand. If you read it in that kind of framework, you know 
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of problems, at Oa\ is-9esse in Ohio, at Rancho Seco here, Crystal River in Florida, and of course, in 
'79, the TMI accident. We have, in fact, probably doubled the oversight on B&W facilities over and 
above what it is on other facilities around the U.S. yes, we are .... 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: one further question at this The states that 
record of emergency performance with respect to emergency preparedness and 
and refueling is unchanged and graded at level 2. What does level 2 mean? 
and 
MR. EISENHUT: OK, in the overall jargon, level 2 means it's basically acceptable, but it's not 
outstanding, and it's not so unacceptably bad that they have to take some action to fix it up right 
away. 
We grade them in three categories: a 1 means it's performing better than the normal and better 
than the minimum requirements; 3 means it's down to the bare minimums and should be improved. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: So that means, a level 2 means that it could be improved. 
MR. EISENHUT: It could. In fact, we would hope that their target would be 1'1 Level Iin each 
case. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: But you indicated on that SALP report that it was unchanged, which 
means that it was •.• 
MR. EISENHUT: It's previous. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: ••• spoke to previously. 
MR. EISE:NHUT: That's correct. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Is there any indication that that will become a 1? 
MR. EISENHUT: Certainly I hope so. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: We're talking about security and safeguards, emergency preparedness. 
I mean, we're not talking about what actually happens to the plant. We're talking about what we do in 
case something happens. 
MR. EISENHUT: That's correct. And certainly I hope the overall target is a level 1 and I'm 
sure that the utility will tell you in a little bit they're committed to do just that. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I think we had better move on, but I'd like to ask you one final question. 
When something goes wrong at the plant, an event of one kind or another, I presume that there's some 
requirement that you immediately be contacted? 
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, sir. For various kinds of events, we're notified on various time---
CHAIRMAN GREENE: What I wanted to ask is not the notification to you, but the notification 
beyond the federal level. Is there any notification that's required to the state, to the city, to the 
county, to somebody other than the feds? 
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, there are, sir. I would suggest the panel on emergency preparedness 
could best address that, because they actually are the ones that have that. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I'm just asking in the sense of your Commission whether thnrn's any 
requirements in this area. 
MR. EISE:NHUT: We have a standard policy, certainly that if any event occurs at a facility of 
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Certainly, these did exist. But two things are important to recognize: 
1. They are virtually all related to failure of adequate management controls. 
2. The reactor design is, in our opinion, a good one and not the root cause of our poor 
operating record. 
Rancho Seco is basically a sound and safe plant, despite some design flaws which will 
continue to be corrected. The reactor safety systems have functioned as designed when they 
were called upon in transits or shutdowns we have experienced. 
Every one of the identified problems has been or is being aggressively addressed. We have made 
changes, and we will continue to make changes to increase the plant's margin of safety. 
I. The plant staff and management has been increased significantly. In 1984, staffing at 
Rancho Seco was about 500. By the end of 1986, it is planned to more than double, with 
most of that increase occurring in 1986. 
2. Plant training programs have been given special attention. New management and training 
staff have been added bringing the total of 40 full-time trainers. New training facilities 
are being added as rapidly as possible. We have committed a new plant specific simulator. 
Existing training is being upgraded; and significantly more training is being requirement. 
3. New management and staff have been added to the nuclear maintenance department. 
New maintenance training programs are being developed and conducted. Preventive 
maintenance -- and I reiterate -- preventive maintenance rather than reactor fixes is now 
the watchword. 
4. And more recently, a comprehensive new plant performance and management 
improvement program, the first ever undertaken by the District, has been developed and 
is being implemented to evaluate and test plant systems and procedures which are key to 
plant safety and reliability. they are being analyzed to determine if the failure can cause 
a reactor trip, challenge a safety system, or cause an overall undercooling following a 
reactor trip. 
The key to this program is to assure that the safety systems and back-up equipment are 
not challenged. This is a dramatic shift from past design and operating philosophy. This 
attention to detail will vastly improve plant reliability and its margin of safety. 
5. Management systems are also being provided to assist our managers and supervisors in 
carrying out the planning and oversight activities. These include personnel, computers, 
software, and accounting support which will help them manage resources more effectively 
and meet committed schedules for modification. 
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LOWE: ... or a 
containment building of over 3t foot of steel-reinforced concrete, but the reactor itself encased in 
8.4 inches of steel. 
GENERAL LOWE: Well, but General, the occurrence, just once in our lifetime might be the end 
of our lifetime, you know. And I don't think I have to worry about a second one. I have to 
about that first one. 
GENERAL LOWE: Rest assured, we are just as concerned with public health and safety and 
that's our first concern. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I'm sure you are. We would like to have that information if it's 
available. Senator Rosenthal. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I believe that you are concerned about the operation of the plant and 
the safety. It seems to me that you do a poor job of public relations. I don't know how you're going 
to begin to change people's impression about how safe it is if in fact you cancel kinds of---some 
things that---something that's supposed to take place today for example -- a SMUD Energy 
Symposium, at which people could have been informed about the changes that were taking place. You 
could have provided some desirable information at a critical time. And it just seems to me that you 
lost an opportunity to do aPR job which is so necessary. In the light of that now, of people's concern, 
there's now an initiative. It seems to me that unless you begin to inform people about tho changes 
that you're bringing about and the kinds of things that you're doing to begin to allay some of these 
fears, you're going to have an initiative that's going to say you're out of business. 
GENERAL LOWE: I think your point is well taken, Senator Rosenthal. As a matter of fact, the 
symposium was cancelled because of lack of interest. A few days before the deadline we had only 
received 60 applications to attend. Our break-even point was over 300. And because of a tight 
schedule, we decided, particularly with all the news about Rancho Seco, to cancel for really 
budgetary economic reasons and those ratepayer dollars. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I understand. 
GENERAL LOWE: On another point, there IS a state law that was passed, I believe early in 
1980, that prohibit SMUD from advertising or manning a public relations program or such. Now, I 
have personally spoken to the local service clubs. I have been to the editorial boards of the locAl 
papers and news departments of television stations in the local area and will continue to do that. We 
plan to continue that communication to, as you say, get the word out with respect to what we're 
doing. And we're trying all we can under all those handicaps. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Now, in terms of what happens outside of the plant, we had some 
discussion as we visited the facility with you last week about the kinds of drills that you're now 
involved in. And Senator---the Chairman wanted to know if you had thought about the need for an 
actual unannounced emergency drill. 
GENEF~AL LOWE: Yes, we---
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Whether or not that type of activity might happen. It seems to me 
that you might very well bo doinq things that people know arc happening in tryinq to respond Lo some 
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assure yourself that you will not lose communication during emergency periods of time. 
GENERAL LOWE: We will certainly look at that for our emergency operating facility. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: OK, thank you. Who will go next? OK, B&W. 
MR. J. H. TAYLOR: Good afternoon, members of the Subcommittee and staff members. My 
name is J. H. Taylor. I'm a Senior Technical Consultant and Manager of Licensing for the Nuclear 
Power Generation Division of Babcock & Wilcox. I've worked for B&W for a little bit over 32 years, 
and nearly all of that has been been in the nuclear arena. 
I want to say I'm pleased to have the opportunity to be with your subcommittee to contribute 
what we can to the subject that you're deliberating. 
It seems appropriate to make a brief statement concerning our company. B&W today is a 
diversified company with many areas of involvement in the energy business. Our company began over 
120 years ago with the development of an innovative steam boiler. Since that time, we have become 
a major supplier to the electric utility industry in supplying central station boilers and related 
equipment to both domestic and international utilities. 
B&W involvement in the nuclear industry began in the early 1950s. Since that time, we have 
been involved extensively in both the Navy nuclear and the commerciul activities. Currently, we are 
a major fuel supplier and a component supplier to the nuclear Na\·y. We're also a major fuel supplier 
and service supplier to the commercial nuclear power industry. 
B&W's involvement in the lar~e central station nuclear power business began in the 1960s, in the 
early 1960s. There was some involvement before that in some smaller projects like the nuclear ship 
Savannah, but in the commercial area, the large central station work began with our company in the 
1960s. Currently, there are eight B&W plants with operating reactors in the United States and four 
additional plants are under construction. We have also just been granted a license for a large nuclear 
power plant of a similar design to those in the United States in Germany. 
My written comments contain an isometric configuration of the designs of the plants that we 
have built and they're all basically similar. 
B&W reactors were designed, licensed, and built to the same regulatory and code require nents 
as the other plants that were going through the cycle at that same time period. However, although 
the regulatory and code requirements were common, the performance characteristics of the B&W 
units are different. This difference was designed into the plant to allow the utility load dispatchers 
to respond to load changes more rapidly than other plants. This capability was built into the plants 
primarily through the use of a different configuration of steam generators. Now, tho use of a 
different type of steam generator in the B&W plants has both pluses and minuses from an operational 
standpoint. For example, on the plus side, the tubing on the B&W generators is much more readily 
inspectable. From the very beginning, the B&W plants have had very strict water chemistry 
requirements for the steam generators. And when you combine this more readily inspected steam 
generator tubing with very strict water chemistry requirernents, the B<~W pl3nts have accumulated an 
outstanding record of steam generator tube integrity. Now, from a safety standpoint, tube integrity 
is important. On the other hand, on the down side, because of the ability that the steam generators 
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MR. TAYLOR: Yes, indeed. The use of simulators is growing all the time. We have had---B&W 
has had a simulator in its Lynchburg offices since about 1969. That simulator is still in use. it's being 
constantly upgraded. And as a matter of fact, simulators are now being planned at nearly every 
facility in the country and simulators are becoming more popular in fossil plants as well, because 
fossil plants are becoming more complex and require a lot of operator training. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What kind of hour requirements are there for this utility x which has just 
built one of your plants and they're looking now for a staff to operate it? What kind of requirenents 
are there for so many hours on the simulator? 
MR. TAYLOR: That's becoming a very uncommon situation now because the utilities are 
bringing in people from their other nuclear plants. That was a common condition back 10 or 12 years 
ago. But it depends a lot on the background of the class that is being put through the training. If you 
have a group of people, and this was very common in the early days, a group of people who had come 
from the nuclear navy and had had extensive operating experience in submarines or aircraft carriers, 
the amount of training they would require would be one thing. If it were a group of people who were 
being brought in from a fossil plant, the normal way to introduce those people was to bring them into 
the conventional part of the plant to give them experience there and then gradually work into the 
nuclear part. But it varied a great deal depending on the background of the people that were being 
put through the training program. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It sounds like it's sort of a---each utility does its own thing in terms of 
training. 
MR. T A. YLOR: Each utility---there is a lot of variability among the utilities. But the one thing 
that is very common is the operator licensing process which is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. And the examinations that the operators must pass to become a control roorn operator 
or a senior reactor operator are common among the utilities. So it's a preparation for those 
examinations which is quite varied. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I guess that's all controlled by the NRC. 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, there are specific regulations dealing with training. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So we don't get involved in that then, do we? 
MR. TAYLOR: Do you mean you the state? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Right. 
MR. TAYLOR: That's my understanding, but Pm not certain of that, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What about---one more question, please. What about---are there any 
requirements to test these people for drug abuse, substance abuse? 
MR. TAYLOR: That's something which is outside of Babcock & 1Nilcox's purview. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, I understand that, but you know enough about it to be able to 
answer the question in some regard, I would assume. 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I believe that Senator Rosenthal had asked those same questions out at 
the plant. Senator Rosenthal. 
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much time here and we've got two more panels here. May we hear from Electrical Power Research? 
MR. JAMES F. LANG: You may. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you. Briefly. 
MR. LANG: Briefly. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. Turn up the juice. 
MR. LANG: Well, I'm Jim Lang and I work at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo 
Alto in the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. Because the Chernobyl incident kicked off at least a 
current flurry of concern, I was going to discuss differences and similarities between U.S. reactors 
and the Chernobyl reactors. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Would you keep in mind, however, that our purposes have to do with 
people, you know, that have nothing to do with the plant really. Of course, it has to do with those in 
the plant, but the other 99 percent are not, like 99.9. 
MR. LANG: I think that one of the important points is and the ease with which a plant may be 
operated ••• 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right, go to it. 
MR. LANG: ••• and that varies. I put up a chart up here. If you have extraordinary vision or 
binoculars you can refer to it as I go through, and I'll mention that Darrell Eisenhut stole part of my 
thunder, so I'll try to make brief the parts that he already mentioned. Thank you. 
Our job is to really understand the Chernobyl accident and determine what actions or what 
lessons there are for U.S. utilities to learn from that accident in Russia. The first step is to 
understand the Chernobyl design and how it differs from our own. 
The first obvious difference between the Chernobyl reactor and our light water reactors, which 
are depicted in the top row, and incidentally light water is regular water like you drink, except in 
reactors it's just kept a little purer -- the first obvious difference is the Societ use of graphite 
neutron moderators. They use a whole lot of graphite in their core whereas in the U.S. we have 
chosen light water moderation for our light water reactors. The Soviet design evolved from their 
weapons system where to produce weapons grade material they use graphite and low enrichment 
uranium. They just allowed the power reactors to evolve from that. The U.S. light water reactor 
selected---or the U.S. designers selectors light water for the moderator to avoid potential problems 
with graphite such as flammability, hard to ignite but it can burn, chemical and physical changes that 
can occur in a reactor, and the immense physical size of a graphite reactor. 'vlr. Eisenhut mentioned 
the 1600 pressure tubes that run through this reactor. And there are 1800 tons of graphite in the 
reactor, and it's about 40 feet across. It's a huge machine. Each of those individual pressure tubes 
has its own pipes connected to the inlet and outlet end, yielding both size and complexity. In 
addition, the U.S. designers wanted a self-limiting reactor. So if coolant is lost, the reactor will shut 
itself down. That's in fact what we've achieved and that isn't obtained in the Chernobyl case. 
The next major difference between U.S. and Soviet reactor designs is in the defense-in-depth 
barriers provided to ensure that nuclear fuel and fission products cannot escape the core. This bears 
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is, the core melt-type of accident, or emergency planning in the detail that we do. Finally, we think 
that our limits for reactor operation, which is part of the licensing process for reactors, emergency 
procedures, realistic operator training, and many other operations-related features that we've 
instituted in the last seven years and are important to reactor safety here do not receive the same 
level of attention in the Soviet Union. 
So, in conclusion, I can say that there may well be lessons for us from the Chernobyl accident. 
The wise man learns from the mistakes of others. However, because of the design differences I just 
talked about, the improvements made in reactor operations in the U.S. over the last seven years, 
information from the Soviet Union is not turning up any deficiencies in our reactor designs. Rather, 
the lessons from Chernobyl may some day suggest opportunities for further improvement. 
Thank you for bearing with me. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you, sir. May we hear from Dr. Ibser. 
OR. HOMER IBSER: Thanks for the opportunity of talking with you. 
In response to the question that was raised earlier by Senator Russell, I'd like to read a short 
paragraph before I start my remarks. One knowledgeable federal scientist challenges that scenario. 
He says he knows of no plausible chemical reaction that would provide enough oxygen for a major 
explosion within the core. This is referring to the Chernobyl event. If the explosion took place 
outside the core, he doubts that it would have stripped away the six-foot-thick concrete shield that 
surrounds the reactor. The scientist and expert in reactor fuel has been directed by the Energy 
Department not to discuss the Soviet accident with the press; however, he spoke with science before 
the order went out and later asked to remain anonymous. I thought you might be interested in the 
reference to the six-foot-thick concrete shield which surrounds the reactor. 
The Chernobyl accident is particularly sobering and its educational value is enhanced if, as 
appears to have been the case, it didn't involve a full-scale nuclear reactor core meltdown. Morris 
Rosen of the International Atomic Energy Agency team investigating the accident and a Moscow-
datelined Washington Post article indicate that the reactor had been operating at only 6% or 7% of 
full power "for a prolonged period" before suddenly escalating, within 10 seconds, to SOCYo of full 
power at the time of the accident. 
If the reactor operated at a small fraction of its rated power for a prolonged period just 
previous to the incident that destroyed it, the huge inventory of relatively short-lived fission products 
ordinarily present in the reactor fuel elements would have largely decayed, and nothing near the sort 
of a core melt that might have resulted from radioactive heating by fission products (had the 
accident occurred at full power) actually took place. This may explain the Soviet proposal to seal the 
reaction in concrete, which would otherwise appear rather futile. 
Even though it appears not to have been a full-fledged nuciear plant accident, Chernobyl 
deserves our attention. Land within 30 kilometers (over 18 miles) of the reactor has been abandoned 
as unfit for habitation or agricultural use; that's over 1000 square miles, somewhat more than the size 
of Sacramento County. As we sit here, we inhale a bit of radioactive iodine from Chernobyl, more 
than halfway around the world upwind from us. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: And who makes that study? The NRC? 
DR. IBSER: The sample5 are sent off to engineering testing laboratories. As a matter of fact, 
Rancho Seco's samples are not now in the pressure vessel. They were sent off to 8avis-Besse---
SENA TOR RUSSELL: Are you saying there are no samples in the pressure vessel? 
DR. IBSER: Yes, but I would consider this not a major point because the samples at an earlier 
time were withdrawn for inspection at a time when the Nuclear Regulatory---
CHAIRMAN GREENE: You know, I really---gentlemen, we're not here to take the plant apart, 
put it back together or do anything else with it. We are here to discuss items that relate to the 
safety of the populace. I don't care to get into the design of that plant. That's between NRC, 
Electric Power Research, Babcock & Wilcox, and SMUD. 
As to the comments you're making, yes, I'm aware of what you said and yes, I'm also aware that 
those particular sample materials have been tested and apparently from those that have done the 
testing, they do not find that the problems you contemplate have occurred. Beyond that I can't tell 
you whether they were there to sweep the plant or whatever it was you said. May we go on? 
DR. IBSER: Yeah, I would just like to respond that an NRC staff member was quoted in one of 
the Science articles about Rancho Seco's problems, that if the pressure vessel had been ten years old 
inste8d of three years old when it had its first severe pressurized thermal shock in 1978, it might very 
well have cracked the pressure vessel. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: And he also said that nobody else on the Regulatory CommissiorJ agreed 
with him, did he not? 
DR. IBSER: I'm not aware of tnat. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I see. OK. May we continue. We're running out of time. 
DR. IBSER: Please. Would Sacramento be given the bad news promptly if a serious release of 
radioactive material occurred at Rancho Seco? Past behavior of SMUD's staff may suggest an 
answer. After the Chernob yl incident, Rancho Seco held a news conference to give reassuring 
misinformation to local news media. A Rancho Seco nuclear engineer claimed that since our reactor 
is "all metal" (the Chernobyl reactor was carbon moderated, and the carbon caught fire), fire was not 
a hazard. Actually, the zirconium (metal) tubes which contain the fuel pellets at. Rancho Seco can 
react with steam to produce enough heat to melt the fuel. According to Soviet Premier Gorbachev, 
the explosion which blew the top off the building housing the Chernob yl reactor resulted from 
hydrogen generated by the zirconium-steam reaction. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Once again, this co;nmittee and its membership are not qualified to pass 
judgment on the things you're talking about. With my engineering degree and all, which just happens 
to be in a little bit different field -- I know something about hydroelectric power and the likes, not 
too much about nuclear -- we are not competent, nor do we have any voice in these matters that 
you're currently discussing. The matters that you're discussing should be properly taken up with the 
national Regulatory Commission and others of that kind who have some voice in these matters. We 
are not here to determine how that plant was designed. It's standing up there. And we're here to find 
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The purpose of the American Physical Society study group was to "review the adequacy of the 
technical base upon which phenomenological models for radionuclide release from postulated severe 
reactor accidents are constructed, the adequacy of the models themselves, and the correct use of 
complex computer codes that incorporate these models in the analysis of accident sequences." 
The study was funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by a contract to the 
American Physical Society. Much of the information on which our report is based was provided 
through documents and testimony of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its subcontractors. We 
also reviewed documents and testimony of Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Society's 
special Committee on Source Terms, and the Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking Program, and 
others. However, our report is an independent assessment of the information available to us as of 
December, 1984; it was not subject to approval by any of the above organizations except for the 
American Physical Society. 
I'd like to briefly summarize the findings of this report. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Excuse me, again. What was your group, this independent group? What 
was it called? 
DR. GOREN: The American Physical Society Study Group. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I see. OK. 
DR. GOREN: It is the professional society of physicists in the United States. And although I 
am not a physicist myself, I was invited to participate in this •••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
DR. GOREN: These are excerpts from our Executive Summary. The full copy of the Executive 
Summary and the conclusions from the report will be given to the record. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: This data is up to December of '84? 
DR. GOREN: Yes, we completed our study in December '84. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: So it's relating to information you got prior to that point in time, 
obviously. 
DR. GOREN: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And so I can put your comments in context, is there any philosophical 
direction this group has as pro- or anti-nuclear? or are they all over the lot? 
DR. GOREN: It was all over the lot, I would say. But it was designed to be an independent 
assessment. For example, I have never done any work prior to this related to nuclear energy. I have 
·Norked on problems of the---engineering problems that would be relevant, but I have never applied 
them to these specific applications. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So it's a balanced group? 
DR. GOREN: It was a balanced group. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Pardon me. Did you say that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
paid for this report? 
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sites where this plate-out can be expected to occur. These are pools of water through which the 
gases may pass or beds of ice in some reactors where the gases are required to pass. 
So these three factors have led many people to predict much lower emissions in the event of an 
accident---
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Would that suggest an increased problem in decommissioning the plant? 
If you're plating out on the walls and so on, would that increase the problem of a decommission? 
DR. GOREN: I'm not able to say, but my guess would be that you would rather have it plate-out 
on the inside •••. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Oh, !---there's no question about that. None whatever. None whatever. 
3ut suppose that you're plating out inside the plant, you've stayed within the containment building, 
OK? The question is, when you could ever go in there and clean it out or do anything with it or throw 
it away, whatever you're going to do, has that---have you increased the problem on that end of the 
line? 
DR. GOREN: I could only guess. My guess is that the timing would be the same because the 
timing is dictated by the speed at which the radioactivity decays. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: But if it's plating out on the walls, if the matter is there rather than 
going through a fissure or crack in the building out in the atmosphere, we've now got to contain. It's 
right here in this building, OK? How do we get it out of here? 
Dr~. GOREN: Well, you must realize that there are many different radioactive species. Not all 
are calculated to leave. And the problem of decommissioning a plant in which the nonvolatile species 
which are probably the more hazardous ones over the long run, that would be I think independent as to 
whether or not the iodine and cesium were allowed to escape. Still, there would be within the plant 
boundary so'ne of the other materials such as cerium, lanthanum, and plutonium. 
C:Hi\IR!v1AN GREENE: Suppose that material did escape, OK? How bad off are we and how 
quickly? Or is that outside your sphere of knowledge? 
DR. GOREN: Well, that's outside my sphere of knowledge. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right, thank you, sir. Go ahead, Senator Rosenthal. 
SENATOl~ ROSENTHAL: Did you indicate then that the report says that we have less to worry 
about regarding radiation outside the plant? 
DR. GOREN: The report says that in many accident scenarios and sequences, there is less to 
worry about than was implied in the 1975 study. On the other hand, we were not so sanguine that we 
would endorse the specific numbers that were being calculated because there remain a large number 
of uncertainties. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Well, until you know for sure, shouldn't we presume the worst case? 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: WeU, what he's saying to us, I think, Senator Rosenthal, is that they 
would now project the worst case as being a somewhat less worst case than earlier without giving you 
any information whatever about what to do about it because that's outside their sphere. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: What he set down was he sat down with his computer and he made some 
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CHAIRMAN GREENE: Again, thank you. I think we best move on. If anybody has a comment 
they just have to make, go ahead and make it. If not, let's move on to our next panel, which is what? 
All right, something here? 
DR. IBSER: I wanted to make one brief remark, if I may. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: OK. 
DR. IBSER: In the light of remarks that were made by two previous members of the panel 
regarding the improvement of the staff at Rancho Seco, as a matter of fact, I know that SMUD has 
been looking hard for people, technical people at Rancho Seco, for years. The problem is that there 
is a severe shortage. I see no particular reason for assuming that there are now prospects for 
suddenly greatly enhancing the technical staff at Rancho Seco. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right, thank you, sir. All right, this panel is on Emergency Planning 
and Coordination and we hope somebody's got some other---there we go. Who shall h:mor us with 
their first remark? Let's start with Nick Nikas, Federal Emergency Management Administration 
(FEMA). 
We're going to try, folks, I don't know if we're going to succeed, but if we can not take up too 
much of your time, we'd appreciate it if there's some way to hold you to five minutes apiece because 
there's 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 minutes right there. We'll stick our two cents in and an hour is shot to 
hell, OK? 
MR. NICK NIKAS: I think I can do it in five minutes. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. 
MR. NIKAS: You have copies of this testimony? 
CHAIRMAN GF<.EENE: Yes, that'll be in our records. 
MR. NIKAS: A copy will be available for the record. 
A little bit of background to begin with. I'm with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
Region IX, in San Francisco. The particular area of concern in rny work is radiological emergency 
preparedness. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Attaboy, that's what we want to know about. 
MR. NIKAS: The Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant incident in March 1979 raised 
public interest in the nuclear power industry, its relation to federal, state, and local governments, 
and the need for improved emergency pr_eparedness around the nation's nuclear power plants. 
Before TMI, offsite emergency planing at nuclear sites, by the utilities and local and state 
authorities, was done under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) oversight and basically on a 
voluntary basis. Specific requirements for offsite emergency planning as a precondition for licensing 
had not been established; and as a result, the capabilities to respond to a radiological accident varied 
greatly. 
One of the major lessons learned from TMI was the necessity for a comprehensive, coordinated 
response plan by every level of government for a possible radiological emergency at each commercial 
nuclear site. TMI also revealed that such emergency plans had to be integrated with onsite 
capabilities, thus affording the public living near the power plant the best possible protection in the 
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CHAIRMAN GREENE: What's now? Now tell us what goes on. 
MR. NIKAS: In reference to our response? 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Hey, this plant just blew. Come on. I need action. What are you doing? 
MR. NIKAS: Weil, what we're doing at this region is assembling the staff and dispatching an 
element of that staff to the Office of Emergency Services ______ in Sacramento. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Then your Washington headquarters is notifying somebody somewhere. 
Where? Sacramento? San Francisco? Where are they, your people? 
MR. NIKAS: They're in San Francisco. Our offices are in San Francisco. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: OK. So, Washington, OK? 
MR. NIKAS: Yes. Well, we would get that notification from NRC. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. 
MR. NIKAS: There's a dual track. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yeah, but would San Francisco get it or would they get it from you? 
From NRC? Does it go from NRC to you to San Francisco? Or does it go from---? 
MR. NIKAS: Sir, I am in San Francisco. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. But where does NRC call? Are they calling you or are they 
calling Washington? 
MR. NIKAS: Well, they've called both places. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. So you would know as soon as Washington knows you would 
know? 
tAR. NIKAS: It would not take very long for us to get the word. Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Ach. Within a minute or two or three? 
MR. NIKAS: As long as it takes to---
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Or ten or twenty or an hour? Are we talking about an hour? Are we 
talking about five minutes? 
MR. NIKAS: Well, ah---
CHAIRMAN GREENE: rm just trying to get at, that plant blew and I'm trying to find out what 
you're going to do and you're not---you haven't told me yet. The plant just went up, rnan. I need 
action. What is it? Come on. There's a cloud up there, you know, floating around while you're sitting 
here talking. 
MR. Oi<, I think I can safely say that we could expect to get the word within 15 
rninutes. We could expect to get word---
CHAIRMAN GREENE: In that case, I don't need it any longer. I think I'm dead. 
MR. NIKAS: Well, I think you're wrong. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Gees, I hope you're right. But if you're not, who's going to be here to 
argue about it, right? 
MR. NIKAS: Well, you know, I think that we can discuss the matter that way and not get 
anyplace. If you're interested in hearing what our systems are in getting the thing on the road, I'd be 
glad to them to you. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: I'd be glad to hear you do it. 
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MR. NU<AS: OK then, we'll dispense with this and I'll try to explain how the system would work 
in terms of our response at the federal level in Region IX. We would get the word that the accident 
occurred. And without waiting for a detailed analysis, the regional director would dispatch an 
element of his staff to the Office of Emergency Services where we would interact with the state of 
California, get the details, feed that information back to the regional director, and assuming that it 
was the type of accident that would require our support to state and local jurisdictions, he would 
dispatch his resources to a federal response center, which we are now in the process of organizing 
adjacent to the Office of Ernergency Services, where we would assemble federal agencies for the 
purpose of directing any support or assistance that we could and which the stat~ and local 
jurisdictions require. Now that involves all of those federal agencies that would have a direct 
involvement in trying to deal with this accident. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: And---ah---
MR. NIKAS: Our requirement, as of right now, is to organize and make that emergency 
response center, the federal response center, operational within 6 to 12 hours of our notification of 
~he accident. And that's really moving. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Senator Greene? 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How many federal agencies would be cooperating with the Office of 
Emergency Services? In this disaster? 
MR. NIKAS: About---anywhere from seven to ten? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Could you tell us what they are? 
MR. NIKAS: Yeah, there's the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environ:nental Protection 
Agency. There's the Federal Emergency Management Agency. There is the Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Energy. Well, the Department of 
Defense may or may not be involved, depending upon the circumstances. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What kinds of things---Agriculture, I guess, looks at the milk and the 
food products. The others I'm not quite sure what they do. Obviously, they look at the plant to see 
what's happened and how they can contain the radioactivity if there is any coming out. 
MR. NIKAS: There is a great deal of activity going on both at the Office of Emergency 
Services and the Emergency Operations Center and within our own federal response center and in the 
field. For example, EPA would be involved in assisting in 'Tlaking dose assessments and measuring the 
rate of radioactive activity outside the boundaries of the plant. DOE would be involved in similar 
technical activities. The Department of Agriculture would be concerned about the impact on food 
and water and things like that. We would have the role of coordinating these federal activities in a 
way that would provide for the dissemination of important information as rapidly as possible, both 
laterally and vertically and through our emergency news centers to the public. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You mentioned the Department of Transportation. That would be the 
moving of rr-opln nnci rnnt.nrial nnd whnt.ovor nart. ,,r tho ni'On? 
MR. NIKAS: Yes. Whatever support the Department of Transportation through the Regional 
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Emergency Transportation Coordinator could provide, they would be prepared to. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That would be then, most likely, Arrny trucks, National Guard trucks, 
that l<ind of thing? 
MR. NIKAS: Whatever transportation was available in the federal community. Ye has that 
authority to mobilize and use those resources. 
SENATOR. RUSSELL: And how do you---maybe we'll hear this from other people. But how do 
you then interface with the county and the city that are---cities that are involved in there? Are you 
in authority or is the City of Sacramento and the County of Sacramento calling the tune? How does 
that work? 
MR. NIKAS: Well, within their own jurisdictional boundaries, local -- I think it's part of 
California state law ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Right. 
MR. NIKAS: ••• that local jurisdiction maintains authority and responsibility. We would respond 
to their requests. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Senator Russell, in each county where there is a nuclear plant, within 
state law there is an obligation for a county plan. And you know, then it goes back to the state and 
so on. You're actually more longer range than short-range, aren't you, your reactions? I rnean, when 
I say what are you going to do right now, you're really not that. 
MR. NH<AS: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: You're the long-range thing. You're not the instantaneous response 
which would be coming from the county, the city, and the state. 
MR. NIKAS: We are not. That's right. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Mr. Chairman? 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Yes, Senator •••• 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: What kind of federal regulations are there for actual drills of 
emergency plans? 
MR. NIKAS: OK, the regulations currently require that---well, the process involves reviewing 
the plans, approving the plans, validating the plans through exercise. Then we have a public hearing 
to make certain that everyone's concerns are heard and dealt with as best we can. Once that's done, 
you're required to exercise once every two years. The purpose of those exercises again is to update 
procedures and the planning to make sure that it's as good as we can make it. That's required once 
every two years. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: But that's a---
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Has a---well, maybe I have to ask the state. I've not been aware of 
an unannounced ::!rill to some situation. Is that required or not required? 
MR. NII<AS: Yes, it is required. It's required to take place at least once within six years of the 
time that the plant is licensed and the planning has been validated. To rny knowledge, at least in this 
region, there has been no unannounced plan per se. But there are plans to conduct those unannounced 
drills. The exact parameters under which they will be done have not been settled as of yet. There is 
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scenarios and making the exercises as realistic as we can, we can 
assurance that we can sir. 
Do you have any whatever, and it's always hard to get 
as to whether had any planning of this kind at all? Because we 
have some fair notion of what happened at Chernobyl as far as warning 
and so on, you how long it took them to evacuate and so on. Do we have any 
all as to whether they have any plans of these kinds? 
MR. NIKL\5: I personally do not have that information. 
CHAIRMAN Have you heard of anybody that knows anything about that? No? OK, 
thank you. 
MR. ROSS A. SCARANO: Mr. Chairman, I'm not aware of what kind of plans that they have. 
But what we have since then, we understand that they did not '!1ake a decision to 
evacuate until hours after the building blew, but that when they did, they did evacuate about 
46,000 people, I believe, in about four hours. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Well, one wonders whether they were preparing in those 36 hours to 
evacuate or whether they said, wait, we're not going to do it and then they said, yes, we're going to 
do it so call out ttle troops, you know. 
MR. SCARANO: We have no ideCi. 
CHAIRMAN You don't know whether they used that 36 hours or not for preparation. 
MR. No. 
MR. 
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assurance that protective measures can and wiH be taken in the event of 
a emergency. Now, we those findings on an evaluation of the licensee's on-site plan 
-- that would be the that we would do as an inspection program out of ;ny office -- and the other 
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rna the kind of so that they can appreciate 
as well as what they are That type of training 
the You 
is by Rancho Seco. We do monitor that training and 
y ours. 
Do you have certain and guidelines that they must do? You 
them however they do it? 
Yes. There 
decision-makers' 
that are listed as a minimum in those 
that I mentioned to you, about maybe some training and 
we're at in our own program and saying, 
of the required training. 
we have in Rancho Seco from '80-84, revisions, 
decade only two: one in '82 and one in '84; and limited exercises in 
Diablo and you have one every year. And San Onofre, 
between what's on Ht Rancho Soco and, say, Diablo 
tnink i~s as wide as be characterized. The requirenent is that 
is an annual exercise that the licensee must go and of our licensees 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you have a copy this? 
SCARANO: As a matter I do 
you 
the first 
Then you go over to 
of '84, and that's it. 
MR. SCARANO: Yeah, I was to the annual 




that the licensee must go 
MR. SCARANO: This is to the exercise drills that the offsite 
would be going through. So this is 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Oh, 
MR. Nli<AS: Yes. 
SENATOi~ ROSENTHAL: Offsite 
of what Rancho is 
This is---
SEI~ATOR RUSSELL: Well, it doesn't look like 
compare that with to 
would Hke to comment, I suppose, when it's their turn. 3ut it 
more than what's it looks like Diablo 
Rancho Seco is kind of 
MR. SCARANO: 
1 mean, rln'""nn 
sir. I have to say that 
look that way 
arena all of the reactors 
to '84 time the months in between are not that 
Rancho has---
RUSSELL: a limited exercise it says. 
MS. CAROL HOPWOOD: That's a exercise. 
MS. Was there a ••• ? 
MR. : It was 
MS. VASQUEZ: It was a corrective exercise. 
SENATOR 
has one every year from 
And then they with limited Rancho has one more 
that, why is that? \\/hat's the difference? Does 
Does know? Amador? 
but I think 
MS. VASt,JlJLZ: [ yuoss the stale it 
SENATOR RUSSELL: throw the hot the state. 
MS. HOPWOOD: For one th Senator I can a 
there 
Sacramento 
at and I know 




because I was the coordinator down there for San Onofre before I came up here. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, !---we're in Rancho Seco right now. 
MS. HOPWOOD: But Rancho Seco with regard to the frequency of the drills, there has been 
some change in the requirement laid upon the outside jurisdictions. And it was, I believe, beginning in 
1982 that all of the nuclear power plant offsite jurisdictions went to a biennial exercise period rather 
than an annual exercise. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: OK, then it looks like Diablo Canyon voluntarily has done some good 
thin•]S. I guess we heard that comrnent earlier. 
MR. NIK.AS: That's correct. The requirement is once every two years. That's the hard and fast 
requirement. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That's a state statute. 
MR. NIKAS: But voluntarily, of their volition, as is the case for Diablo Canyon juridictions, 
they can exercise more often and they have chosen to do so. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: OK. 
MR. NIKAS: And they have asked on occasion, I think for each one of those exercises so far, 
for an evaluation from FEMA. But the hard requirement is once every two years. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: OK, San Onofre and Diablo Canyon have done more than they needed to 
do. OK. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: All right, may we hear from the state? 
:v1S. VASQUEZ: Yes. Those with the blue packets---do you have those in front of you. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
MS. VASQUEZ: My statement is contained in there. I'm Ann Vasquez from the state Office of 
Emergency Services. Rather than read the statement in the interest of time, I'll tell you •.. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, briefly. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: (Inaudible.) 
MS. VASQUEZ: •.• what's in the packet. Do you have one? There's a yellow book in the packet 
that reflects a summarization of the effects of a serious nuclear power plant accident in California. 
We did that under Senator Gararnendi's legislation, 1183 (1979). 
SENATOR F~OSENTHAL: Oh, yeah. That's it. 
SENA TO.~ RUSSELL: Oh, yeah. 
MS. VASQUEZ: That explains the zones and basically what we felt could happen during a 
serious accident. 
You also have in there copies of the legislation that have supported this project since 1980. The 
legislation mandates that the utilities pay for all the operations on the state and the county level, and 
those funds are washed through my office. The local jurisdictions provide us with annual budgets and 
work statements, and we keep up and audit that process. 
In there is also my statement; and then because one of your people -- I think it might have been 
Mr. Fadelli -- called my office and said, we wonder how OES operates during a nuclear emergency, 
there is an organizational chart for emergency operations in the back of the packet as well. 
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I have two things that have come in fir3t is that my office is 
all the state agency for nuclear power We finished that process and 
submitted and had the state plan the Governor's 1985 and 
it 
process is still for the state 
takes to read it. 
also ng. of the 
plans have been 
in 
our office as and also have 
been submitted to FEMA for their review. 
We are responsible for responding during nuc power We :-naintain a 
cadre of response people and equipment. would set up immediate in the 
Operations Center on Meadowview Road as we of and recent did for 
the tsunamis. We also have staff that are to go onsite a nuclear power 
emergency assist local jurisdictions in the utility and the seriousness of the accident 
and assisting local jurisdictions in their decision-making process how they wish to their 
population. 
RUSSELL: If an my calls and says, "What do I do? Do 
to the bed? Do I get in the car miles an How do the 
ildren, and so forth?" and I'm here in the Capitol, wioat do I do? Do there 
do you on some kind of protective clothing? What do you do if there's some k of a---? 
MS. Will you excuse rne for to 
MS. HOPWOOD: 
MS. Normally, the would answer that but I've asked 
them for to answer. The local 
to would use the EBS and any other 
electronic mechanisms that 
And tnat mechanism 
are used 
the 
on an annual basis within a ten-mile 
is provided to each and every 
SENATOR 
MS. VASQUEZ: How is the information 
and have :wen used for other 
what to do. 
of each nuclear power in 
It's sent out the mail. use 
the list. They use phone books. use a number to define where each and every 
household is. 
S[NATOR : That's accident occurs---? 
tv1S. VASQUEZ: No, that's on an annual basis to make sure that 
a nuclear power is a in 
adopted by the state of California. 
: Do you have an 
MS. HOPWOOD: Yes, you have a 
of that? 
know this is what do 
and is a 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, there's a calendar •••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: :Jh! I see. 
MR. NIKAS: Also, Senator, the schedule for the dissemination of public informatio:1 on an 
annual basis is shown on that matrix that was furnished with your folder. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The problem I guess is that -- you know, this is terri fie. We get this and 
we put it up on the wall and we mark our calendar on it but nobody reads the information or 
remembers it. And I guess there's nothing you can do about that. 
MS. VASQUEZ: No, well, actually, remember that around the nuclear power plants within a 
ten-mile radius is the siren system. It's the only emergency which we're that prepared for. And when 
those sirens sound, they mean one thing and that's turn on your radio and television. And that is 
basically what that information tells them. 
What the situation is, is that during a nuclear power emergency the local jurisdictions and the 
state would come out with immediate information over the TV and radio system. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How would they get that? How would Sacramento County know, as 
apparently they didn't seem to know in Chernobyl and that may be for other reasons, that the people 
needed to be evacuated or they didn't need to be evacuated? There was such a mass of 
misinformation from our perspective. Maybe it was different over there. 
MS. VASQUEZ: I understand that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But how does Sacramento County know that there is x amount of 
radiation level and that means that in 10 miles, 20 miles, 100 miles we've got to clear everybody out? 
How do they know that for sure without all kinds of false alarms and the press running around like 
crazy talking to anybody who will give them an opinion on anything? 
MS. VASQUEZ: I understand. Carol. 
MS. HOPWOOD: With regard to that question, Senator, we have what is termed the "Unified 
Dose Assessment Center." It is composed of nuclear health physics people from state, from SMUO, 
from the county, and we---they have a computer-assisted program where they make dose projection. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Does the federal government in their group play a part in that? 
MS. HOPWOOD: Yes, they're in there; so is the Environmental Protection Agency and a number 
of other federal agencies. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So they are all together in this, wherever you do this site. 
MS. HOPWOOD: It's down at corporate headquarters at SMUD, in their emergency onsite 
facility. In addition to that, we can get dose projections off the computer; but in addition to that, 
the counties also have a series of teams. With regard to Sacramento County, we use our health 
sanitarian people and they are given a special type of training. They will actually go out into the 
field and they will track the plume or the cloud. They have very, very in-depth training regarding 
these instruments. And in addition to tracking a plume, they can also through a particular type of 
instrument learn if we have particulate matter down and in fact if we have iodine concentrations out 
there. 
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SENATOK RUSSELL: Well now, do you have to wait until the federal folks come from 
Francisco? 
MS. HOPWOOD: No, no, no. Within---once the utility has decided on the level of emergency 
classification, they are required by federal guidance to alert the offsite jurisdictions as to what that 
level of classification is. Once that occurs, if it's above an unusual event, then the County of 
Sacramento would activate its emergency operations center. We would call all our people in. If we 
get to an alert, our emergency operations center comes up. If we go to a higher step of emergency, 
then I and some of my staff respond to the emergency onsite facility at SMUD and we direct the 
county forces from that area. But it's a very quick response time. And I'm on 24-hour call. We have 
a call-out list of people for the county and we are five deep, so if I am not available, then the next in 
line is. And we are always on call. So we can come up very, very quickly. That's how---first, we 
have----so we have two levels. We have a capability to make dose projections, using a computer-aid-
--assisted system; and we can actually put people into the field in protective gear and using very 
delicate instruments to actually tell us what is out there and we can track the cloud. So that's how 
we would know. 
And then we also have meteorological capabilities -- which way the wind is blowing, is it 
raining, is there fog? And based on those various scenarios, then you can ascertain what is the best 
protective action guides to---
SENATOR RUSSELL: And there are escape highways listed? 
MS. HOPWOOD: There are a number of highways out there and routes that we would use. The 
ideal---depending on the nature of the incident, if you have a puff release or a single release and it 
stopped, ideally you would want to shelter the population and let the cloud pass. You do not want to 
be moving your populations through the cloud and giving thern unnecessary doses of radiation. If you 
have a continuous release, you would try to evacuate the population away from the cloud or around 
the cloud, rather than through the cloud. 
We have a very comprehensive plan. Our Sheriff's Department responds and they set up a series 
of roadblocks. And we have the capability to actually send certain people into the area to evacuate 
people who for whatever reason -- either they do not have a series of transportation rneans or we do 
have some special facilities out there -- and we take those particular people into special 
consideration. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How do you keep the media from misinforming? 
MS. HOPWOOD: We have an ernergency news center which is set up at the SMUD site, at the 
Emergency On-site ~=" acility. And all of the counties, as well as S\1UD, have public information 
officers. In addition to that, within my Emergency Operation Center, we also have a public 
information officer; and we have a facsimile copy machine. We have land-line capability, telephones. 
We have two-way radios. So that all of us have the same information at the same time. That was 
one of the lessons that was learned as a result of the TMI accident, that there was enormous amounts 
of misinformation being put out and enormous amounts of misinformation given to the public even 
when they had that information. 
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SENATOR ROSENTHAL: On December 26, something happened at Rancho Seco, OK? What did 
you do? 
MS. HOPWOOD: I received a call at 4:30 a.m. in the morning. And I was informed by my 
County Communications Division that there had been an incident at the plant and it was classified as 
an unusual event. The plant---I don't recall all of it right now, but that it was cooling. It was cooling 
1nore quickly than they had anticipated. At that time, they told me it was nothing more than an 
unusual event and not to worry about it, that at that time the plant was under control. So I went 
back to bed. They said they would advise us if there was any further information. I happened to be 
on jury duty at that time; and when I got down to the court at 9 o'clock, I was astounded to find out 
that it was---or at least the press was involved and there had been a press conference subsequent to 
that. And of course, none of my staff knew about that because it was an unusual event category 
which is not that unusual and really as a rule is not---
SENATOR RUSSELL: An unusual event is not unusual? 
MS. HOPWOOD: No, I wouldn't say so. I think that they happen on a somewhat routine basis. 
mean a low-flying plane can come over the plant and that can be categorized as an unusual event. Or 
you may somebody driving around in the night out there on the hills around the plant and you see the 
lights and security gets real concerned about that. And that could even be classified uncertain 
circumstances as an unusual event. 
So it triggers a response in that you are aware that something's going on at the plant. And tnen 
depending on what further information you have as a follow-up guide to that, you determine what 
you're going to do from that. But I was led to believe at that point that there was not a great deal of 
concern. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK. You heard about it approximately 4:30 in the morning. 
MS. HOPWOOD: That is correct. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: What time did it actually take place? 
MS. HOPWOOD: About 4:12, 4:15. 
MS. VASQUEZ: 4:15. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: So it was a pretty quick •••• 
MS. VASQUEZ: Senator, could I add some information to that? 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
MS. VASQUEZ: One thing that hasn't come out in this hearing is t;,at the Office of Emergency 
Services maintains an electronic notification system tied into all three nuclear power plants in 
California. And when certain things happen at those plants, whether we're called or not, that board 
goes off. And when that board goes off, I get a call at home or on my pager. I'rn also on 24-hour or I 
have a duty officer replacing me. I received the call about the same time the board went off which 
wan o<1tlior t.han t.hoy rocoivod tho notifir:1tion by mintttr~g. I ro[lponded :J[l :1oon :1:1 I ret:oivod thn 
notification from my warning control officer to the office. I live five :ninutes from there. And we 
all receive---we have a ring-down system where all of us can talk to the plant at the same time; and 
when we use the ring-down system to receive the information, there were some questions at the time 
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on the information. So from that point forward, about 5 a.m. in the morning until about noon that 
day, all three of us were in contact at some time or another recognizing that although we didn't feel 
it was any classification other than unusual event, we did recognize that the control rootn was not 
following the procedures they had been trained to us and not giving us the information they were 
required to by procedure. But we never felt during that time that it was anything more than an 
unusual event. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK, now, what has taken place since then to change whatever took 
place in the plant? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Before we get to that, can I stay on this situation? The lady from 
Sacramento said it was unusual and so she felt comfortable in going back to bed. You felt that they 
were following procedures, but it was not that of a crisis. Did you go down to the plant---I mean, to 
your office when you got the call? Or were you---? 
MS. VASQUEZ: Actually I received a second call fro:!l my warning controller. We have a 24-
hour warning controller at the Office of Emergency Services. And the reason I responded to my 
office is because my warning controller said, "The information they have given me does not match up 
with the information I should be filling in on my form." The control room is supposed to follow a 
form we all fill in together. And with that in mind and since I am such a short distance away, I went 
down. Call it dedication. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, OK, they weren't filling in the form, whatever that means. 'Nhat 
did you do about that? Did you call back or---? 
tv1S. VASQUEZ: Yes, I had the warning controller recontact the control roo.n on several 
occasions; and when we still weren't satisfied, I also called the local jurisdictions to discuss with them 
the fact that the procedures were not being followed and that I told them I was getting in contact 
with the utility through other means to find out why this was going on. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And did you get---receive cooperation? 
MS. VASQUEZ: Yes, I received cooperation, but as the NRC individual has indicated, sometime 
later down the road there were miscommunications. In other words, one person would say there was a 
release or we don't know if there is a release or there was no release. And that kind of 
miscommunication, we were not satisfied with. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Boy. 
S[NA TOR ROSENTHAL: It's so frustrating. If in fact somebody is not doing so<nething so that 
at least we're aware of what's happening, there's no penalty. 
iv1S. VASQUEZ: Just a minute. Before the NRC jumps out of their seat, immediately ••. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: ••• a slap on the wrist. Who got fired? I mean, I just---I want to know 
what---how---unless there is something significant that brings about the change so that it works the 
way it should work, what are we talking about? 
MR. SCARANO: There's---as---! mentioned earlier that I did have an inspection team that 
went down to the site and followed up on this. And the inspection team covered quite a few areas 
including this particular incident. In the areas of emergency preparedness and radiological 
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monitoring, not any of which really are involved in this particular incident, we are going to have an 
escalated enforcement action. It is in the works and will probably occur within the next two weeks. 
It will be incumbent on the licensee to take corrective actions and to provide to us satisfaction that 
those corrective actions will work prior to consideration of a restart. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK, and that's fine. Supposing three months from now something else 
happens. I guess---
MR. SCARANO: We feel it's a matter of training. And you know, I've been involved m 
exercises and drills and emergency plans all over this nations. I've been involved in the response of 
the NRC. And I can tell you with no hesitation that communications is the biggest hang-up all across 
the board. There is no way to guarantee that communications are going to be absolutely perfect. 
That's like a common thing. And all that can be done and the counties are very good at holding the 
licensee, as well as we are, to the wall to minimize the infractions on communications. It, indeed, is 
the biggest problem. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Unless there is some harsh penalty of some kind, I don't know how 
you're going to prevent it from happening again. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Does it require---? 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: What can we do at the state level to improve communications? 
MR. SCARANO: Well, I feel quite confident, as a matter of fact, the county folks that are 
involved in this are very conscientious folks and they can't do their job without proper 
communication, so they're really hard-nosed about trying to get what they need. I think that it's a 
continuing process, particularly with Rancho Seco. I have to admit that we have more problems in 
communications and training at Rancho Seco than we do at the other two nuclear power plants in this 
state. And we're looking for some management commitment to turn this around. And we've been 
talking to these folks for some time about emergency preparedness. And it has been hard in the past 
to get management to really put their attention on it. There's no payback. It's not turning out 
kilowatts. It's in some people's minds throwing money down the drain. We need a broader-minded 
manage!' that can look at the bigger picture. Hopefully, we have that now; but only time will tell. 
SE:NA T'OR ROSENTHAL: So in your opinion, you think that the present management is capable 
of providing that kind of leadership so that the persons in the plant will respond in a proper manner? 
MR. SCARANO: Only time will tell, Senator. We will be watching it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You're in charge of the training, I mean you oversee the training inside 
the plant, correct? 
MR.. $CARANO: That's---we're in charge of monitoring that tr8ining, that's correct. Not in 
providing it, but monitoring---making sure that it's being done. 
SENATOR RUSSELl_: And you have developed in your agency the guidelines which tells this 
plant what they have to do? 
MR. SCARANO: That's correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And how often do they have in-house drills? 
MR. SCARANO: There is a schedule for the in-house drills. They have been adhering to that 
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schedule. Where we have a---
SE!'..JATOR RUSSELL: What is the schedule? 
MR. SCARANO: It's on an annual basis. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Once a year? 
MR. SCARANO: Pardon me. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Once a year? 
MR. SCARANO: Yes. But it really---really encompasses a lot of minor portions of that plant 
th"lt, you know, they arc not all done at one time is what---
SENATOR RUSSELL: In other words, you don't have one big drill once a year and forget it. 
MR. SCARANO: That's correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You have a lot of little things that are going on all the time? Part of the 
training? 
MR. SCARANO: Yes. And what I was going to lead to is, our biggest problems is not so ;nuch 
of holding the drills, but their training program needs a lot of help; and the major reason Nhy we're 
having this enforcement conference is that it is a repeat item. It is an item that we have found them 
to be lacking in for the last couple of years. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Apparently, how---only just the last couple of years? 
MR. SCARANO: Ummmm, I've been on the scene since '83 and it's been recurring since '83. 
I---
SENATOR RUSSELL: How about before you came on board? Did you hear stories about good 
or bad or indifferent in terms of their training portion? 
MR. SCARANO: I heard a lot of stories about Rancho Seco and that's why I gave it a lot of 
attention when I carne in '83. So what we're hearing is that this has been a perennial problem for 
many years exceeding---going beyond your purview. Do you have the authority then to say, look, this 
place is in such shape that we're going to have drills twice a year? 
MR. SCARANO: We could certainly state that we are not satisfied with the results and put 
pressure on to make performance better. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Why don't---haven't you done that? 
MR. SCARANO: Well, as a matter of fact, what we're seeing is the culmination. The 
particular notification problem that was part of this December incident in and of itself is not tnat 
major. It's just not that unusual. If it were the only notification problem that occurred in the last 
four years, we probably would just slap them on the wrist and say, you know, you ought to perk your 
training up. What's particularly irritating to me is that, you know, these are recurring items. And 
what has occurred is that there has never been, you know, a major problem out at Rancho Seco. What 
we have been seeing is a lot of indications of things that, you know, can lead to real problem areas. 
And so we've beeR after them on that .... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You know, it's easy for us to sit up here on Mount Olympus and look down 
and say, this is a perfect world and why don't you do it the way we think it should be done. And most 
of us really don't know what we're talking about in terms of practicality. We know what we want and 
we're frustrated because we can't get it. But it seems to me that you have the responsibility, your 
agency does, to insure that whatever plant is under your purview, and we're talking about Rancho 
Scco at this time, that their training come up to some standard of operation and that if they continue 
and recurringly do not, it seems to me then you ought to have some sort of ability to exact a 
monetary fine or to do something that they would have to start paying a price other than just your 
trying to browbeat them into doing something that they for whatever reason aren't doing. 
'v1R. SCARANO: You're absolutely correct. And the enforcement conference that I referred to 
will take into consideration a monetary fine. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You have that ability now? 
MR. SCARANO: That's correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, from Mount Olympus up here, it seems to me that you should use 
that. Because from what we hear, there are positive signs of improvement with new management and 
so forth. I mean, rm encouraged with that. But it seems like this has been going on for. such a long 
time that there's something inherently flawed, not necessarily in the plant itself, but maybe 
something inherently flawed in the people who are running it and the management. And I'm sure 
they're good people but---so that means it's got to be the training, the rehearsals. And I guess that's 
where you co1ne in. And you know, we can't do anything other than to say to you, please, come down 
on them and come down on them hard in whatever ways you can to get them to do the training over 
and over and over and over again till they get it right. I know in the military that's what they do. If 
you don't run the obstacle course right, you go back and do it again and again and again and again. So 
why can't tnose kinds of things---I'm sure it's not as simple as I picture it, but why can't those kinds of 
things take place. And I urge you to do it for the security and peace of mind of everybody around 
here. 
\IIR. SCARANO: I understand, sir. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: May we hear from the other two witnesses? Also, the gentleman 
from Amador, my understanding, you testified before an Assembly committee speaking about a larger 
emergency radius than ten miles. Would you carne in on that? 
MR. SEAN CROWDER: Correct. ::Jutlined in my written presentation, it concerns that. Right 
now the only planning done is within 10 miles, and that's extensive planning including sirens and 
evacuation. 
My county believes that that 10 rniles should be expanded an additional 15. And in that 
additional 15 miles should be some additional planning to look at such things as evacuation times, 
whether or not there are problems with prisons, correctional facilities, identification of handicapped 
people. We do not think that it is going to be cost effective to put i:-t sirens throughout that entire 
25-mile area. And it's not going to really be cost effective to do a great deal of planning. But right 
now, the planning, at least for Amador County stops at the 10-miles boundary. And no planning is 
done beyond that for the City of Jackson. Translated into the other counties, it goes into higher 
population areas there. 
So we believe it would be appropriate for the state to look at an additional 15 miles in planning 
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so that there is something on the books that will give us some guidance should something serious 
really happen that goes out to 18 or 20 miles. 
I'll just briefly touch on my other items. I also suggested that there be some amendments to 
Senate Bill 1976 which are outlined here. One of the questions I keep hearing from the Senators is 
what can the state do to help the situation. I believe that there are wide-open areas for legislation 
for the state to take a look at. I think that the state Office of Emergency Services should be given 
some type of enforcement authority -- I don't know exactly what. There are situations that don't get 
corrected at Amador County---don't get corrected around the plant that the state could take more of 
an aggressive lead role. FEMA and the NRC have no direct authority over the counties. And the line 
of authority through the state is questionable. I think that it would be appropriate for the Legislature 
to take a look at that. There's nothing that mandates, you know, the level of preparedness. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Would you---what do you mean by questionable? What---give us an 
example of something you think should have some response from the state or the county. 
MR. CROWDER: OK. As an example of one thing, we had a situation with being able to set off 
the sirens in Amador County. We had a problem and we asked the utility to correct that by putting in 
a siren-activation panel in a remote location. It took the utility two years to complete that. That 
was even with the state of California encouraging. Our county believes that the state of California 
should have been able to put some pressure on the utility to speed that up because that W8s 3 mr~jor 
i tern. So there's an example of specifically what we feel should be happening. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Can we have the state respond? 
MS. VASQUEZ: We were aware of that situation. We were aware that the jurisdiction had the 
capability of back-up notification of. the population same as they would for any other type of 
emergency except nuclear power. The utility was remiss in the amount of time it took them to clear 
it up. We were at them constantly. And we have high hopes for the new utility administration and 
this never happening again. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: In that particular case, do you have the ability to fine or to bring 
about a change quicker than what appears to have been happening? 
MS. VASQUEZ: No, sir, we do not. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Well, maybe we ought to take a look at something. 
MR. CROWDER: Amador County firmly believes the state needs some enforcement authority 
in such situations. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: We're talking about so:nething which could be serious. Tl,cre ought to 
be some police power. 
iv1S. VASQUEZ: I have a little bit of difficulty responding here because that's sort of a policy 
decision •.• 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I understand. 
MS. VASQUEZ: ... and the full title of my office is the Governor's Office of Emergency 
Services. So I can't respond to that. Whatever DES is directed to do by code or law, oh, yes, we'll do. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Yes, further. 
-58-
MR. CROWDER: That in summary outlines what my presentation was. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Let me ask this question in that regard. If the Legislature were to put 
some enforcement capabilities in somebody's hands on this kind of a subject, where should that lie? 
In your Office of Emergency Services? 
MS. VASQUEZ: Sir, again I have problems with that being a policy---! just---1 couldil't answer a 
question like that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, it's---
MS. VASQUEZ: That's the kind of thing I guess over time we, you know, could help the 
Legislature in providing whatever input we could to help pick the appropriate place. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Let me ask the counties. We have Senate Bill 1976, introduced by 
Senator Campbell. 
MR. CROWDER: Correct. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Were you aware of the bill? 
MR. CROWDER: Yes, I am. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: All of you were aware of it? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are they for it? 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Pardon? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are they for it? 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Were you in support of it? 
: Of course. -----
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Did you think there was something could be done? \11/ere there 
problems with it? Did you appear before a committee, for example, to indicate some interest in it? 
MR. CROWDER: I appeared before the Assembly meeting and made some recommendations. 
And since then I have written a letter to Senator Campbell outlining two recommendations the 
County of Amador makes for changes. We believe that the current law which has a sunset clause 
should be eliminated, that basically emergency planning should be mandated for the counties and the 
state until such time as decommissioning of a plant. Right now it's every two or three years 
depending on who will be asked to carry the legislation. 
The other area that my board is concerned about is that the wording be changed to actually 
address reimbursement for actual costs of nuclear power plant planning as approved by the state of 
California. Right now it's limited to the lesser of the actual amount or $100,000. In tne case of 
Rancho Seco, the SMUD Board has been most cooperative in making certain that the offsites have 
sufficient money. But our Board would like to see that as legislation. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Anybody else want to comment -- counties -- on this? OK. San 
Joaquin. 
MR. MICHAEL COCKRELL: My name is Mike Cockrell. I'm with San Joaquin County, Office 
of Emergency Services. And I have submitted written testimony for the Senators and for the 
audience. 
Back when Senate Bill 1183 was mandated for the local agencies to prepare emergency response 
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plans, the three counties got together .and developed a joint powers agreement. Since then we have 
developed our emergency plans. These plans have been tested and the drills and exercises we've 
already discussed. 
Presently, FEMA has stated there is no 111ajor deficiencies in the response efforts of the 
counties. The San Joaquin County Ernergency Plan has been accepted by the Board of Supervisors and 
the state of California. Our County feels that the public in San Joaquin County can be adequately 
protected. Examples are the floods and chemical spills and other incidences that happen in this 
County. Many aspects of response are redundant. Emergency operations centers, field command 
posts, public warning, and evacuation -- we feel we have performed adequately in those of incidences. 
Presently, the County must plan for many types of emergencies. The County has put hundreds 
of hours in training, planning, and exercises for Rancho Seco; and we will keep that commitment. For 
the future, we are planning a large-scale exercise in October '86. The problems we anticipate are 
mainly communications. 
As far as cooperation, the three counties have worked pretty well together. The utility in their 
planning has not had good interrelations with the counties. They've done their planning; we've done 
ours. A state plan has to concern themselves with the county-wide. We feel that now the state 
should take their plans and work with the county plans so that we will know how they will fit 
properly. The same way the federal government should work through the state CJES so we know 
exactly how the federal agencies will respond to the incident. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Now, wait a minute. What you said then, is that you haven't actually 
sat down with the plant---the state, the counties, and the plant and talked about these? 
MR. COCKRELL: We've discussed it. When the utility developed their plan, it was mostly 
internally. They are now taking actions on training to see how their plan does follow through with th9 
counties on notification, etc., exactly how does it work. The federal agencies now are providing 
documents and guidelines on how they will respond so that we can have a better view of that. 
MS. VASQUEZ: As a point of clarification, when the three jurisdictions gathered together to 
write their initial plans, staff members from my office participated in that, strongly directed how 
their plans were going to be written in terms of what the state plan already said, so the coordination 
was there at the time. And when the local jurisdiction plans are reviewed by my staff and my office, 
a concurrent review is conducted of the portions of the utility plan that affect the offsite 
jurisdictions and we look for a lack of interface on that material. 
'v1R. COCKRELL: I think Ann misunderstood me. We were aware of their plan efforts. We had 
no direct input in tho development of their plans specifically. 
The utility, we feel, still lacks a good-faith effort in responding quickly to the county needs for 
supplies, manpower, equipment, etc. 
As far as the conclusion, we feel the local planning is co11plcte. The counties have put 
considerable effort into emergency response planning. That the utility, the state, and the federal 
planning efforts should be now coordinated with the individual counties. Finalty, SMUD does need to 
revise its attitude in working with local agencies. We have heard the idea of new attitudes with 
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SMUD. For San Joaquin County, we'll take a "wait-and-see" attitude for that itself. Thank you. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK, thank you very much. We have the third and final panel. 
Unfortunately, two of the .11embers had to leave. And I hope we'll get their testimony for the record. 
George Appel, Chief of the Sacramento County Fire Communications Center, and the Sacramento 
County Sheriff's Department of Communications had to leave. Did we get---did they have any 
written presentations for us? Would the staff please request whatever they were going to present to 
us so tnat we'll have that as part of our information. OK, let's see, San Juan Unified School District. 
We're going to have to leave here shortly. The room is going to be used for something else. And 
please short---we want your testimony for the record. 
MR. CARL THOMPSON: My name is Carl Thompson, Senator. I'm Assistant Superintendent for 
Business Operations with San Juan Unified School District. Do you want me to confine my remarks to 
only the nuclear response problems or---? 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, yes. 
MR. THOMPSON: OK. We have not had very much experience with a nuclear emergency since 
we really haven't had one that has caused major problems in this area. We do have some experience 
in disaster preparedness. I was Disaster Preparedness Officer with the Riverside Unified School 
District. For 12 of 14 years that I was there I was on the emergency response team with the city. 
And my departments tend to respond to those kinds of emergencies here in San Juan. 
We had an occasion recently, in February, with the rains, to get involved in somewhat of an 
emergency situation. And as has been alluded to earlier by other speakers, communication has been a 
major problem. In Riverside, for example, they have a structure where each of the various public 
agencies has a primary and secondary responsible party on the city's disaster team. .~nd these 
indidividuals in an emergency report to the city manager through the disaster preparedness officer. 
And of course, there were several emergencies during my time down there and it worked very well. 
In contrast to that, the problems we had in February and March with the rains, we do not have 
that kind of a structure here. I think probably because except for those agencies whose primary 
function is disaster preparedness or emergency services, there has been some diminished interest over 
the year and there's not been a real need for a structure, a cohesive structure. From our standpoint, I 
think that's something that we need. There must be an overall structure. There needs to be periodic 
meetings. There needs to be tests of that structure, so that when you have an emergency, people 
respond and do so appropriately. We had difficulties with erroneous information corning from the 
state Office of Emergency Services, the county, the radios. People were saying our schools were 
closed when they weren't, and a number of things like that. So that's our primary concern. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Would the parents of a child in school feel secure if a drill occurs? 
MR. THOMPSON: In what way? What kind of drill? For a nuclear crnorgcncy? 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: INhere does a parent find their child? 
MR. THOMPSON: As with any emergency, we would keep the kids in school until it was safe to 
rele8se them. We release them to a parent who would get them home via school bus or same other 
means. Again, because Sacramento is outside of this 10-mile range, for exa,'llple, I've never seen the 
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material that is typically sent out that they were describing earlier about what's sent out to people, 
what to do in a nuclear emergency. We don't get that kind of information. So we aren't included in 
those things. And San Juan has about 45,500 students. So that could become a major problem. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Well, maybe we ought to provide the information even though you 
may never need it. 
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, I agree. Again, if we have a structure that deals with all kinds of 
emergencies including these and we incorporate representatives from ali of the school districts in the 
area, the appropriate other governmental agencies, then everyone will be privy to this information. 
We are in the process now of developing a manual for our division which includes all kinds of 
emergencies, not only power failures, but downed aircraft, you know, all kinds of things I ike that. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: As I looked at this calendar, and the portion speaking about hazards 
of one kind or another, safety tips, be prepared, have on hand for an emergency, fire and other 
hazards, power lines, what about radiation, emergency response plan summary, what to do, shelter, 
evacuation of schools, etc. It seems to me that this kind of information, which is four or five pages, 
perhaps ought to be reproduced. 
\~R. THOMPSON: I would agree. Certainly we have the vehicle with our instructional 
programs to disseminate that information to students and parents alike. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK, thank you very much. 
MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, sir. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes, Citizens for Safe Energy, would you like to---? 
MS. MARTHA ANN BLACKMAN: Thank you. As others, in the interest of time, I will only hit 
highlig'lts of my statement which I have prepared for you. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MS. BLACKMAN: Time and again Citizens for Safe Energy has addressed many facets of the 
problems related to Rancho Seco. And time and again we have been told that those problems were 
old problems and that they weren't having those problems anymore. And we always find, or we have 
found that in fact the record does speak for itself. 
The third .worst nuclear accident in a decade occurred at Rancho Seco when the 25-cont light 
bulb was dropped onto a control panel and caused the fastest cooldown in U.S. history. The recent 
December 26 incident was the third fastest cooldown. The tenth fastest cooldown was also R.ancho 
Seco's. This is of special significance because of the vessel---because of the problem of 
embrittlement of the reactor containment vessel. Bombarding a reactor vessel with highly 
radioactive particles causes the metal to beco:-ne brittle, no longer flexible enough to withstand the 
fast overcooling which could shatter tho walls of the reactor. This loss of containment would lead to 
a release of radioactive materials, contaminating our valley and much beyond. 
Past experience has shown many other problems at Rancho Seco, including some of the 
following (I'll just read a few of these): 
- A communications misunderstanding between plant workers caused 4,500 gallons of 
radioactive coolant to be dumped in a sump. 
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- A 3,000-pound cask dropped from 10 feet above the open reactor when a thick metal cable 
holding it broke. It missed the reactor mouth by inches, striking instead a protruding flange and 
seal plate. Six days earlier a heavier 7-ton load was lifted directly over the highly irradiated 
spent fuel assemblies in clear violation of NRC rules. 
- SMUD claimed that radioactive iodine detected in milk from a farm near Rancho Seco was 
caused by fallout from Chinese nuclear testing in 1976 and not from the plant. Dr. Homer Ibser 
claimed that the odds were "one in 5,000 trillion" that a single atom of radioactive iodine still 
lingered from the blast and the NRC agreed with his calculations. There was a trial at that 
time. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I think he also said that we are breathing radiation from the :=hernobyl 
plant. 
MS. BLACKMAN: We are at this time. They have detected that in milk that Rancho Seco 
sampled .... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So if we're doing that, why is it not logical to assume that it might be the 
Chinese blast rather than the plant? 
MS. BLACKMAN: At that particular time, those particular radioactive particles had decayed 
beyond their half-life extent, for radioactive iodine has a very short half-life of eight days. The NRC 
did agree with him in his conclusion and it is part of the court transcript that they did agree with this 
particular calculation with him. 
- A brand of circuit breakers used to shut down the plant proved "unreliable" and malfunctioned 
at least fourteen times. We wonder why it had to malfunction fourteen times before they 
decided to do something about it. 
- In November 1982, former General Manager John Mattimoe told the NRC that the utility did 
not have time to provide information requested for congressional hearings. He wrote, "No 
major steam generator repairs are anticipated for Rancho Seco for the next five years." Two 
days later, a steam generator tube leak occurred at the plant. 
- Radioactive water was discharged into Clay Creek until 1984 when it was discovered that 
SMUD had used calculations suited to release in an ocean or a large lake, body of water. 
Approxirnately 13 million gallons of this wastewater was released. 
- Auxiliary batteries which would provide power to the plant in the event of an emergency were 
found corroded and of no use. We have to keep electricity to the plant whether the plant is 
providing electricity to us or not. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Let me ask a question, and I don't want to minimize the accidents and 
things that hav~ taken placo. What should tho stato do? 
MS. BLL\CI<MAN: I think we should continue to study it so that we know and are informed 
enough to deal with the problems that we have. When Three Mile Island occurred, the reporters, no 
one, even knew the right questions to ask. I don't like to say it, but we have come a long way since 
Three Mile Island. We've carne a long way since Chernobyl even. And it's not a very pleasant way to 
come a long way. And I'rn not exactly looking forward to a third experience anyplace in ti1is world 
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where we have to learn from experience So I think what we have to do is continue to ail 
the we can. We have a record of SMUD back from the public, from the 
NRC, from all authoritative bodies. a It's the 
time that it's and we continue to let this be the rule of the 
because as as that's tne the we're and as we're all 
don't have any choice in matter as far as I can see. 
- Rancho Seco has consistently been 
States. 
among the ten worst ractors m the United 
- SMUD did not implement ali the changes after the Three Island accident. 
Another problem at the Ranch deals with our radioactive waste storage are8. The 
spent fuel pool has been re-racked twice so that it was daub once and then doubled again to hold 
additional amounts. No Environment Impact was prepared for this potentially dangerous "hot 
spot". Dr. Ibser also did a calculation that a one percent of the cesium 137 in the pond 
was enough to contaminate Sacramento County to the point it being uninhabitable. 
There is also a low~level radioactive v.Jaste storage area at Rancho Seco. SMUD has proposed 
the instaliation of ponds for the evaporation of the liquid waste, but they've met much opposition 
from neighbors and others. Testimony has been that ponds will leak -- it's being lined ~- if 
they do it with a plastic, thick plastic. 
An experimental project was done a few years back where balloons were released fr:>m Rancho 
Seco because people were interested in knowing where the radioactive materials might go. Within a 
half-hour launch of balloons in one particular morning, b!=illoons were found in Stockton to the south, 
near Lake Tahoe to the northeast, Pine Grove the Sacramento to the north, and l_akeport to 
the northwest, which showed that if there's a overall pattern at all to the wind pattern in this 
area, it is really that there is no pattern at all. 
It is difficult to believe that in the event nuclear accident at Rancho Seco that we 
could evacuate everyone who needed to leave within time needed to do so. 
The ton-mile radius around Rancho was not very informed before the NRC 
they receive information relating to accidents at the We've been asking them for years to 
us more information. We said, "Why don't it in the books? Why don't you it in 
the paper?" As soon as tho NRC mandated it, did it. 3ut we had been asking them for years 
previous to us information. And we ask now that they also us information for this part of 
town, because we're too close to not know what to do should is event carne about that we have to 
deal with it. The "Public which includes Sacra:nento should definitely know 
what's happening. Otherwise, we 
The potential for a "worst case 
C::hernob could not because of 
like do when they don't know what's happening. 
does exist here. While the identical accident (like 
nuclear technologies, the fact remains that the 
potential does exist. Rancho manual contains a summary which lists the ten 
general emergency conditions which are the worst case of those ten list a breach or a 
possible or an ultimate breach of containment. tv1r. Mattimoe, who was the general manager, stated 
categorically you could not possibly have a breach of containment. And I was wondering, why would 
they put it in the emergency manual, half of the ten worst accidents if it can't possibly occur? 
There is also a problem related to transporting nuclear waste. Spills or accidents on our 
freeways could be disastrous. The route is taken from Rancho Seco, west on Twin Cities Road, north 
on Highway 99, north on Interstate 5, east on Interstate 80. During a recent meeting with the 
Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, it was noted that a portion of the freeway on I-5 near the J 
Street exit was especially prone to accidents. This is a rather serious consideration when you figure 
we're only a few blocks away from the State Capitol when you're I-5 at the J Street entrance. 
The true costs of nuclear power have been hidden for years. The Wall Street Journal, 
September 17, 1985, says that in 1984 direct nuclear subsidies totaled $15.8 billion, which was nearly 
as much as the total retail revenue from those 84 nuclear output plants. This figure doesn't include 
the Price-Anderson ceiling on liability for nuclear accidents. Federal loans and guarantees saved the 
industry $3.32 billion in financing costs. Tax breaks added another $10.2 billion. The liability of 
SMUD in the event of a major accident is $640 million. I would expect the State Capitol is worth a 
little bit more than that even if you start putting all our pretties together that we have, that we love. 
As a nuclear power plant operator, SMUD could also be assessed up to $10 million in the event of 
another nuclear power plant accident in the United States. So that means that ratepayers here have 
the responsibility for another $10 million that we might have to deal with. 
Rancho Seco is connected to the entire cycle of radioactive contamination. And I think we 
have to realize that that's also part of what we're dealing with here. The land which is being mined 
for uranium is poisoning the environment around it. Mill tailings are left in huge piles to irradiate the 
land. A lot of this land belongs to Native A;nericans and much of it is sacred to their religion. Mined 
uranium has to be refined, enriched and fuel fabricated. There is transportation dealt with in each 
one of these cycles and we have to keep concerned with transportation in all of these. There's a large 
potential for accidents in all of these cycles. Fuel has been loaded at Rancho Seco and the release 
activity continues as well know. As a matter of fact, 56 percent of the time that they were releasing 
radiations over the past we found that they did not have the correct weather calculations; 56 percent 
of the time that they used incorrect weather calculations. That means that it either blew indirectly 
to populated areas, most likely; or -- this is conjecture on my part -- but if it was released when they 
would not be allowing it to go, it either settled back down on the area around them or came into a 
dense population area, which is what they don't want it to do. 
Fuel is removed from the core after it's used. Sarno of it will be radioactive for hundreds of 
thousands of years. At some time in the future, this spent fuel is supposed to be stored in a place 
where the living earth will not shift or roll ..• ever. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Mr. Chairman? 
MS. BLACKMAN: I have about two more things I'd like to say. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: OK. 
MS. BLACKMAN: And then I'll be finished. I would like to suggest things that we have 
proposed to SMUD to do. VIe would like them to begin preparations for the permanent decommission 
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and closure of Rancho Seco. We want them to 
the Ranch. We want them to 
who have had to put up with 
a 
energy, revenue, and 
we had this to us. 
contribute to an increase in morale at SMUD. 
reliable information for this zone which we are 
a 
We 
for alternative energy to 
workers at Rancho Seco 
financial base and it would also 
like them to provide accurate and 
that a 50 percent chance of 
a nuclear accident occurring within the next twenty years is much higher for Rancho Seco than 
normal because we've had a lot more problems at Rancho Seco than most people have. 
One more word. 
MS. BLACKMAN: If you haven't seen the Bee article starting on the 18th of this month, I would 
suggest you read five days' worth of Bee like to know if there's no chance of a major 
accident, why the heck are we preparing for it and spending so much money on it and worrying about 
it if there's no chance of an accident happening to us in our neighborhood. And I think that's all. 
I'd like to say that we learn lessons been happening out there, and I think we've had 
enough lessons to learn already. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right, thank you very much. May we hear from the final witness? 
Who is it? 
MR. ___ : The Ratepayers. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: The 
MS. DEE PRICE: Yes. My name is My is very but I will to 
summarize it. I'd like to say we've certainly learned a lot today that I will take back to our members. 
Much of what I have said in the and I've prov has been addressed. 
The accident at Chernobyl has made one very evident: we must educate the public more 
fully regarding radiation. The word radiation evokes panic because the public has not been fully 
informed. Now is the time for the and the industry to work to inform, not to 
frighten. And it'll be committee such as this that will ish that. We're dealing with a 
danger. And holds no place in this issue. 
We have not asked for the of Rancho Seco nor we until more 
are answered. We have asked the of the y, we are 
concerned the mismanagement of the and the retention of those persons who have been 
involved in the management and supervision of the over an approx 10-year period. We 
are ANGRY about the effect this has had on our rates and the of an elected 
board of to dismiss those persons who have and who will continue 
to so if retained. 
We don't want to point the 
N!<.C IHw done out there. 
at 
The 
y. We've qot n 
assessed out there. 
Wf~ hnvo snlvn it. B11t 
And ob th::ir job 
has been poor and has failed, and we resent that, because we are being asked to pay for it. 
We would strongly suggest and support legislation that would prohibit the operation of a nuclear 
reactor by a municipal utility district. With a public utility such as PG&E, Southern Cal Edison, San 
Diego Gas and Electric, there's at least a check and balance between the staffs of the utility and the 
PUC. We wish right now we had that option. 
At this time, we would also support special legislation to allow the PUC to oversee or review 
the effect this mismanagement has had and will have on our rates. 
We would also ask that this Subcommittee continue these types of hearings, and we will be 
willing to cooperate and assist in any manner that we are able. 
I would also like to say, I say the calendars for the first time. I live within the 10-mile radius. I 
have lived within 10 miles of Rancho Seco since 1959, before it was constructed. I have never gotten 
a calendar. I don't know who mails them out. (Laughs.) But I really would like to have a copy of that 
calendar. 
Thank you for inviting us to speak. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you very much. Appreciate all your attendance here today. 
MR. THOMPSON: Senator, if I may, Roy Erickson from San Juan School District is a 
curriculum director and has just a brief statement to make also. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: All right. 
MR. ROY ERICKSON: I'd very quickly like to say, I've heard the question asked, what can the 
state do to several of the questions. One of the things that I would lil<e to see in the area of 
curriculum, delivering this to the children the notion of what to do in an emergency really should be 
incu-nbent on the state to develop some guidelines and to develop some curricula. We have Assembly 
Bill 3848 that's law now, that talks about nuclear age education; but I don't find any mention of tne 
emergency provisions in this. Perhaps an amendment to this bill or some kind of a bill that would 
authorize the state department to develop some guidelines on what it is that we tell children, because 
that's the big issue out there. We don't know for sure what to tell children about an emergency. We 
don't know what to tell about the effects of radiation. We have heard testimony today that was very 
confusing to me sitting back there. And so it would be a direction that the state could help provide 
us for that. We could deliver within the school system through the curriculum. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Thank you very much. You made a cogent point there. Incidentally, 
don't know anything that would prevent the Department of Education to try to make a search to try 
to figure out what to tell people in the first place, but you're right. You're going to need to push, and 
maybe we can find the means of pushing them here. 
I want to thank you all for giving us your assistance today. And you know, Mrs. Ratepayer 
Association, have a copy of the calendar and you can mark today's date on it as one of the days that 
you testified before us. I want to thank the audience for putting up with this time and this use of 
' your energy and ours. We have a long way to go. I hope we've made some kind of a start. One of the 
things is that you've all had something to say of importance in terms of what your interests are, you 
know, and what your positions are. I think we must, nonetheless, find some other way of carrying on 
our objectives. Because our objectives are more singular than the nature of rnuch of the testimony. 
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One is to us about the technology of the makeup---the metallurgy of steel, you know, 
containers. Another is talking about what we be teaching in our is 
germane that case. The Citizens for have of v on what safe 
that answer be that does not 
energy. Is that 
MS. BLACKMAN: It's reasonable until such time---
CHAIRMAN GREENE: is that a reasonable your if you---
MS. BLACKMAN: I have to y it. I've done this for before too. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: Certainly. 
MS. BLACKMAN: It's reasonable until time as no a of 
don't mean storage, but disposal, neutralization of wastes as far as we're concerned. 
CHAIRMAN OK, thank 
MS. BLACKMAN: Thank you. 
CHAIRiv1AN GREENE: In any case, what you see arc our own tasks relate to what it is possif:Jle 
for the stat!) to do. And there are certain things, many of which have been covered here today, that 
are beyond the possibility of the state doing anything where they lie within and 
in areas where legally we cannot---we can outside the fence. We can't cross the fence and 
operate inside the fence, if you know what I'm trying to say, you know, where the plant is. our 
problems are that we have to know what's going on inside the plant in order to know what we must 
defend against. Senator Rosenthal. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: I just want to comment on that. It is true that we don't control what 
goes on inside the fence. But I think it's also true that if S:v1UD is aware that we are looking over 
their shoulder in terms of the training, in terms of whatever is place then while we may 
not legally or officially have any over 1 think that will 
hear us. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: One of the we will look 
of what right can we exercise and the terms of or 
physicist, the nuclear engineer, or you 
that we can satisfy ourselves of some level of excellence of the 
certain requirements in order to do those 
is that question 
or certifying the nuclear 
on plant 
there that have to meet 
ROSENTHAL: And also we to them that to have this 
simulator because there's a certain turnover in to be You 
know, in state law, we have continued education and other of areas. It just scorns to me that---
CHAir~MAN Gr~EENE: Yeah, we've heard indications when we were out 2t the plant that 
they do have the equivalent of that, but send them back East. It's not, you onsite here. 
but it to be onsite. 
MS. BLACKMAN: Excuse me. If I shortly here. It's rny understanding that the 
Lynchburg simulator has a few differences than our simulator here. 
CHAIR1v1AN GREENE: Yes, sure it does. 
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MS. BLACKMAN: Atso, it's going to cost almost $10 million to build one. And SMUD's having 
enough trouble with rates; they don't want to do that I guess. 
CHAIRMAN GREENE: No, I don't even know where you'd build it. That means anotner building 
too for that purpose. But in any case, that's a concentration on only a portion of the problem that 
we're interested in. What we're interested in knowing is that if something goes wrong, OK, what do 
we tell the kids at school, what are you to do, OK? How is information communicated? Nhat is the 
means? I tried to express it earlier and I couldn't get anywhere with the federal man -- it was the 
wrong man to talk to, I guess -- when I said, assume that 20 miles or 25 miles from here, that's not 
Rancho Seco, that's Chernobyl, OK, and it just blew. Quick. What do we do? Quick. Hurry up. It 
just blew this minute. What happens? And his answer is, well, as far Hs the fods somewhere between, 
what was it, 6 and 12 hours they would put their organization together. Yeah, and that stuff's co.ning 
down out of the sky in the meantime, you know, and so on. Well, but he's an---all right, then I finally 
catch on. I'm talking to the wrong person. He's long-term. He's long-term effect. When that 
something---when Chernobyl went right here, south of us, you know, what happened then? What lines 
of communication---if it's Rancho Seco, we'll relabel it, and it just blew, what do they do there? You 
know, they immediately notified their headquarters at SMUD. They immediately notified NRC. 
What did they tell the county? What did they tell the state? What happens to those people they told? 
'We saw over the SMUD building where the headquarters are, where these people are supposed to 
gather themselves together -- the city, the county, the state officials, and even NRC people, and the 
communications link with Washington, and so on, yeah, OK. i3wt let me see what happens. 'What do 
these people do? There's Joe and Jane Citizen out there and their kids, Susie and George, are in 
school over here. What happens? What do you do? How long does it take? Are we all dead before 
you do anyything? You know, what happens? Chernobyl -- it took them too much time before they 
moved anybody out. And now the first---what is it, we're up to 15 so far and maybe it'll be a couple 
hundred or whatever, you know, before the end of this line and maybe a lot more than that. One 
doesn't know. What is the direction of the prevailing winds in this area? And can you count on those 
prevailing winds to be prevailing in that direction when the bomb goes off, you know? These are all 
kinds of things that we have to know about and we don't know at this time, but at least we've reached 
out here. We've made our beginning. But it looks to me like it's a fairly long journey. And I thank 
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to 
participate in today's hearing. 
Even before the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, I had deep 
concerns regarding the safety of some u.s. nuclear power plants 
and the effectiveness of federal regulatory efforts to ensure 
that safety. 
My concern with nuclear reactors designed by the Babcock & 
Wilcox Company in particular dates back to the accident at Three 
Mile Island in 1979. Despite safety reforms adopted after Three 
Mile Island, serious problems have continued to recur with 
alarming frequency at other B&W plants. The Rancho Seco nuclear 
plant outside Sacramento, for example, has had so many problems 
that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission last week ranked it the 
sixth worst nuclear reactor in the country after the five TVA 
nuclear reactors. 
Last January, I was skeptical when the NRC announced its 
intention to conduct a long-term safety review of all B&W 
reactors. While I welcomed the idea, I questioned the motives of 
the action. I had discovered a pattern of activity at the NRC. 
When public or congressional concern is highest, there is a 
flurry of activity at the NRC. But when the furor subsides, NRC 
activity seems to subside as well. 
This particular safety review seems to me to be no more than 
a public relations ploy. As a result of my own investigation, I 
found that the NRC already knew that B&W reactors have design 
flaws that make them more vulnerable to operational transients. 
I found that the NRC already knew that design vulnerabilities 
coupled with poor management were a prescription for trouble. I 
also had one Commissioner tell me that the NRC had simply failed 
to take effective action to correct these problems. 
A q~ick look at the current status of the NRC's long-term 
safety review I think bears out my original observation. First 
of all, little has actually been accomplished besides the 
obligatory public relations. But second, the NRC has turned over 
that safety review to the owners of the reactors themselves. I 
am not reassured when the industry is responsible for its own 
safety review, and I fail to see the objectivity in self-
regulation. 
What concerns me most is the fact that there is dissension 
within the Commission itself on this matter. Commissioner James 
Asselstine has called for an independent safety review group, 
including experts from outside the NRC, to conduct a thorough 
review of the safety vulnerabilities in the B&W design and the 
adequacy of past NRC efforts to ensure that B&W plants meet 
acceptable safety standards. I agree with him entirely and I 
have asked the NRC to follow his suggestion. However, I regret 
to say that the other members of the Commission have rejected 
this proposal. As a result, I am afraid that we will see 
business as usual at the NRC and no guarantee that accidents at 
B&W plants will be made any less likely. 
In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union, 
these issues have grown in importance. Congress has increased 
its scrutiny of the safety of u.s. nuclear power plants and the 
adequacy of the NRC's regulatory efforts. 
Last week, the Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee 
on Energy Conservation and Power held a hearing on the safety of 
u.s. commercial nuclear reactors. Given my concern with the 
effectiveness of NRC regulation of B&W plants, I was asked to 
participate in that hearing. 
If I could, I would like to take a few minutes to reveal 
some of the more important disclosures. 
In regard to Rancho Seco, the NRC admitted to me that they 
could have prevented the December 26, 1985 incident if they had 
followed one Commissioner's advice and initiated a generic safety 
review of B&W plants afte~ the June 1985 shutdown of the Davis-
Besse plant in Ohio. 
Each NRC Commissioner told me that if they had known the 
extent of the problems at Rancho Seco beforehand, they would have 
closed the plant down. They said that management is the key to 
nuclear safety, and they admitted that management problems at the 
Rancho Seco had not been effectively regulated. 
In regard to the safety of B&W reactors in general, one 
Commissioner told me again that it does not make common sense to 
I 
have the industry itself conduct its own safety review and that 
the Commission has reverted to a pre-Three Mile Island proclivity 
toward self-regulation. 
As far as the lessons of Chernobyl are concerned, the NRC 
admitted that the Soviet plant actually had more safety features 
and was much closer to American reactor designs than Western 
experts had originally assumed. The Chernobyl plant did have 
adequacy of the NRC's regulatory efforts. 
Last week, the Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee 
on Energy Conservation and Power held a hearing on the safety of 
U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. Given my concern with the 
effectiveness of NRC regulation of B&W plants, I was asked to 
participate in that hearing. 
If I could, I would like to take a few minutes to reveal 
some of the more important disclosures. 
In regard to Rancho Seco, the NRC admitted to me that they 
could have prevented the December 26, 1985 incident if they had 
followed one Commissioner's advice and initiated a generic safety 
review of B&W plants after the June 1985 shutdown of the Davis-
Besse plant in Ohio. 
Each NRC Commissioner told me that if they had known the 
extent of the problems at Rancho Seco beforehand, they would have 
closed the plant down. They said that management is the key to 
nuclear safety, and they admitted that management problems at the 
Rancho Seco had not been effectively regulated. 
In regard to the safety of B&W reactors in general, one 
Commissioner told me again that it does not make common sense to 
I 
have the industry itself conduct its own safety review and that 
the Commission has reverted to a pre-Three Mile Island proclivity 
toward self-regulation. 
As far as the lessons of Chernobyl are concerned, the NRC 
admitted that the Soviet plant actually had more safety features 
and was much closer to American reactor designs than Western 
experts had originally assumed. The Chernobyl plant did have 
and double our safety efforts to match that definition. 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, ~ would like to include in the record 
my correspondence with the NRC and an NRC document relating to 
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INTRODUCTION 
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM DEWEY LOWE, 
GENERAL MANAGER OF THE SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 
CSMUD). I WAS APPOINTED TO MY CURRENT POSI~ION IN SEPTEMBER, 
1985, AFTER MORE THAN 35 YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
AIR FORCE. 
I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME TO TESTIFY BEFORE 
YOUR COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT OF RANCHO SECO FACILITY SAFETY. 
WHILE I WILL FOCUS ON THAT SUBJECT, MY COMMENTS WILL INCLUDE A 
BRIEF STATEMENT ON EMERGENCY PLANNING WHICH IS THE SUBJECT FOR 
THE NEXT PANEL. I AM SUBMITTING FOR THE RECORD WRITTEN 




THE SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT WAS FORMED BY A VOTE 
OF THE ELECTORATE AND BEGAN PROVIDING ELECTRIC SERVICE IN 
1947. CURRENTLY ITS 890-SQUARE-MILE SERVICE AREA INCLUDES 
NEARLY ALL OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY AND A SMALL PORTION OF PLACER 
COUNTY. THE SOLE ACTIVITY OF THE DISTRICT IS TO GENERATE, 
TRANSMIT AND DISTRIBUTE ELECTRIC ENERGY FOR ITS 384,000 
CUSTOMERS. 
THE DISTRICT'S 3100 EMPLOYEES ARE GOVERNED BY A FIVE-MEMBER 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, ELECTED BY WARD, FOR STAGGERED FOUR-YEAR 
TERMS. 
SMUD IS THE SOLE OWNER AND OPERATOR OF THE RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR 
GENERATING STATION. POWER FROM THIS FACILITY REPRESENTS 54 
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL GENERATION RESOURCE OF THE DISTRICT. THE 
DISTRICT WAS ASSISTED BY BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION IN THE 
SELECTION, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF RANCHO SECO. ITS REACTOR 
SYSTEM IS SUPPLIED BY BABCOCK AND WILCOX. 
EMERGENCY PLANNING 
SMUD HAS BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN EMERGENCY PLANNING WITH THE 
SURROUNDING COUNTIES STARTING BACK IN 1971. NUMEROUS 
REGULATORY CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THAT TIME, PARTICULARLY 
AFTER THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT. THESE CHANGES HAVE 
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RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. 
WE REMAIN TOTALLY COMMITTED TO ASSURING THAT OUR UTILITY'S, AS 
WELL AS LOCAL COUNTY AND STATE, PLANS ARE FULLY INTEGRATED AND 
STAND READY TO DEAL WITH ANY MAJOR ACCIDENT IN THE UNLIKELY 
EVENT IT WERE TO OCCUR. 
RANCHO SECO SAFETY 
YOU HAVE NO DOUBT READ AND HEARD OF THE MANY PROBLEMS FACING 
THE DISTRICT AS A RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING INADEQUACIES AT 
RANCHO SECO: 
I LACK OF ADEQUATE STAFFING 
1 POOR TRAINING 
I POOR MAINTENANCE 
1 POOR ATTENTION TO DETAIL 
e POOR MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
CERTAINLY, THESE DID EXIST; BUT TWO THINGS ARE IMPORTANT TO 
RECOGNIZE: 
1. THEY ARE ALL RELATED TO FAILURE OF ADEQUATE MANAGEMENT 
CONTROLS. 
2. THE REACTOR DESIGN IS, IN OUR OPINION, A GOOD ONE AND 
NOT THE ROOT CAUSE OF OUR POOR OPERATING RECORD. 
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RANCHO SECO IS BASICALLY A SOUND AND SAFE PLANT. 
DESPITE SOME DESIGN FLAWS, WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE 
CORRECTED, THE REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS HAVE FUNCTIONED 
AS DESIGNED WHEN THEY WERE CALLED UPON IN TRANSIENTS 
OR SHUTDOWNS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED. 
CORRECTIVE ACTION UNDERWAY 
EVERY ONE OF THE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS HAS BEEN OR IS BEING 
AGGRESSIVELY ADDRESSED. WE HAVE MADE CHANGES AND WILL CONTINUE 
TO MAKE CHANGES TO INCREASE THE PLANT'S MARGIN OF SAFETY. 
1. THE PLANT STAFF AND MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN INCREASED 
SIGNIFICANTLY. IN 1984 OVERALL STAFF AT RANCHO SECO 
NUMBERED ABOUT 500. BY THE END OF 1986 WE EXPECT IT 
TO HAVE MORE THAN DOUBLED WITH MOST OF THAT INCREASE 
BEING ACCOMPLISHED IN 1986. 
2. PLANT TRAINING PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN GIVEN SPECIAL 
ATTENTION. NEW MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING STAFF HAVE 
BEEN ADDED BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 40 FULL-TIME 
TRAINERS. NEW TRAINING FACILITIES ARE BEING ADDED AS 
RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. WE HAVE COMMITTED TO A PLANT 
SPECIFIC SIMULATOR. EXISTING TRAINING IS BEING 
UPGRADED AND SIGNIFICANTLY MORE TRAINING IS BEING 
REQUIRED. 
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3. NEW MANAGEMENT AND STAFF HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE 
NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT. NEW MAINTENANCE 
TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE BEING DEVELOPED AND CONDUCTED. 
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE RATHER THAN REACTIVE FIXES IS 
NOW THE WATCHWORD. 
4. A COMPREHENSIVE NEW PLANT PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND IS BEING 
IMPLEMENTED TO EVALUATE AND TEST PLANT SYSTEMS AND 
PROCEDURES WHICH ARE KEY TO PLANT SAFETY AND 
RELIABILITY. EACH KEY SYSTEM AND COMPONENT IS BEING 
ANALYZED TO DETERMINE IF ITS FAILURE CAN CAUSE A 
REACTOR TRIP, CHALLENGE A SAFETY SYSTEM OR CAUSE AN 
OVER- OR UNDER-COOLING FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP. 
THE KEY TO THIS PROGRAM IS TO ASSURE THAT THE 
SAFETY SYSTEMS AND BACKUP EQUIPMENT ARE NOT 
CHALLENGED. THIS IS A SHIFT FROM PAST DESIGN AND 
OPERATING PHILOSOPHY. 
THIS ATTENTION TO DETAIL WILL VASTLY IMPROVE 
PLANT RELIABILITY AND ITS MARGIN OF SAFETY. 
5. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE ALSO BEING PROVIDED TO ASSIST 
MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR 
PLANNING AND OVERSIGHr RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE 
'. 
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INCLUDE PERSONNEL, COMPUTERS, SOFTWARE, AND ACCOUNTING 
SUPPORT WHICH WILL HELP THEM MANAGE RESOURCES MORE 
EFFECTIVELY AND MEET COMMITTED SCHEDULES FOR 
MODIFICATIONS. 
RANCHO SECO CONTINUED OPERATION 
RANCHO SECO IS ONE OF THE LARGEST ASSETS THE SACRAMENTO 
COMMUNITY HAS. IT REPRESENTS 54 PERCENT OF SMUD'S TOTAL 
ELECTRIC GENERATION AND IS ONE OF THE CHEAPEST RESOURCES WE OWN. 
RANCHO SECO'S CAPITALIZED COST OF $642 MILLION EQUATES TO 
APPROXIMATELY $70p P~R ~~~~~±t WHICH IS A TREMENDOUS BARGAIN 
TO SACRAMENTO ELECTR1CttY USERS. 
RANCHO SECO IS FUNDAMENTALLY A SOUND AND SAFE NUCLEAR 
GENERATING STATION. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS 
MATERIAL READINESS AND ITS MARGIN OF SAFETY. WE HAVE SOME 
DESIGN FLAWS WE ARE CONTINUING TO CORRECT. WE HAVE HAD 
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS BREAKDOWNS. THEY 
ARE BEING CORRECTED. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO OPERATE A SAFE AND 
RELIABLE NUCLEAR PLANT AND TO ACHIEVE A GREATER THAN A 70 
PERCENT CAPACITY FACTOR FOR RANCHO SECO BY 1990. WE INTEND TO 
REGAIN THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC THAT WAS ONCE 
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NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
<SENATOR LEROY GREENE -- CHAIRMAN) 
WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1986 -- 1:30 P.M. 
HEARING ON 
"EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY ISSUES'' 
I am Dewey K. K. Lowe, General Manager of the Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District <SMUD). As such, I am responsible for the administration of the 
District. I was appointed to the General Manager's position in 
September, 1985, ending a career of more than 35 years with the United States 
Air Force. My last assignment was as Commander of the 15,000-employee, 
Sacramento Air Logistics Center at McClellan Air Force Base where I held the 
rank of Major General. I hold a Bachelor of Science degree in economics and 
business administration from the University of California at Berkeley, a 
Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from the University of San Francisco Law 
School, and am a graduate from the industrial college of the Armed Forces at 
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. I am also a member of the state bar of 
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SACRAII.ENTO MUNIC:PAL UTILITY DISTRICT 
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SMUD OVERVIEW 
Organization and Powers 
The Sacramento Municipal Utility District was formed by vote of the electors 
in 1923 under provisions of a statute <Municipal Utility District Act) 
approved by the State Legislature in 1921 and subsequently codified as 
Division 6 of the California Public Utilities Code. District headquarters are 
in the City of Sacramento, and its service area <890 square miles) includes 
the principal parts of Sacramento County and a small portion of Placer County. 
Although organized in 1923, the District did not commence electric operations 
until the start of 1947. At that time, the District acquired, by cash 
purchase, Pacific Gas and Electric Company's <PGandE) electric system which 
was located within the District's service area. Since 1947 the District has 
provided all electric service within its service area. 
Districts formed under the Municipal Utility District Act (the Act) have broad 
powers to acquire. construct, own, and operate works for the supplying of 
light, water, heat, power, transportation, and other services for their 
inhabitants. The only activities of the District have been the generation, 
transmission, and distribution to, and promoting the efficient use of electric 
energy by, its 384,000 customers. 
The District is governed by a board of five directors elected by ward for 
staggered four-year terms. The Board of Directors <the Board) appoints a 
General Manager who is responsible for the District's operations. The Board 
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also appoints the Assistant General Managers, Accountant, Secretary, 
Treasurer, and General Counsel, all of.whom serve at its pleasure. The 
appointment and removal of other employees fall under the jurisdiction of the 
General Manager. Except for special administrative and technical personnel, 
employment is under a civil service system adopted and administered by the 
General Manager. 
The Act confers upon the District the necessary rights and powers for the 
conduct of its business, including the right to sue and be sued, to exercise 
the power of eminent domain, to enter into contracts of all kinds, to take 
property and construct works, to fix rates and charges for commodities or 
services furnished, to incur indebtedness and issue bonds or other 
obligations, and to invest its funds. 
Management 
The Board sets the operating budget, approves major expenditures, sets rates 
and makes policy decisions for the District which management administers. The 
present members of the Board are as follows: 
Name Occupation Term Ex8ires 
Ann L. Taylor, President Businesswoman December 31 ' 1988 
Cortus T. Koehler, Vice President Educator December 31' 1988 
Paul w. Carr Suslness Executive December <, ~I ' 1986 
John T. Kehoe Business Executive December 31' 1988 
Clifford R. Wilcox Agribusinessman December 31, 1986 
The management of the District's 3100 employees is under the direction of its 
General Manager, who serves at the discretion of the Board. 
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GENERATING RESOURCES 
By the end of 1985, the total customers served by the District had reached a 
record high of 383,796. This made SMUD the third largest municipally owned 
utility in the continental United States in terms of numbers of customers. 
Peak demand soared to a new high in 1985 when on July 9 it reached 1,851 
megawatts -- a 121-megawatt increase over 1984. Total energy sales to 
customers also reached a record 6,881,631,000 kilowatt-hours, or 8.2 percent 
over a year earlier. 
Initially, SMUD met its obligation to its customers by purchasing wholesale 
power from Pacific Gas and Electric Company. In 1954 the District also began 
buying Central Valley Project power from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation <now 
known as Western Area Power Administration <WAPA). Since that time the 
District has developed a number of its own generation resources. SMUD has 
earned a reputation as a progressive utility. It has one of the most 
diversified generation mixes in the world. 
Upper American River Project 
In the late 1950s SMUD started construction on its own hydroelectric project 
on the South Fork of the American River in El Dorado County known as the Upper 
American River Project <UARP>. Completed in 1971, the UARP development has 
eleven reservoirs and seven power plants capable of producing a total of 659 
megawatts. It is SMUD's cheapest source of power with 1985 production costs 
of 6.47 mills per kwh. 
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Rancho Seco 
The District began construction of its 913-megawatt rated nuclear generating 
station, known as Rancho Seco, in 1968. The plant is on a 2,500-acre site 25 
miles southeast of Sacramento. The plant uses a pressurized water-cooled 
reactor which was furnished by the Babcock & Wilcox Company <B&W). Cooling is 
by means of water from the Folsom South Canal of the Central Valley Project~ 
The initial cost of Rancho Seco, including switchyard and transmission but 
excluding decommissioning and nuclear fuel, was approximately $342 million. 
Plant modifications, installed to improve plant safety and reliability or 
satisfy new Nuclear Regulatory Commission <NRC) requirements, have increased 
this cost by $300 million since the plant become commercially operable in 
April 1975. Additional plant modifications <remaining changes ordered by NRC 
primarily as a result of the March 1979 incident at another B&W plant, Three 
Mile Island Unit No. 2 <TMI-2) near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), emergency 
preparedness facilities, other NRC requirements, and renewals and replacements 
are expected to increase the plant cost by another approximately $382 million 
through 1991. 
SMUDGEO #1 
The District has completed a 72-megawatt Cnet) geothermal unit, known as 
SMUOGEO #1, in the California Geysers area. The plant began commercial 
operation in December 1983 and produced 621 million kilowatt-hours of 
electrical energy in 1985. The plant operated at a 96.1-percent capacity 
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factor from the start of commercial operation through December 31, 1985. The 
production cost of energy generated from this plant, consisting of steam 
purchases, operating expenses, and depreciation was 28.8 mills per 
kilowatt-hour for the year ended December 31, 1985. It has already earned a 
reputation as the most efficient geothermal power plant in the country. 
McClellan C. T. 
The District, in conjunction with the Air Force, has completed the 
construction of a 49-megawatt peaking combustion turbine generating p1ant at 
the McClellan Air Force Base site. The $26.2 million gas turbine project was 
completed in January 1986. 
SMUD P. V. 
In 1980 the District, in cooperation with the Department of Energy <DOE> and 
California Energy Commission <CEC>, undertook development of a photovoltaic 
installation at a site adjacent to the Rancho Seco nuclear plant. The first 
one-megawatt became operational in July 1984. It cost $12 million, of which 
the District provided $3.2 million, DOE provided $6.8 million and CEC supplied 
$2 million. The second one-megawatt increment cost $10.4 million of which 
$3.6 million was provided by the District and $6.8 million was furnished by 
DOE. Further development of photovoltaic generation has been indefinitely 
postponed because costs have not fallen as rapidly as originally predicted. 
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PURCHASED POWER AGREEMENTS 
Western Agreement 
In 1954 the District entered into a 40-year contract with the federal 
government for the purchase of 290 megawatts of Central Valley Project <CVP) 
power delivered to the District via Western transmission lines. In 1966, the 
contract was amended to provide for the purchase of an additional 70 megawatts 
under the same general terms and conditions. On April 15, 1983, the District 
and Western executed a contract amendment and settlement agreement that 
terminated a lawsuit filed by Western to resolve a dispute over the 
interpretation of the contract. That agreement extended the contract until 
2004, and give the District the right to purchase 100 megawatts of peaking 
power in addition to 1ts 360 megawatts capacity and energy. 
PGandE Contract 
The District executed a contract with PGandE in June 1970. The PGandE 
Contract is a power sale, exchange and integration agreement which provides 
for the integration of the District's generation into the Northern California 
power system. A principal feature of the PGandE Contract is that the parties 
share reserves so that when there is an outage of generation or transmission 
facilities, the resources of the entire interconnected system are available to 
meet loads. Another important feature of the PGandE Contract is that PGandE 
purchases nearly all capacity and energy produced by the District which is 
surplus to the District's requirements. This enables the District to operate 
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its nuclear plant at a high load factor so that the'cost per kilowatt-hour can 
be held to a minimum. A third important feature of the PGandE Contract is 
that it provides that if the District's power supply resources are less than 
its requirements, PGandE will make capacity and energy available to the 
District on an exchange basis <subject to certain limits>. This will enable 
the District to borrow power from PGandE if it encounters delays in bringing 
additional generating resources into operation. 
South Sutter ~ater District 
In August 1981 the District entered into an agreement to pay the debt service 
on approximately $16.9 million in bonds issued by the South Sutter Water 
District as well as certain operating costs and royalties for the output of 
the Camp Far West hydroelectric project. Th~ Plant which began commercial 
operation on February 1, 1985 is rated at 6.8 megawatts and anticipated to 
produce 27 million kilowatt-hours of energy in an average water year. 
California Power Pool 
An extra-high voltage <EHV> transmission contract was negoti~ted in 1967 with 
the California Power Pool <comprised of PGandE, SoutherQ California Edison 
Company, and San Diego Gas and Electric Company) which placed in service EHV 
transmission lines linking the Pacific Northwest and California. This 
contract provides the District with 200 megawatts of the interties' capacity 
available on a long-term basis. This intertie capacity can be used to deliver 
surplus peaking capacity and surplus energy which may be available from the 
Pacific Northwest. This contract terminates in 2005. 
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RANCHO SECO DESIGN, OPERATION AND SAFETY 
The 913-megawatt plant was built by the District with assistance from the 
architectural and engineering firm of Bechtel Power Corporation. It's 
pressurized reactor design was supplied by Babcock & Wilcox. With regard to 
Rancho Seco's design our first and foremost concern has been the safety of our 
employees and the people living in proximity to the plant. 
Because Rancho Seco was designed with safety as the most important 
consideration, engineers and scientist contributing to the project used 
"Safety in Depth" as their criterion. Multiple barriers and redundant systems 
were used extensively to provide protection for the employees as well as for 
the public. This means that if for some reason one essential system fails, 
there is a second, or back-up safety system ready to take over. 
The heart of all nuclear activity is confined to one carefully controlled 
area--the reactor containment building. This building houses the reactor 
vessel and two steam generators. 
The reactor vessel and steam generator components are encased in reinforced 
concrete which supports the vessel and provides a shield against radiation. A 
leak-tight steel shell lines the domed structure where the reactor vessel and 
components are housed. The structure's massive reinforced concrete wall, 
3-1/2 feet thick, acts as another radiation shield and is the final protective 
barrier. The central control room constantly monitors and regulates the 
reactor. From here, the reactor can be shut down manually or automatically in 
an emergency situation. 
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Throughout the nuclear power plant, there are safety systems and devices which 
trap potentially harmful amounts of radioactive materials to prevent them from 
being released to the outside environment. Filters, evaporators and other 
equipment remove radioactive materials and thus allow it to be treated and 
stored or disposed of safely. 
In addition to all the shielding built into the power plant, there are also 
many operating procedures, access controls and security measures designed to 
keep both the workers and the public safe. 
Emergency Planning 
Despite the protection offered by these physical barriers, and system 
redundancy, the nuclear industry and regulators, along with responsible local, 
state, and federal emergency response organizations have developed 
comprehensive public protection plans which integrate the various authorities, 
resources, and expertise to deal with extraordinary events at nuclear plants, 
if they occur. 
In SMUD's case, this involved working directly with the County of Sacramento 
as early as 1971. Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 the 
Emergency Planning Zones were increased to a minimum of a 10-mile radius 
around Rancho Seco, so Amador County and San Joaquin County emergency planning 
personnel were incorporated in our response planning efforts. 
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Following the issuance of regulations and guidance by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, particularly the 
guidance contained in Criteria for Preparation of Evaluation of Radiological 
Emergency Response Plan to Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654 FEMA REPl, Rev. 1, 
published November 1980, SMUD rewrote its Emergency Response Plan. We fully 
conform with the regulatory guidance and have integrated our internal action 
plans with those counties and state jurisdictions. 
Major topics covered in the plans and implementing procedures include the 
following areas: 
o Assignment of Responsibility 
o On-site Emergency Organization 
o Emergency Response and Resources 
o Emergency Classification System 
o Notification, Methods, and Procedures 
o Emergency Communications 
o Public Education and Information 
o Emergency Facility and Equipment 
o Accident Assessment 
o Protective Response 
o Radiological Exposure Control 
o Medical and Public Health Support 
o Recovery and Reentry Planning in Post ACcident Operations 
o Exercises and Drills 
o Radiological Emergency REsponse Training 
o Responsibility for the Planning Effort 
o Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans 
In the spirit of fulfilling our respective responsibilities to protect the 
public, the District and three counties have had periodic planning team 
meetings for the overall coordination of plans and procedures for response to 
an incident at Rancho Seco. These planning team meetings have been held 
routinely over the past <approximately> five years. 
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Three major emergency response exercises have been successfully completed with 
these jurisdictions in the past four years. A fourth major exercise is 
scheduled for this fall. Each time an exercise is conducted, new refinements 
are made. Much of the current effort is focused on training, notification of 
personnel both on- and off-site, improvements in county communications, and 
procedure review. 
Based upon the comprehensive nature of the current plans and procedures which 
are in place and with the continued training, drills, and exercises, and 
cooperative teamwork the public health and safety can be appropriately assured. 
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Operational Problem Areas 
From the beginning of its operation, much of the scale-up in size of Rancho 
Seco was based on the technology developed for fossil-fueled power plants. 
Staffing and maintenance programs were largely modeled after them. SMUD staff 
weren't initially equipped to prevent the nuclear plant from going through 
shutdowns as frequently or severe as those tolerated at fossil plants. Crew 
size was too small and maintenance standards were inadequate to assure a high 
degree of plant reliability. 
With an environment which led to lack of attention to detail, little problems 
began to compound into more serious ones. While the plant was new, it could 
withstand the impact of these problems and operated fairly well. But as it 
matured, it became more susceptible. 
The Three Mile Island accident caught both the industry and regulators off 
guard. They simply were not prepared to deal with anything like it. The 
industry reacted largely by being defensive and resisted proposed changes. 
SMUD, in particular, as a fiscally conservative public agency, dug in its 
heels. With the pressure on its elected Board to keep rates low, management 
did not want to admit its weaknesses or errors and was re1uctant to ask for 
more money or staff to deal with inevitable changes. 
So, by 1980, SMUD was under-staffed, under-trained, with less than adequate 
maintenance standards, and faced with new regulatory requirements and 
additional plant modifications. The management and staff were now in a 
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reactionary posture. The initial solution was thought to be more temporary 
help (to get us over what was judged as a short-term problem) so a large 
contingent of contractor personnel was brought on board. 
At the same time no additional permanent SMUD management personnel were hired 
and its undermanned staff was unable to provide the supervision, long-range 
planning, or coordination that was required. Instead they found themselves 
consumed with paperwork, daily projects, and plant operating problems. There 
was not sufficient time for training. Maintenance philosophy was, "repair it 
now, we'll find out later why it happened." Unfortunately, more projects came 
along and no one had the time to go back and follow up. Managers and 
supervisors were overloaded and overwhelmed. On top of that there was a lack 
of management systems or controls in place to deal with the resource and 
workload problems being encountered. As productivity and efficiency suffered, 
commitment dates <agreed to with the regulatory agencies) came and went 
without completion of some of the modifications. NRC audits began to become 
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Finally, in 1984, the SMUD Board of Directors commissioned an 1ndependent 
management audit of Rancho Seco. All the problems that had been developing 
over the past ten years of operation and the reasons for them came sharply 
into focus in the written report submitted to the Board in November 1984. 
tiame 1 y: 
o Lack of Staffing 
o Poor Training 
o Poor Maintenance 
o Poor Attention to Detail 
o Poor Management Systems 
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Corrective Action 
The Board reacted quickly hiring a member of the LRS organization, strong in 
nuclear plant management, to act as the technical advisor to the newly created 
<Board) Rancho Seco Implementation Committee. This committee was to be the 
eyes and ears of the full Board to assure the approximately 90 LRS 
recommendations were reviewed, modified (if necessary), and implemented as 
soon as possible. 
The Board also approved an immediate effort to increase the depth of the 
existing staff, recruit new talent, and expand the management team. Last 
Fall, a new nuclear organization was established to provide a better span of 
control and greater indepth accountability. As new people are hired, contract 
personnel are being phased out. One of the first positions filled was that of 
Training Manager. That organization has a major increase in staff, a new $8 
million reactor control room simulator and training facilities have been given 
the 11 90 ahead 11 by the SMUD Board, and four of Rancho Seco's training programs 
have recently been accredited by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 
<INPO> and recognized by the NRC. 
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o General l'\11anager 
G AGM Nuclear 
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MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL ADDITIONS 
• TRAINING MANAGER -
AGM D!rect Report 
• NUCLEAR PROJECT MANAGER -
AGM Direct Report 
o MAINTENANCE 1\~ANAGER -
Plant IVianager Direct Report 
• SCHEDULING r,JJANAGEA -
Plant rJJanager Direct Repor~ 
• TECHNICAL I'J1ANAGER -
Plant rJianager ~lrect Re~ort 
Meanwhile, more attention Is being given to the plant systems. The regulatory 
and industry attitude toward redundancy has changed. Instead of taking credit 
for the back-up safety system as part of normal operating or shutdown 
conditions, the new philosophy Is to modify the plant and procedures to reduce 
the potential for needing <or challenging) the back-up safety systems. 
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MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IMPROVE~JiENTS 
•ADDED SINGLE MAINTENANCE MANAGER REPORTIUG TO 
PLANT MANAGER 
•INCREASE MANAGE!JENT/SUPERVISORY PEFISONNE!. TO 
ALLOW IAORE SUPERVISORY TIME IN FIELD 
•iMPLEMENTATION OF A PLANNING AND SCHEDULING STUD.V 
•IMPLEMENTING GRADUATED QUALITY PROGRAM FOR WORK 
ON MAJOR SECONDARY PLANT. EQUIPMENT 
• PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS 
Additional outside expertise was brought in to assist. A plant manager from 
the record-setting Duke Power Company was asked to come and work with us. 
Duke Power Operations Superintendent also came to help. More recently a 
top-notch team from Management Analysis Company is providing the senior 
management guidance to the nuclear organization to assist In coalesing SMUD's 
new nuclear team in moving ahead with a comprehensive plant performance and 
management improvement program. 
ADDITIONAL OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE 
• MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT TO BOARD -
SINCE JANUARY 1985 
Carl Andognlnl 
• EXPERIENCED PLANT MANAGER -
SEPTEMBER- NOVEMBER 1985 
Ed Smith 
• EXPERIENCED OPERATION SUPERINTENDENT -
MARCH- JUNE 1986 
George Cage 
• MANAGEMENT ANAL YSJS COMPANY TEAM 
SINCE MAY 1986 . Phase I 
Phase H 
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An elaborate plant performance and management improvement program, fully 
staffed by approximately 100 people, is now underway. Its objective is to 
examine past plant performance and management shortcomings, identify fixes, 
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This objective translates into a very formal, tough, comprehensive, detailed, 
time-consuming effort on the part of the District. Included is this program 
are: 
o A determination of the consequences of component and system failure 
(i.e. what would happen if). 
o Personal Interviews with each member of the plant staff to identify 
previously unreported or unresolved plant equipment or procedure 
problems. 
o Careful investigation of the precursors <reasons for and contributors 
to) of events, failures of equipment or procedures, or human error in 
the past. 
Once the above investigations are completed, their significance will be 
determined by the following screening criteria: 
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1. Does it cause a reactor trip? 
2. Does it challenge any safety systems? 
3. Does it cause over- or under-cooling following a reactor trip? 
If the answer to any of the these questions ts "yes" for a given piece of 
equipment or a procedure, they will be given top priority for quick 
correction. All of those which affect over- or under-cooling will be 
corrected before the plant comes out of the current shutdown. 
•Deterministic Failure 
Consequences 
ePlant Staff Interviews 
•Precursor Review 
eEvent-related Actions 
eSystem Review & Testing 
• BWOG Stop-Trip Program 
RAHCIIO SECO 








•Project Management Program 
•Enhanced Quality Program 
.Reduce Challenges 
to Safety Systems 
•Enhance Plant Reliability 
•Reinforced Procedures 
• Restart Report 
.Revised Living Schedule 
• Resource Allocations 
• Test Program Definition 
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The benefits resulting from this intense effort are: 
o Reduced challenges to safety systems 
o Enhanced reliability 
o Reinforced procedures 
o Clearly identified, and agreed to fixes from regulatory agencies on, 
what needs to be done before the plant can restart 
o Key corrective actions factored into our long-term scheduling to 
assure resources are available to meet commitment dates 
Rancho Seco's Future 
As I pointed out in my discussion of generation resources, Rancho Seco is the 
backbone of our baseload generation. It represents 54 percent of all our 
generation facilities. It represents one of the cheapest sources of 
electricity for our customers (i.e. only hydro is less). Even at a 28 percent 
capacity factor, it can pay for its cost of operation. This is well below its 
current lifetime total of 46 percent <capacity factor). Rancho Seco's 
benefits to the SMUO customer-owners are enormous. In its 12-year operating 
history, it has saved over $800 million compared to having built the 
oil-fueled alternative. Its fuel cost is 20 to 30 percent of that for oil, 
even with the recent drop in oil prices, and likewise it remains cheaper than 
coal energy delivered to the Sacramento area. Rancho Seco's capitalized costs 
of $642 million equates to approximately $700 per megawatt which is a 
tremendous bargain to Sacramento electricity users. 
The quality of the overall plant design is good. What got us to our current 
situation was a breakdown of our management systems. These are repairable. 
It is one of the single, most valuable resource in Sacramento County. We are 
well on our way to recovery. We know what has to be done. 
PAGE 27 
We have taken major steps already. We've increased staff, brought in new 
management with new perspectives, we've installed, and are installing new 
equipment. Most importantly, we're determined! 
Our objective is to operate a safe and reliable nuclear plant and to achieve a 
greater than a 70 percent capacity factor for Rancho Seco by 1990. What has 
happened at Rancho Seco is not unique. Some utilities recognized it sooner 
than others, and made the necessary adjustments. Others, like SMUD, are still 
on the road to recovery. But we have a plan and we are well along that road. 
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BABCOCK & WILCOX TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE NUCLEAR SUBCOMMITTEE 
My name is J. H. Taylor and I am a Senior Technical Consultant and Manager of 
Nuclear Plant Licensing for the Nuclear Power Division of The Babcock & Wilcox 
Company. I have worked for Babcock & Wilcox in various capacities for the past 
32 years. Nearly all of this time has involved work in the nuclear area. 
I am pleased to have an opportunity to speak briefly before your subcommittee 
today to present a B&W perspective on the issues you are discussing. 
It seems appropriate to begin with a very brief statement concerning our 
company. B&W today is a very diversified company with many areas of involvement 
in the energy business. Our company began 120 years ago with the development of 
an innovative steam boiler. Since that time, B&W has become a major supplier to 
the electric utility industry in providing central station boilers and related 
equipment to both domestic and international utilities. 
B&W's involvement in the nuclear industry started in the early 1950's. Since 
that time period, the company has been extensively involved in both the 
commercial and the Navy nuclear power activities. Currently we are a major fuel 
and component supplier to the nuclear Navy. In the commercial arena, we are a 
major fuel supplier and provide diverse services to the commercial nuclear power 
industry. 
B&W's involvement in the large central station commercial nuclear power field 
began in the 1960's. Currently, there are eight B&W reactors with operating 
licenses in the United States and four additional units are under construction. 
There is also one plant of the B&W design in Germany, which just received its 
operating license within the past few months. Physically, the arrangement of 
the Reactor Coolant System on all of these plants is very similar. That general 
configuration is shown in isometric form in a figure included in my written 
testimony (see Figure 1). 
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B&W reactors were designed, licensed, and built to the same regulatory and code 
requirements as other plants going through the cycle in the same time period. 
Although the regulatory requirements are common, the performance characteristics 
for B&W plants are different. The B&W plants were designed with a different 
type of steam generator. This difference was designed into the plants to allow 
the utilities to change load at the request of the load dispatcher more rapidly 
than other reactors. The use of steam generators which are physically and 
functionally different has both pluses and minuses from an operational 
standpoint. For example, on the plus side, the tubing in the B&W steam 
generators is more readily inspectable. From the beginning, the water chemistry 
requirements imposed by B&W have been quite strict. The combination of strict 
water chemistry requirements and more easily inspected tubing has produced an 
outstanding steam generator tube integrity record for B&W plants. Tube 
integrity is significant from a safety standpoint. On the down side, there are 
certain component malfunctions which require prompter corrective action because 
of the rapid load change capability designed into the plant. When talking about 
overall safety, the tendency is frequently to focus only on the negatives and 
lose sight of the positives. 
The B&W reactors contain some other 11 plus" safety features which no other 
reactors have. These include vent valves in the reactor internals and direct 
injection of flooding water into the reactor vessel, both of which enhance core 
cooling under certain accident conditions. 
In terms of performance records, the B&W plants are very representative of the 
entire industry. In comparing such things as plant availability and reactor 
shutdown frequency - two key performance parameters - there are some B&W units 
which rank among the very best in the country, there are some which are average, 
and there are some in the lower half of industry performers. f~y written 
testimony contains a figure showing both the overall industry and B&W plant 
performance in the availability area (see Figure 2). I should point out, 
however, the relative positions of each plant vary depending upon the 
characteristics being compared. 
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B&W believes firmly that its reactors represent a very low risk to the health 
and safety of the public. At the same time, B&W is committed to further 
improvements in reactor plant design and operation. We believe that nuclear 
power is a safe means of generating electricity and that the nuclear option is 
important as an element in the nation•s energy future. As members of the 
technical community, we acknowledge that there is no such thing as zero risk, 
but relative to other societal risks we believe that the risk from nuclear power 
is very small. 
We also believe that any significant malfunction at a nuclear plant deserves 
review to determine what can be learned from it. Advantage should be taken of 
these lessons. Consistent with this belief, B&W initiated a unique program 
about six years ago to gather information about the operating experiences at the 
B&W plants. This accumulation of operating experience information has begun to 
pay off. We anticipate that the benefits of this program will become much more 
visible within the next two to three years. 
Also, because of the belief that operating experience can teach many lessons, we 
are providing significant support to SMUD, some of it at no cost to them, to 
help assure that when Rancho Seco returns to power, it will be the beginning of 
a long period of substantially improved performance. It is in this same spirit 
that we are aggressive, active participants in the Babcock & Wi1cox Owners 
Group, which is a unique industry organization having as its major current 
objective the development of new ways to safely improve the performance of all 
B&W plants. Some of the support we provide to the B&W Owners Group is also at 
no cost to the member utilities. 
The B&W Owners Group, of which SMUD is a member, presently has underway a major 
reassessment of the member plants aimed at finding ways to further improve 
performance. In my written testimony, there is further information regarding 
this reassessment effort. (See Attachment A.) 
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In concluding my brief comments, it would be appropriate to comment specifically 
about Rancho Seco. It is no secret that Rancho Seco's performance record has 
considerable room for improvement. At the same time, there have been some 
periods of very good performance at Rancho Seco. There is currently a major 
effort being mounted to set the stage for sustained performance improvement at 
Rancho Seco. 
There should be no doubt that Rancho Seco is capable of significantly improved 
performance. There are no major technical differences between the .Rancho Seco 
Nuclear Station and the Oconee Nuclear Station, which currently holds the 
world's record for continuous days of power operation. The Oconee Nuclear 
Station has been a reliable and economically attractive plant for its owner, 
Duke Power Company. Rancho Seco can be likewise. 
As an indication of the type of performance which Rancho Seco is targeting for, 
some very ambitious and yet quite achievable performance goals have been 
submitted by SMUD management to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations to be 
achieved by 1990. These goals include a diverse set of performance parameters 
covering ten important performance areas. They cover the spectrum from plant 
availability to personnel exposures and industrial accidents. 
I believe that Rancho Seco is very capable of safely, reliably, and economically 
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ATTACHMENT A 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(From B&W Owners Group Performance Improvement Program Description) 
(Submitted to the NRC on May 16, 1986) 
Two abnormal transients at B&W plants in 1985 - one at Davis-Besse and the other 
at Rancho Seco - resulted in increased NRC concern regarding the frequency of 
reactor trips and complexity of transients on B&W plants. The NRC's perception 
that there may be a generic risk significance associated with these transients 
resulted in a decision to call for a broad reassessment of B&WOG plant design to 
assure their design requirements result in levels of safety comparable to other 
PWRs. In undertaking this effort, the NRC recognized that the B&WOG must play 
an important role in performing this reassessment, and as a result requested 
that the B&WOG take the lead in the reassessment. 
The B&WOG readily accepted the opportunity to take the lead in this reassessment 
effort and acknowledged, 
the B&WOG has in-depth expertise and familiarity with B&WOG plants 
the B&WOG has access to a substantial operating experience data base 
accumulated through their Transient Assessment Program (TAP) 
the B&WOG has inherent incentives and responsibilities as owners and 
licensees to further improve plant performance. 
The B&WOG immediately formed a special team comprised of Utility and B&W 
personnel and led by experienced Utility personnel. The first action by the 
team was to develop a more precise and quantitative definition of the perceived 
concerns. This was necessary in order to ensure the development of a meaningful 
program plan with specific and measurable goals. The NRC's concerns regarding 
the frequency of reactor trips and complexity of transients were quantitatively 
defined: 
The quantification of reactor trip frequency was straightforward. 
To define complex transients required the development of specific criteria. 
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After quantitatively defining the concerns, and gathering and evaluating the 
data, performance improvement goals were established for reducing the frequency 
of reactor trips and complex transients. The basis for defining complex 
transients and the establishment of performance goals was the existing B&WOG TAP 
Data Base. 
Previous B&WOG programs had placed extensive effort on reactor trips, but a 
re-review of the TAP Data Base in view of the concern about complex transients 
helped to focus on post-trip response and to identify those areas of the plant 
where additional emphasis may be needed. 
A program plan was developed to define the actions necessary to achieve both of 
the distinctively different, but yet related, program goals; reduce the number 
of trips and complex transients at B&WOG plants. 
Throughout the development of the plan, NRC input has been obtained both through 
meetings and written communications. This input has been carefully considered 
and the resultant plan is intended to address the NRC's concerns. 
One of the main guidelines used in preparing this plan was for it to be 
comprehensive and yet focused on real problems. This guidance is reflected in 
the plan. Its comprehensiveness is demonstrated by the scope of new 
investigations, and the inclusion of an in-depth study comparing the response of 
B&W NSS to other PWR designs. It includes entire systems such as ICS/NNI, main 
and auxiliary feedwater systems, and secondary plant relief systems. This is 
further illustrated by the search for new problems through such means as special 
plant visits and interviews with operators and maintenance personnel. The 
program is focused in that it has specific goals; a reduction in trips and 
complex transients, and specific means to achieve them are being pursued. 
Due to prior B&WOG emphasis on trip reduction, many actions were underway which 
would contribute to achieving that portion of the program goal. This plan 
reflects and incorporates those previously initiated activities. With regard to 
transient response, the review focuses attention on those specific systems and 
components which affect heat transfer in the steam generators. More 
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specifically, the plan focuses attention on those systems and components which 
affect steam generator inventory and pressure. 
In general, the program plan calls for three types of actions: 
1. Those actions which can directly affect specific parts of the plant and 
which can directly contribute to the reduction in trip frequency and 
improved transient response. 
2. Those actions of a programmatic nature which can affect the plant in a more 
indirect but yet important way. 
3. Those activities related to assessing the risk significance of complex 
plant transients. 
Within each of these types of activities, the program plan calls for integrating 
actions which are sponsored by the B&WOG, individual utilities, or other 
industry organizations such as EPRI and INPO. 
The first type of activity includes those things which affect plant operations 
such as hardware configuration, maintenance, procedures and training. From a 
hardware standpoint, the plan includes review of instrumentation, controls, 
fluid system components and their motive power. 
The second type of activity is included to further strengthen B&WOG actions in 
certain areas where past experience indicated a need to do so. Specifically, 
the plan calls for the development of an improved and more structured approach 
to seeking the root cause of problems. It also calls for more formalized 
follow-up to determine the timeliness and effectiveness of implementing 
performance improvement recommendations. The plan calls for a means of regularly 
monitoring B&WOG progress towards the program's performance improvement goals. 
The third type of activity is included in the program to develop a more 
objective understanding of the relationship between core melt risk and complex 
transients. 
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The program schedule calls for the completion of a major part of the 
investigative activity in 1986. Significant action will be underway through 
1986 to reduce trip frequency and improve transient response at B&WOG plants. 
Implementation of other significant actions will extend over several years but 
will be consistent with the INPO performance improvement goals. 
The B&WOG program is extensive. When fully implemented, it is expected to 
produce a significant reduction in reactor trips, plant transient behavior will 
be improved, and an improved understanding will hav~ been developed regarding 
the significance of transients on B&WOG plants. 
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I am Jim lang. I work at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto 
in the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. We are working to understand the 
events of the Chernobyl accident and to develop an understanding of what 
lessons from that event can be applied to our U.S. commercial nuclear power 
industry. The first step is to understand the Chernobyl design and how it 
differs from our own light water reactors. 
The first obvious difference between the Chernobyl reactor and U.S. light 
water reactors is the use of graphite as a neutron moderator. The Soviet 
design evolved from earlier weapons production reactors that used graphite and 
low enrichment uranium. U.S. designers selected light water moderation over 
graphite moderation for power reactor applications for a number of reasons. 
They wanted to avoid graphite's potential flammability, the unique physical 
and chemical changes that occur in graphite in a reactor, and the huge 
physical size and complexity associated with the use of a graphite 
moderator. The Chernobyl reactor contains about 1800 tons of graphite 
penetrated by over 1600 individual pressure tubes, each with its individual 
inlet and outlet piping. In addition, U.S. designers wanted a self-limiting 
reactor where a loss of water would shut down the reactor. This is not the 
case with Chernobyl. 
The next major difference between U.S. and Soviet reactor designs is in the 
defense-in-depth barriers provided to ensure that nuclear fuel and fission 
products cannot escape the core. The Chernobyl reactor and U.S. light water 
reactors use the same kind of fuel surrounded by a zirconium cladding of about 
the same wall thickness. However, the next barrier of defense against release 
is radically different. The Soviets use over 1600 individual pressure tubes, 
each 3 l/2" in diameter, to contain the fuel elements and light water coolant 
flowing past the fuel elements. The pressure tube walls are less than 1/4 
inch thick, whereas the pressure vessels in U.S. light water reactors are 
about 16 feet in diameter and have walls 6 1/2 to 8 1/2 inches thick. This 
means that fuel in the Chernobyl reactor lies right next to the pressure tube 
and, if damaged, has a much greater chance of penetrating this second barrier 
of defense (the pressure tubes} than in a U.S. light water reactor where there 
is an expanse of water and steel between the fuel and the single large 
pressure vessel. 
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These first two Soviet differences, use of graphite as the moderator and thin-
walled pressure tubes, combine to form a third distinction, the possibility of 
creating dangerous hot-graphite/hot-steam reactions from a breach in the 
pressure tube wall. 
The subject of Soviet containments has generated a great deal of discussion in 
the last few days. Early Soviet reactors like Chernobyl did not have 
containment. Incremental steps have been taken on subsequent versions, but 
Soviet technology appears to remain far behind the technology applied to our 
commercial light water reactors. 
To us, full containment means complete enclosure of all reactor and primary 
support systems for the reactor such that any design basis accident is fully 
contained inside. Full primary containment is achieved typically in the U.S. 
by building a strong, thick, and practically air-tight steel and concrete 
containment building around all primary reactor systems. On the other hand, 
at Chernobyl, only part of the reactor system appears to be contained within a 
boundary intended to be pressure tight. At most, there are compartments 
around the lower part of the reactor to suppress the pressure from breaks in 
the inlet piping but there appears to be no way of isolating pipes outside 
these compartments. This seems to be substantiated by an Associated Press 
report that Ivan Yemilianov, Deputy Director of the Soviet design 
organization, "confirmed speculation that the reactor did not have a 
conventional containment vessel used in the West to prevent radiation leaks in 
case of a breakdown." 
The final area of U.S. and Soviet designs that I wish to address is safety 
systems. This topic is perhaps the most difficult area of comparison, but 
also is the area that is likely to yield the most useful applications to our 
industry. First, the Chernobyl reactor is not self-limiting as our U.S. light 
water reactors are. Loss of cooling water at Chernobyl can cause reactor 
power to increase. Translations of Russian reports and papers, which we have 
studied, state that under certain conditions these reactors have been reported 
to be unstable and difficult to control. 
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Soviet publications show emergency core cooling systems with modern designs, 
which appear to be similar to Western approaches but appear to lack degree 
of diversity and backup components that we provide in our modern light water 
reactors. We also have concluded that Soviet designs do not address the full 
scope of design basis accidents that we do in the U.S •• nor do they treat 
severe accident and emergency planning in the detail we do. Finally, we think 
that our limits for reactor operation, emergency procedures, realistic 
operator training, and many other operations-related features that are 
important to reactor safety in the U.S. may not receive the same level of 
attention in the Soviet Union. 
There may well be lessons for us from the Chernobyl accident; however, because 
of the design differences I just described and the improvements made in U.S. 
reactor operations over the last seven years, information from the Soviet 
Union is not turning up any deficiencies in U.S. light water reactor 
designs. Rather, the lessons of Chernobyl may some day suggest opportunities 
for further improvement. 
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by H. W. II-l.SER 
Prof. of Phy5ics 
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On Saturday monling, Harch 1G, both major Sac ramer' to newspapers car-
• 
/ 
ried front page stord.eh about a 51 billion clnirn~filcd agninst the 
Sacramento Municipai Utility District (.SHUD) the Jay before, a claim 
contending, according t'o the newspapers, that large quantities of radio-
active water from SMUD' s Rancho Seco nuclear powf: c plant have endangered 
the public. I was particularly interented in the alJegatior. becau::>e I 
have known for years thut analyses of milk samples from cows near Rancho 
Seco have shown the presence of radioactive iodine-131 which could hardly 
have come from any source but Rancho Seco. 
Morton Friedman, attorney for the claimants, confirmed my nssumption 
that the ~iling of the claim was merely the legally nr>CARsnry preliminary 
to a lawsuit to \>e filed against SHUD after the anLi,:ipah:d rejection by 
SHUD of the claim. 
At its regular meeting on th;;, "vening ot April 4th, the SHUD board of 
directors rejected without discussion the claim by 11 Conrad and Patricia 
· Weisker, et al11 for damaees resulting from rudioHctive contamination of 
the area a1~und Rancho Seco. 
On March 20 the SMUD Public Information Office had sent to news mediA 
representatives the "5th in a Geries of informational reports1' (Report) 
which presumably indicates SMUD 1 s levAl of under::otand.Hlg of Rancho Seco 1 s 
radiation problems. The Report is replt~t~ with insup:-1ortabl e statAments i 
for instance, that "the Intt:rnational Council on Radiatior. r':-otection 
[presumably meaning the In terJ,,> t ional Council on H:tdio loc; i c:1l Protection] 
has established a limit of 5,000 mi11lrf'ms pf'r ye<H· as a lt·vcl at which 
(O·l/£1<) 
Document 2, spc~aking of iu; Lf;q, oror>-).S•.d 1irntt of 1'/G rni11i:·.:ms (mr) per 
year for the general popul;-Jt1orc- 1/30 of t.ht: 5000 mrjy.:ar vrcup~tional 
limit! --state that "This li:nitatlOn nlJCc:~;·ro;1riJy invvlvc<; a comprorr.i~;e Lc-
tween delete rio us e f fee ts and ~;oci <tl t;enL: f i U; .a~ l'ecornm•: nda :::i rm in qunn t ita t i vc 
terms are needed in the !iesign of po~twr plantr; ••• it is felt thnt th:iR level 
provides reasonable latitude for the expanRion of atomic energy programs ••• 
It should be emphasized that the limit may not in fact repreGent the proper 
balance between pos[;ible harm and probable benefit ••• " 
.Since the promulgatipn of Lhe 170 mr/year limit, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (in December 1979) reduced the permissible ~xposm·e of the 
general population to radiation resulting from the "nuclear fuel cycle" t_o 
a limit of 25 mr/year. In sp~ te of pressure to do so, the occupational 
exposur~ limit of 5000 mr/year -- 200 times as high! -- has not been also 
reduced, for the obvious reason that any substantin1 reduction would inca-
pacitate nuclear power plants. Rancho Seco, for instar.ce, has wori{ed men 
i"n radiation fields of at least 15,000 mr/hour! (In 1978 EdwHrd Radford, 
chair of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological 
Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BIER Co~mittce) testified to a House of 
Representatives comm1ttee that new evidence indicated occupational exposure 
limits should be red~ced by a factor of at least 10 because of the risk of 
c~ncer induction. S0ymore Jablon, also of NAS, noted that "if a person 
receives the NRC limit, he is going to have effects." 
Not even the 25 mr/year wns conRidered by the EPA to bf hrtrmless; on the 
contrary, in proposing ~he regulation the EPA staLPd f'XUli.citt~ly that the 
limit was considered to be a compromisf' b0tw0en thr- r,<'fl•·ti ~ C'Am.>ef> r.nd 
othpr hf'nlth effects to be exp,dr·d from such expo:,u:cs, nr:d thP b,nefits 
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of nuclcnr· power pJ.-,nt op, l'Dl iun. 
as the SHUD Public Kicinform;dion Office. 
/ 
(_o ~~~~) 
ESTIMATES OF RADIATION-INDUCED CANCER DEATHS 
OF REACTOR WORKERS FOR 1980 EXPOSURES 
BEIR I (1972) 2-4 CANCER DEATHS (50-80 PER 10
6 PERSON-REMS)(A) 
BEIR II (1979) 3-15 CANCER DEATHS (70-353 PER 10
6 PERSON-REMS) (B) 
BEIR III ( 1980) 3-10 CANCER DEATHS (77-226 PER 10
6 PERSON-REMS)(C) 
UNSCEAR (1977) 5 CANCER DEATHS ( 100 PER 10
6 PERSON-HEMS) (D) 
RADFORD (1981) 1Q:-.30 CANCER DEATHS (2()()._600 PER 10
6 PERSON-REMS) (E) 
GOFMAN (1977) 200 CANCER DEATHS (3771 PER 106 PERSON-REMS)(F) 
MORGAN ( 1978) 350 CANCER DEATHS ( 7000 PER 10
6 PERSON-REM.S) (G) 
A) NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL 
EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION (BEIR COMMITTEE), REPORT FOR 1972. 
B) BEIR COMMITTEE, 1979. 
C) BEIR COMMITTEE, 198o. 
D) UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, 
1977. 
E) RADFORD, E., SCIENCE, 1981 AUG. 7. 
F), GOFMAN, J. W., HEALTH PHYSICS, 1981 JULY. 
G) MORGAN, K. Z., BULLETIN Q!.!!!,! ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 1978 SEPTJlmER. 
(MORGAN•S ESTIMATES ARE BASED~ON HANFORD DATA OF MANCUSO, STEWART, AND 
KNEALE PUBLISHED IN HEALTH PHYSICS, 1977 NOVEMBER) • 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
THE ABOVE IS FROM ANALYSIS .Q!.: !!!!£ ~ Q!! NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORKER 
EXPOSURES !Q RADIATION, FRED MILLAR AND BOB ALVAREZ, ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICriNSTITUTE, 1981 SEPT. 1. ~ 
Takes Se 
As it braces for a reorganization soon 
to be announced by the President, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission {NRC) 
this month comes to grips with the most 
difficuh !t:chnical decision it has had to 
face since the accident at Three Mile Is-
land a year ago. 
At issue are the safety and reliabili!y 
of !he reactor made by Babcock and Wil· 
cox (B & W), the type !hat went out of 
control at Three Mile lsl~nd and which is 
installed in five other operable gener-
ating plants around the country. II is just 
po:~slble, says Darrell Eisenhuc, acting 
director of the NRC's division of oper· 
ating reactors, that the NRC staff will 
find this system unstable in its present 
configuration. 
Eisenhut's deputy, Robert Tedesco, 
was asked on 13 March to lead an intense 
2- to )-week review or the problems with 
B & W reactors and come up with some 
definitive condusions based on the last 
12 months of study. The review was 
prompted in part by the gyrations of a re· 
actor in late February at the Crystal Riv-
er plant in Florida, in which the system 
overheated and dumped radioactive wa· 
ler onto the floor of the containment 
building. That reactor was made by 
a & w. -
The NRC staff must investigate this 
latest incident in an atmosphere of some 
uncertainty. The original investigation of 
steam system troubles in B & W reac-
tors last year grew out of a request made 
by Commissioner John Ahearne, lhe 
man named President Carter in De-
cember as the new, but tempor...r.ry, chair-
man of the NRC. Carter has already giv-
en notice that Ahearne will nol remain 
chairman, and he has indicated that the 
re~hutfte of NRC authority will give 
Ahearne's successor greater power to di· 
recl, hire, and fire members of the staff. 
Will the new chairman share Ahearne's 
concerns'? One cannot say. 
Thus, with uncertain leadership in the 
NRC and the White House, the NRC 
st;.~lfers are tackling an issue whose reso-
lu!iun could be very importanl to lhe fu· 
ture of nuclear power. If !he B & W sys-
tem is as problem-ridden as some on lhe 
NRC stafflhink il is. then !he public and 
the nuclear industry would be well 
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served by a decision to scrap or overhaul 
this particular system quickly. This 
would be a painful decision, costly in fi. 
nancial terms, in lost energy production,· 
and in lost prestige for !he companies 
concerned. But il would be less costly to 
the i.nduslry than a prolonged record of 
stumbles and near-accidents. 
Alternatively, if there is no fundamen· 
tal design weakness in the B & W reac-
tor, !he NRC will have to demonstrate 
that the accident at Three Mile island 
and the severe .. transient'' at Crystal 
River are unrelated. It will need to de· · 
fend any policy that allows these reac· 
tors to continue operating without re· 
moJeling. 
The trouble with the B & W system 
may be that it is too rambun•.:tious. Like 
an overbred racehorse, it may be too jit· 
tery to settle ·down placidly to its task 
(boiling water). II likes !o cavort. This ls 
not I he way the NRC describes the 
lem it is examining this month. The anal· 
off 
ant, the B & W reactor may allow the 
of only 30 to 60 
dry, while other 
allow 30 to 60 minules.. 
of !he 
ment poses no hazard ordinarily, but 
when uueriy unex~ted 
pens, as was the case al Three Mile b-
land, or when the computer fails. as was 
the case a! River, it mag-
nifies the demands placed un human ca-
pabilities. Not every operator can man-
age a reactor a crisis. 
Here, in is· how Eis.:nhut de-
scribes the River The 
"took off and did own 
when the computer in the !CS re-
anu out erroneous infor-
mation. The trouble when some-
thing (it is still not known what) created a 
short circuit in a section of the control 
room not related to I he reactor conlrols.. 
The Florida Power. claims !hat 
the short circuit was caused either by a 
~he computer in the ICS began .. ,....,.,.,""' 
giving out erroneous information. 
ogy is suggested a phrase that 
neers use when they talk about the 
unique characteristics of the B & W 
equipment: it is "ex!remely respon-
sive," they say. Is i! perhaps too respon· 
sive for ordinary control room operators 
to ride? 
In a sense, the question has already 
been answered. During normal 
the B & W reactor is run with the help of 
an instrumentation and control system 
(!CS), which uses a dimputer !o make 
split-second judgments and adjuslmenu 
governing the reactor. The computer is 
necessary, the NRC"s Eisenhut 
because a mortal operator cannot be ex-
pected lo respond rapidly enough to 
keep up with the reactor when its deli· 
cate is dis!urb~:d. He 
out, for example, that with a loss of cool· 
the control 
or maintenance work 
done on an panel. The short did 
no! knock out the entire system but did 
distort all the 
in a B & W reactor remain within a rda-
narrow band of temperatures. The 
computer, which is instructed to worry 
about such that the 
coolant was growing too cold. It there-
upon began lo accelerate the nuclear re-
action in the core by conlrol 
rods. It reduced the flow 
of coolant. The reactor overheated. 
drove !he pressure up lo 1he danger lev-
el, and then shut down. 
The befuddled computer inslrocled 
the pressure relief valve and re-
main open. This """"''"'." 
of a "desiRn defecl in the electrical sys-
tem." The emergency core cooling r;ys-
tem hegan pumping water inln the reac-
tor. An astute operator noticed lhe com-
puter's error in opening the relief valve. 
and several minutes later plugged !he 
leak by switching shut a block valve. 
Water filled the reactor to the top and 
then poured out through two safety 
valves. One of these did not at first re-
seal properly. Befnre it was ~ver. 43.000 
gallon~ of radioactive water were 
dumped on the floor. 
While this was no! a major accident, it 
has proved a ffif\ior embarrassment for 
the NRC. It occurred on the very day the 
commission announced that it would re-
sume licensing new reactors, a proce-
dure which had been suspended for II 
months while the Three Mile Island acci-
dent was being studied. Secondly. the 
Crystal River incident seemed to confirm 
douhts about the B & W system raised 
by the NRC staff last fall. 
Harold Denton. director of the NRC's 
office or nuclear reactor regulation. 
wrote to ownen of 8 & W systems on 2.5 
October. alerting them to the NRC's in· 
vestigation and a~king for their help. A 
paper which he appended stressed a 
broad concern: "The slaff is concerned 
by the inherent responsiveness of 
B & W OSTG [once-through steam gen· 
eratorl design. While some specilic in-
stances are rresented in !he next section 
of this paper. I he staff concern!! are al:o~o 
of a scncmll nature. It i!l felt that good 
design practice and maintemmce of the 
defense-in-derth concert require a 
stable well-behaved ~yslem. To a lnrge 
part. meticulous operator atlention aml 
prompt manual action is used {sicl on 
these plants to compensate for the sy!l-
tem sensitivity. rather than any inherent 
design features. The staff believes the 
general stability of the B & W plant con-
trol systems should be improved ...... 
Many changes were made as a result 
of this study and others done by the in-
dustry. But the significance of the Crys-
tal River foul-up is thai !he problem per-
sists. The extr~!'"-~- .. ~~~itivity" of 
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B & W reactors. identilled as a source of 
trouble al Three Mile Island. may be a 
fundamental !law for whi~h no 
te~hnical till is available. 
Duval Holt. a spokesman for B & W. 
said his company is not yet prepared 10 
comment on the transient at Crystal Riv-
er or on any of the generic problems 
associa1ed with B & W equipmenl. 
Florida Power. which owns the plant 
at Crystal River. is "well satisfied" with 
the B & W equipment thus far. accord-
ing to spokesman William Johnson. No 
damage was done to any critical equip-
ment; the radioactive waste has been re-
moved from the conlainment building 
and prepared for shipment lo South Car· 
olina's disposal site. It is too soon, John· 
son said. to estimate the \ost of this in-
cident or to render a linal judgment on 
the plant's performance. 
The Nuclear Safely Analysis Center 
(NSAC), a research organiza!ion created 
lasl year by the electric utility industry. 
concluded a brief study of the Crystal 
River incident in early March. The staf· 
fen~ who worked on the project at first 
proposed to make recommendations for 
changes in specific lypes of equipment, 
but in the end they decided to offer 
broad. generic suggestions. As one 
NSAC slalfer said. the operators at 
Crystal River were "11ying blind" during 
the crisis hecause the control room in-
strumentation had failed. Therefore. the 
principal recommendation of the NSAC 
study is that some 11ort of redundancy be 
buill into the controls that govern normal 
operation of the plant. This would re-
quire a redesign of electrical power sup-
ply systems. · 
No matter what remedy the NRC 
chooses, the decision will be difficult. 
for lhe commission works in a highly 
charged polilical environment today. In-
dustry leaders are protesting loudly thai 
the (!Overnment has become too con· 
cemed with the trivial mechanical prob-
lems of nuclear plants and not enough 
concerned with impending energy short-
ages. Yel the NRC can hardly ignore the 
safely-related problems thai its own staff 
ami NSAC have identified. It will be in-
teresting to see how lhe lessons of the 
Crystal River incident will he applied. 
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-- 2 --
The 111 !he Nuclear lors. holds 
Commission INRCI whose i~ lo pre· waler ihal 
vent nuclear accidenls work in a ~chizo­
environmenl. As demands for 
protecling rmhlic ~afcly grow more nu-
merous and more complex. the federal 
support for dealing with them grows 
weaker. 
Ever !Iince the accident nl Three Mile 
Island, lhe NRC has tried lo broaden its 
outlook on ~afely i!l~ues. II ha!! focU!!ed 
less on I he po!!sibility of ~pectac· 
ular but event!~, such 1111 large 
pipe breaks, which seemed Ro lmporlant 
10 yean ll!ZO. Now it has begun lo look 
al f'Oienlial con11equence!l of 
mundane mi~hapn. Three Mile hland · 
showed !hal the small and rar more likely 
slipups may be a:. di~astrous a!l 1he 
big ones. Thus. !he NRC ha!ll opened up 
a whole new category or worry. In lhe 
process. il has produced an enormous 
list of that mu~t be in· 
ve~ligated and remedied 
AI lhe same time. lhe 
told 10 CUI ils J'ii'OJ'IOSCd 1982 
12 percent, jusl like other federal agen-
cies. The cuts will full on !he 
staff and on research. 
officials cstimu!e thai rc· 
search ahsorb aboul 75 percent of 
the mandated reduction. On lop of lhi'l. 
the Adplini~lration hus a'lketlthe NRC' lo 
accelerate the of light water 
ami lo prepare lo licen~e the 
breeder renchlL new Jemamh 
also 'ilrain resources. 
The AdminHration is cool 
the NRC's 
rc<>eurch 
increase tht? turmoil in nuclear 
over\ighL Om: of lhe !1eneli!s of 




of rc;u.:tor vc~sd 
nacking. knnwn in the rade ;" !he 
"thermal siH~t'k i"IIC. suddenly a hot 
topic a! the NRC. 
;\t !he hear! oflhe problem i" the \led 
VC\'cl which in pres,mited watel rcat:· 
71>1> 
from the reactor core. 
slccl lose~ resilience. 
well tmdersloml. Bul 
becomes quite brillle. II becomes briHie 
even at lcmper!IUm::s. 
!he range or 220" to 290• F. Flaws in !his 
seclio~ of lhe vessel m11y inlo 
crack!! and, under certnin circum~limce!'l, 
!he cracks 
which Is needed 




gt·t l he NRC to 
Hou<>e ~uhcomminee on energy aml the 
environment. Udall became mtcre'l!ed 
and urged the NRC to inve-,rigate. 
Qwte apart from the roluic-; involved, 
the NRc·, sense ofurgenq· uerivcs fmm 
"damn good data" developed over 1 hc 
1<.~'>1 'i years, John\on 'ays. The NRC~ 
chicf of safety technology. Thomas Mur-
ley. confirmed the worst expectations in 
Fehruary 1981 when he carefully reex-
ammed the data from Rancho Seco and 
found that all the elements of a thermal 
shock scenario had been present-ex-
cept for a hrittle vessel. 
In May 1981. the NRC asked the Oak 
Ridge National Lahoratory to gather to-
gether all the availabte information on 
thermal shock and to help estimate the 
amount of risk involved. The laboratory 
produced a draft report on 9 October. 
concluding that "pressurized thermal 
shock must be regarded as a serious 
potential threat and merits a great deal 
more !\tudy using refined techniques." 
The ftnul dn&ft it due later this full: il will 
say essentially the same thing. 
'One of the authors. R. D. Cheverton. 
says that the scenario for a thermal 
shock accident is quite pi:IUsible and thai 
the consequences could be severe. But 
he points out there are huge uncertain-
ties in the data used to calculate what 
happen~ at each step in such an accidenl. 
To grc~sp the degree of uncertainty, 
consider the difference obtained simply 
by using different computer models to 
simulate a thermal shock. The Oak Ridge 
staff used two techniques, known as the 
IRT code and the TRAC code. both of 
which were developed for studying the 
behavior of an overheated fuel core. One 
difference is that IRT assumes incorrect, 
and TRAC assumes correct. operator 
action. They were adarted. not entirely 
SUCCessfully. for e!>timaling What WOUld 
happen to an overstressed pressure ves· 
sel. The Oak Ridge group found that in 
simulating a break in the main steam 
line. the IRT said that a reactor vessel 
would he vulnerable to rupturing after 
only J or 4 yc;m; of use. With the same 
a.,.;umptions. the TRAC code showed 
that the pre"ure vessel would 1101 rup-
ture during its entire lifetime. 
Many year-; of research on 'ileel cylin· 
ders have produced nothing more defi-
nite than this. The engineers have con-
cluded I hat America·, aj:!ing prc-;•wrized 
reactors may already pm.e a 'ierious 
thrcal to public safety. And they have 
adJed a l{lolnnle '>aymg that much of the 
data lt:admg to th1s condusion may be 
wrong. 
Tlw; safety problem is different from 
tllhe1' that bedcv1lthc NRC in a couple 
of re,rect-,. llnlike co1 rosion prohlem\. 
11 NOVI'MI!I H I'IHI 
thermal 'ihock could occur 
without It i'l larger than m0\1 
other issues. Perhaps as many as 20 
water reactors may he 
fecled. The remedies are awkward and 
terribly One solminn some· 
limes mcniloned would he to do~e the 
affected and ask the owners to try 
to anneal the weakened steel by hca!mg 
it to a very temperature for a 
of days. A plant have to be put out 
Rancho S.CO 1, Clay Station, Cslllomls 
lo dtl ~o. the 
a!lent1un to th..: uf 
thermal shock. Roe Jedmes to rank 11 
relalmn 10 issues 'iince. he 
says, that would be like trying to ,Je..:idC 
During un emnflt'flcy shutdown in Murch 1978. the opt'mtors a/ this plum unwillin~lv Jimu-
iatt'd alltlrt' elt'mt•nts of a thnmul slrack incident. Forllmtllt!l)', the rem tor l'cswl was too 
ytTUfiR {J years old) 10 auck, us an older l't'Hrl might l1a1'e done. 
of commission for 2 years to do this. 
Even this might not be adequate, for 
metallurgisls have not had enough expe· 
rience with irradiated steel to a,uarantee 
that annealing would remove all lhe 
flaws from a weakened pressure vesseL 
NRC Chairman Nunzio Palladino mel 
wilh the members of lhe independent 
· Advisory Commillee on Reactor Safe-
guards (ACRSl on 16 October to discuss 
plans for coping wilh thermal shock. The 
ACRS told Palladino that thi-; was an 
urgent maller, bul no I one requinng im-
mediate plan! closings. PallaJino. how-
ever, could not the ACRS a firm 
schedule for his own plans lo clarify the 
risks involved. By common consent. it 
seems 10 have been decided that the 
NRC will have a grace period of I year in 
which to come up with better informa-
tion thai will confirm or di~pelthe lhreaL 
Herbert Kouts. a mcmher of the 
ACRS. is a physici~l al !he Broukhaven 
National Laboratory who has carried out 
research on reactor ves~cl prohlem' for 
more than 2U years. in his !he 
which of his children he likes the best. 
NRC onicials do not want to appei!r 
neglectful of any of the problems that 
have been winnowed out anti placed on 
the !is I of unresolved issues! USil. 
All of these are an "A" ranking in 
priority Uhermal sh•>ck is listed under A· 
II, "reactor vessel materials tough-
ness") and are worked on together. 
In thc past, I he NRC was criticized for 
shunting aside !he problems. Ia· 
beiinglhem "generic 1ssucs." and study-
ing them to death. The USI lisl is a 
managerial gimmick dcsigncJ lo over· 
come thatlendem:y. Once a problem has 
been ranked as a USL it acqtures spectai 
sigmticance. A task manager is assigned. 
Milestones and deauline;. for solving the 
problem are set. reports to 
Congress descrihc: thc: proj!ress of work. 
The August report h~ted 16 active 
US I' s, running from A-1. "water ham-
mer." !o A-·Hi, · 





NRC Reviews Brittle ac Hazard 
The staff would 
.but 
summer, 
industry sees "no near term" risk at all 
Although the United States generally 
leads the world in setting standards for 
nuclear safety, it has not been the first to 
act on the hazard known as pressurized 
thermal shock. This came to light during 
a review this March before the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), which 
must decide what to do about thermal 
shock, a problem that has received a lot 
of notice in the press. 
The danger is essentially this: the steel 
vessel that contains the hot fuel and 
water in a pressurized water reactor is 
designed so that it should never crack 
during its expected 40-year lifetime. 
However, under high stresses, a vessel 
could burst apart, creating a severe leak 
of radioactive water. The possibility of 
this happening is remote, but recent dis-
coveries make it seem less so. The most 
important new information is that the 
welds in certain vessels made of steel 
plates contain impurities, and these are 
causing the welds, in the presence of 
high neutron radiation, to become more 
brittle than the plates which they hold 
together. If cooled too rapidly, a flawed 
weld might crack. The original safety 
codes assumed that the welds would age 
at the same rate as the steel plates, but 
now it appears that welded vessels may 
have a shorter lifetime than anticipated. 
~unzio Palladino. chairman of the 
NRC. ordered a review of the thermal 
shock hazard last year. On 9 March. he 
and the other commissioners listened to 
two briefings on the problem. one pre-
pared by the NRC staff and the other by 
industry spokesmen. Palladino asked, 
among other things, whether foreign 
governments were worried about reactor 
cracking. The staff briefers gave little 
information; the industry spokesmen, 
less. But one NRC employee in the audi-
ence said that West Germany has 
changed the way fuel is loaded in at least 
two reactors to reduce the risk of a 
thermal shock accident. 
NRC chairman Nunzio Palladino 
Ridge National West Ger-
many decided in l9i5 that all reactor 
vessels would be made of forged steel 
cylinders with a steel cap at each end. 
The new design was intended to make 
vessels built after 1975 stronger. would 
require fewer welds, and the welds 
would not be near the middle of the 
vessel, where damaging neutron radia-
tion is most intense. 
Like the United States. West Germa-
ny operates some older reactors made 
welded steel In two of these. at 
Stade and Obrigheim, the Germans have 
reduced the amount of neutron radia-
tion that reaches the walls of the vesseL 
Fuel bundles have been in the 
core with elements near the 
outer edge to absorb neutrons 
from the center toward the steel walls. 
This has slowed the process of embriule-
ment. 
Finland also has decided to shield the 
this vessel is made 
parently the Finns 
radiation was so intense 
weakening the steel 
According to an engineer at the Oak gree. 
The NRC has studied the problem of 
steel embrittlement with growing intensi-
ty for about a decade. The industry, too. 
has poured several million dollars into 
structural analysis during the last 5 
years. And in the past year, stimulated 
by the NRC"s concern, several plant 
owners have changed the way fuel is 
handled to reduce the neutron bombard-
ment of the vessel walls. They have 
the schedules so that 
fuel is used longer in the reactor. and 
more depleted fuel bundles are placed at 
the outer of the core to lower 
radiation levels near the waiL But no 
U.S. group has gone as far as the Ger-
mans in revamping construction or fuel-
The NRC has not required any major 
change in vessel construction. except to 
raise the standard for weld The 
NRC has not ordered a change in fuel 
arrangement. although the staff expects 
some new rules may be issued later this 
year. in June. Until now, the 
government has been reluctant to impose 
this area. 
is ill defined. Mean-
are 
the 
was Clark Gibbs, vice 
president of Middle South Services and 
chairman of the Atomic Industrial Fo-
rum ·s committee on reactor licensing 
and He told the NRC that a 
recent Oak Ridge on vessel crack-
ing exaggerated the risks. The study re-
ported that some vessels might be in 
danger of cracking within a few years. In 
fact, Gibbs said, the own cal-
culations made in December and January 
show ·'that there is no significant near-
concern"' about vessel 
Gibbs said that · many utilities 
have instituted low 
fuel load which may reduce the 
overall rate of vessel embrittiement. · · 

Rancho Seco Reactor 
Suffers Another Mishap 
An "unusual event" at the Rancho Seco 
nuclear reactor 25 miles from Sacramento 
lasted onlv 4 hours, from 4:30a.m. to 8:41 
a.m. on 26 December, but it triggered a 
special inquirv by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). According to a pre-
liminary NRC report dated 5 January, all 
power to the plant's computerized control 
system was lost for 26 minutes. A pump 
burned out, spilling 450 gallons of radioac-
tive water onto the floor of an auxiliary 
building, some of which escaped to the 
atmosphere as radioactive steam. A spokes-
man for the owner, the Sacramento Munici-
pal Utility District, says that a person stand-
ing at the edge of the sire boundary would 
have received no more than 0.2 millirem of 
extra radiation, a trivial amount. Two work-
ers received small exposures to excess radia-
tion. 
Despite the happy outcome, the incident 
aroused concern for rwo reasons. The 
chromcle of the 4-hour crisis indicates that 
the control room was thrown into confusion 
and that operators had only a tentative grasp 
of what was going on inside the plant when 
the electrical power was out. 
Second, the steel reactor vessel was put 
3H 
through .1 kmd ot' ,rre<>;, It I'> nor 
endure lr w,l\ m crheated, rhen 
cooled at prcs:-un.:. 
hJ.Z.1rd known JS 
shock." The ~RC !us been n;nn•rnt'l 
several years about the pmsibilltY that welds 
between the steel pl.1res crack under 
stresses such as these. L.1st 1 u!v the Comnm-
sion issued a rule 
against this risk. 
had two coo!down events, a one m 
1978 and a minor one on 2 October 1985. 
Judging by the NRC report, the environ-
menr in the control room was chaotic after 
the power went out. (The investigators have 
not yet discovered why the power failed.) 
Many indicators and controls are pro-
grammed w go to mid-value when power is 
lost. When this happened at Rancho Seco, 
water flow to the reactor decreased, leading 
I; 
.-: 
Third thermal shock 
lk 




mer examined the 
and announced that the mcidem had 
no general for this tvpc of 
reactor. They that Ran-
cho Seco will 
that loss of control 
rapid cooldown 
Rancho Seco has now had three mishaps resulting in excessively rapid coolduwn. 
to an increase in pressure and heat. Other 
systems went faster at mid-value. Within 
seconds, the reactor automatically shut 
down because of the pressure buildup. At 
this point "many fire alarms," a actua-
tion alarm, a seismic al.1rm, a 
temperature alarm for the spent fuel pool 
went off. 
The operators made several false starts in 
anempting to bring the system under con-
trol. They anempted to close some valves 
using hand cranks, and when a couple of 
them apparently got sruck. they resorted to a 
wrench. It, too, proved inadequate to the 
task. Meanwhile, the emergencv heating and 
cooling system sprang into action, "signifi-
cant1y" increasing the noise in the control 
room. Nine minutes later, someone shut this 
emergency svstem off to maintain A 
sentor operator, exhausted from his 
work on the hand cranks, collapsed on the 
An ~RC official in California savs a more 
in Febru-
to get into 
irs own, without 
from operators. "We think 
may be necessarv the control 
ro make the plant more for-
official savs. "We'd like to 
don't have 
to take any actions to 20 minutes" 
into a crisis. In this recent case, the operators 
the cooldown from 
more severe 
sooner than 
The NRC has not decided vet 
the incident has 
time has been 
Ill ELIOT .MARSHALL 
the 

The RBMK·1 000 reactor 
There are appra'CtmateZv 20 of these "J!ressure 
tube" reactors in the So!'ier Union, the newer 
ones rated at 1000 meqan•atts. All are said to 
be shut don;n at J!rem7t, balving the Soviets> 
J!roduction of nuclear eleetn"city. Unlike U.S. 
reactorr, the_v haPe no J!ressure vessel or 
containment dome. The uranium dioxitk fuel 
and woli11.g water are contained in hundreds 
of metal tubes, each linked to the coolant 
pumps a11d mvunred in a core matk of 
graphite blocks. TIJe core is surrountkd by 
inert gas and sits in the bottom of a wncrete 
n•ell. Tbe blast at Chernobvl tore awav the 
upper part of the building ·reJ!rmnted in this 
drawing. 
on it to "evaporate instantaneously." 
P~:ople in an 18-mile radius around the 
plant were evacuated in Kiev city buses, a 
process that began 36 hours after the reactor 
caught fire. "The situation remams compli-
cated,'' according to Tass, but technicians are 
mil manning three other reactors at Chemo-
bvl. 
At the outset, Soviet officials gave few 
detatls beyond acknowledging that there 
was an accident. Indeed, the Soviets went 
this far only when Swedish diplomats de-
manded to know why a radioactive cloud 
crossed into Sweden sometime on Sunday 
27 April. At first, the Soviets denied that 
there had been an accident. Then Swedish 
officials in Moscow cited data that pointing 
irrefutablY to a reactor blowout. On 28 
April. the Soviets offered a terse confirma-
tion. Also in this meeting, Soviet officials 
informallv asked for advice on putting out a 
graphite reactor tire. They also sought ad-
vice from Wt-st Germanv. The United States 
otfered help the same d;v, but the offer was 
declined. However, Robert Gale, a bone 
marrow transplant specialist from the Uni-
versitv of California at Los Angeles, tlew to 
Russia on 2 Mav to offer private help. 
The Soviets must have been aware that an 
accident was in progress as early as 25 April, 
observers sa\'. In anv event, the Soviets 
failed to warn ne1ghh~ring countries of the 
impending crisis. This did at least as much 
harm to Soviet prestige as the fallout itselt 
In a belated efiort to repair the damage, 
several Soviet officials have granted inter-
HJ MAY 1986 
views to Western news media, but have 
provided few additional details. 
The Soviets were not the onlv ones em-
barrassed bv the information blackout. With 
unbecoming haste, U.S. officials on 29 and 
30 April repeated some confused rumors 
that flickered across the news wires in the 
early days. For example, thev gave credence 
to reports that thousands had died. The 
director of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, Kenneth Adelman, said it 
would be "preposterous" to think otherwise. 
Tho Secretary of State said he would "bet 
$10" that the deaths were "far in excess of' 
the numbers given by the Soviets. The 
White House and State Department also 
gave authoritv to reports that a second 
reactor at Chemobvl (unit 3) had melted 
down, that the graphite fire would bum •'for 
weeks," and that the reactor had been used 
to produce weapons material. 
It may rum our that none of this is true. 
While it is difficult ro be certain about the 
damage, U.S. scientists sav that it is 
that 2000 people were killed outright. 
"The Russian reports, sparse though they 
are, make sense," savs Richard Wilson, the 
Harvard physicist who chaired the American 
Physical Societv's 1985 srudv of severe nu· 
dear accidents. "My guess is that we will get 
80 dead. That's a lot, but ir's nor 2000 .... 
They evacuated probablv evervone within 
10 miles downwind, and if vou look at our 
emergency planning they say, 
evacuate people 12 downwind .... 
The Russians have done the 
contaminated wne 
percent a few 
so the 
would 
the cesium got out, we mav be 
1000 square which isn't 
that much." 
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contract to the 
our report 
s 
I should like to summarize our findings by reading excerpts from the 
executive summary with some slight paraphrasing. A copy of the full executive 
summary and the conclusions and recommendations is attached. 
Reading from executive summary. 
I should like to add the following comments, which are in the body of the 
report. Calculated emissions differ widely depending on details of the plant 
and details of the accident scenario. An early, significant failure or by-
passing of the containment is very likely to produce much larger emissions 
than a late failure. Some key parameters such as the timing of containment 
failure and the size of the opening produced currently are not predicted 
from a mechanistic analysis but are inputs provided by the computer code 
users. Other key parameters such as the size of aerosol particles entering 
suppression pools or the temperature of the molten core attacking the concrete 
base mat are estimated mechanistically; however, they enter into other calcu-
lations in an extremely sensitive way so that evaluation of the computed 
emissions must reflect the accuracy with which these complex processes have 
been modeled. Since our understanding and predictive capability are now and 
will continue to be incomplete, sensitivity or uncertainty analyses must be an 
essential part of source term estimation. 
Risk involves both the probabilities of a set of accidents occurring and 
the severity of the consequences of those accidents. Chemistry, physics, and 
engineering can help quantify the consequences of accidents and this was the 
subject matter of the American Physical Society report. There are also 
important institutional questions such as quality control in construction, 
plant maintenance, operator training, and others that are essential for 
maintaining an acceptable risk to the public by reducing both the probabili-
ties~evere accidents and their consequences. 
n DE F AS FRO.\i S RE 
ACC!DESTS AT SUCLEAR PO\VER PLASTS 
EXECUTIVE SUM;..!ARY 
Rt:pc)rt prepared by a study group of The Amc:ri~·.1n Phys-
ical under contract with the US Nuc:kar 
tor:r Commission 
In The American formed a 
stud) group on radionuc!ide release from severe :1ccidents 
at nuclear power plants to '·review the of the 
techr,ic:ll bas<! upon which the models 
for radionuclide release from 
cidents are constructed, the 
seh es, and the correct use of the 
that these models in the 
sequences." 
The to the rese:~rch came: from the: ob-
servation that much less radioactive iodine: was rdeased 
the: Three ~file Island accident than had been ex-
pected in an accident of that magnitude. It is of obvious 
interest to inquire how g<!neral that obs<!rvation is. 
Although this executive summary describes, explains, 
and paraphrasc:s some of the conclusions of ~his report, 
any r<!fcrence should lJe to the conclusion as writ-
ten in Chapt<!r VIII rather than to the executive sum-
mary. 
This report is concerned with the release of radionu-
clides from a hypothetical severe nuclear reactor 
accident-more severe than any that has yet taken place. 
It discussc:s both the predictions and the scientific basis 
for making them. we have not calculated 
abilities of individual accident sequences, we have chosen 
for detailed discussion those sequences deemed by others 
to be "risk dominant" or to involve a wid<! range of physi-
cal and chemica! phenom<!na. 
The study group finds considerable progress in develop-
ing both a scientific basis and computational ability for 
predicting the consequences of hypothetical nuclear reac-
tor accidents since the R<!actor Safety Study of 1975 
(WASH- !4001 which is the current basis for 
concerned with severe accidents. In several cases, the new 
calculations indicate that significantly smaller quantities 
of radionuclides reach the environment than calculated in 
the Reactor Safety Study. In other cases, the calculated 
quantities have not changed dramatically. 
A reactor accident can lead to severe consequences only 
if several barriers between the radioactivity and the envi-
ronment are breached. One postulated scenario by which 
this could occur is the failure the core heat-removal 
syst<!:ns. This would cause the core to overheat, lose 
coolant, melt, fall to the bottom of the reactor pressure 
vessel, melt through the vessel, and be in the 
watc:r of the re:xctor This would release ·;team and 
nonc<'r,Jenslble g:1ses to the reactor containment budding. 
Jnd thereby incr.:a~e the preo.,ure, •.;,h1ch would ~tress the 
cont.HnmenL The Rextor Safety .1 high 
pr<;bcthilt>-~nc: :n ould fad 
;: .! • . 'Y ';; ... -: 
at th:s tin:1:-. This is fhH\. considered to be vc:y ucl~ 
OrKc the \>,J.:cr in the rc:actor cavity is c\.lfc'r.,rcJ, the 
core would remelt from the heat generated by the 
of the fission products and would attack the C()ncr;:;te 
tl00r. This interaction would be very comple.x, relea,in_s 
gases ::md radioactive aerosols. Calculations indi-:a~e th1· 
this \\Ould cause the containment building to fail from 
ov.:rpres>ure m:my hours latc:r-although it is 
(and claimed by some inve~tigators) that the conuinment 
would hold for m.my If the containment does nct 
the molkn core might <!Ventually penetrate the ba~e­
mat, but this possibility would have only modest immedi-
ate consequences for 
Where new calculations indicate: that radionuclide 
emissions would be less than those reported in the Re:K· 
tor Safc:ty Study, the reduction can be attributed to three 
principal factors: 
(i) the recognition that the containment buildings, which 
are de::.igned to contain the radionudidc:s in the event 
an are stronger than was assumed in the Reactor 
Safety Study and ther<!fore would fail, if at all, at later 
(ii) the inclusion in the modeling of various physical and 
chc:mical phenomena, previously neglected, that will 
to retention of fission products; this retention is particu-
larly eff<!ctive if more time elapses before containment 
failure; and 
(iii) the inclusion in the calculation of a number of sites 
which can retain fission products--such as suppression 
pools and ice beds, and in some cases 
buildings-that had not previously been considered in 
tail. 
The Reactor Safety Study pessimistically assumed that 
iodine would be released to the environment as gaseous 
molecular iodine. There is good evidence that the iodine 
reacts with cesium to form cesium iodide, a salt of low 
volatility, which would either dissolve in water or con-
dense to form an aerosol. Some of the aerosols would 
deposit on surfaces in the primary reactor system or, if a 
sufficiently long time were available, on surfaces in the 
containment building; in either case, the release to the en-
vironment would be reduced. 
Some reactors are equipped with suppression pools anrl 
ice condensc:rs that are designed to condense steam. 
These can reduce the release by scavenging the fission 
products. However, experimental studies to evaluate their 
effectiveness are only now in progress (suppression poolsl 
or have not been planned (ice beds). Moreover the effec-
tiveness of these devices has not been subjected to detailed 
peer review. Reactors that contain these scavenging 
sites-the Boiling Water Reactors with suppression 
and those few Pressurized Water Reactors with ice con-
denser containments--have been studied far less than 
Pres;urized Water Re:1ctors with large dry containments, 
and little confirmatory work has been carried out. The 
group recommends more study of h: 
severe J<:;;Jdents mvolving lhese reactors. 
Tho:: study group looked for phenomena which m 
incr.:a>e tho:: ~:1dionuclide releases above thu-,e ~;~;,-~.I.Jf 
:he R•·:JCU•~ S, 5: udy. One "Uch effxt is :he 
· r~:::a~e of non\ o::.tile rad1onuclides during the :::ore-
in !traction. Some nonvolatile fission products, 
~uch as ianthanides, and some transuranics, such as plu-
tonium, are biologically quite dangerous. The phenomena 
in the core-concrete interaction are complex and are not 
releases depend critically upon the tem-
;>erature achie>ed in the core-concrete interaction, and 
other parameters which are n<'\t understood. Moreover, 
the calculations are in a preliminary stage. Some re-
cent calculations indicate that ·releases of nonvolatile 
spxies may be greater than predicted in the Reactor Safe-
ty Study for some postulated accident sequences. More 
experiments and analytical work are needed to improve 
the knowledge of the chemistry and physics in this crucial 
area. 
Phenomena that could generate aerosols or volatile 
iodine late in an accident sequence as the result of decay 
or chemical reactions may also be underestimated. 
The aerosols or iodine might have very slow deposition 
rates, and even be emitted to the environment following a 
late containment failure. These phenomena are not in-
cluded in the present ~RC computer models. 
The study group examined results produced by the 
computer codes used by participants in the severe ac-
cident research program. These codes have not, in gen-
eral, been publicly released. Although these computer 
codes go a long way toward describing the complex phe-
nomena involved, and represent a major advance in the 
art of accident description, the normal scientific pro-
cedure for establishing the reliability of the results is not 
complete. The study group recommends that the theoreti-
cal and experimental studies be published in archival, 
peer-reviewed journals, and that the computer codes to-
with a clear and complete technical description of 
the models and the assumptions be made available to in-
terested parties. 
Reliable estimation of possible radionuclide release dur-
ing severe accidents at nuclear power plants requires 
direct calculations, complex computer codes, small scale 
experiments, and large scale experiments. This research 
has been underway in several countries, some of the· 
research being of an international cooperative nature. Be-
cause of the complexities of the phenomena being 
Rev \'.>d. Phys. Vol. 57, No 3, Part II, Jc·ly 1985 
m,:~eied. it is ~~tntial to c~•::;::--~1:-e :h~ .:._ ·,~1-:;; .. l::r (. "~-~ 
a&:J.inst ~ell controlled, small ~::ale ~).penmen~;, ar-d 
against realistic. adequately iqstrumen:t"d. Ja:g= '-:all"" In-
tegral experiments to ensure that all important phenc•me-
na are modeled with sufficient accuracy. Such compar· 
ison is not yet completed. Because of this. the study 
group concluded that it cannot endorse at this time 
specific quantitative estimates for the amounts of ra-
dionuclides released. However, the general trends shown 
by the calculations are consistent with our understanding 
of the chemical and physical phenomena involved. For-
tunately, some of the key parameters are largely deter-
mined by o>erall energy considerations las for e.>.ample 
the maximum pressure reached in the containment) and 
these can be estimated with a reasonable degree of confi-
dence. 
The quantity of radionuclides released is called the 
source term. It consists of contributions from groups of 
radionuclides, broadly classified as ga<.eous, volatile, and 
nonvolatile. The contributions from the first two of these 
have been widely considered to have the most 
nificant potential impacts on public health. These are 
better understood now than they were previously. 
The environmental impacts and mechanisms for 
releases of noble gases are the best understood. Their 
releases 'are not tboug_h_Uo differ importantly from those 
calculated in the Reactor Safety Study, except insofar as 
radioactive decay could reduce their radioactivity when 
containment failure is late. Some current calculations of 
the release of the volatile radionuclides to the environ-
ment predict substantially smaller values than those re-
ported in the Reactor Safety Study because of the later 
times to containment failure. The magnitude of the con-
tribution from the nonvolatile radionuclides is still open 
to question, primarily because of the uncertainty of the 
core-concrete interaction. 
For the reasons described in the previous six para-
graphs, the study group believes that it is not yet possible 
to derive factors by which the source terms for all ra-
dionuclides and all reactors can be changed from the 
\'alues reported in the Reactor Safety Study. Research 
that is currently in progress will impro> e this situation 
and may enable such factors to be determined for all im-
portant radionuclides and reactor ~equences. 
VII.F.13. Growth and 
Vll.F. 14. Change sequence fission 
The possibility and consequences of failure of the 
mary reactor system from 
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group finds that considerable pro-
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mechanism that for some 
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is the re!e:.~se of 
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been started. The decontam-
are expected to be sensitive to 
and the relative humidity of the gases, as well as to 
variables. credit taken for fission 
these reflect the 
IV.C). 
VIH.B.8. The calculation of the source 
containment has not been isolated or has been 
very sensiti"e to the details of the failure. Accidents 
before and just after maintenance 
IS 
and this is the time when isolation failure is also most 
The containment bypass sequences (V) ::;,re 
reactor; once recognized, their 
consequences can often be reduced by simple steps. \\'e 
attention 10 these 
operators of nuclear 
of the 'arious gcq~rnment, 
and groups 
that 
unc,,n~iJcrcd. \\'e urge th~>Se groups to 
of source term until 
are resolved 'see Section 
of conclusion VIIIA2 




stu":~::'"~ t~..' c;1cc,mp~i..;-; t!-.: 
voh ~c. The st g~oL!p 
tr;J.ctc•r~ ha' ~ selc:ctc:d the se·-; uc:r.cc:s welL 
H,w. ~' ~r, of thc:~e sc~ :.:·:rkc:~ no arpt:3r to 
be risk and othc:r_><:-iunces h:lYe be-:orne reb-
tiHly more important. In order to make sure th~!t the 
risk dc•r:1ir;ant sequences hav:: be~n identified 
an-:i in>ec;tiga:d, we strongly urge another iterJ.tion of the 
pro.::::-;s of the se..:;uc:n::cs in the of the 
und~~<.Lh::n:; so far. that 
consicc:-c:d include containment isol:J.tion failure and con-
tainmer.~ bypass sequences, inc 1uding the of 
ste:lm gent:rator failure dur',ng a TMLB sequence, and 
events e."<tema!ly initiated by an event such as an earth-
quJ.kc, fire, or flood fsec: Sect;on II! 0. 
VI1I.C.2. Analyses of the Pressurized Water Re:.~ctors 
with large dry containme:1t> have been more e.\tensive 
th:.m these with ice conde:her> a:1d of the Boiling Water 
Re:1ctors. We urge that attention be paid to 
these other re:1ctor types. 
VHLC.3. If a:nounts of the volatile ele:nents cesi-
um and ioeine were rele:.~-;d, would dominate the 
he3.lth hanrd. For that reason, most of the studies to 
date have correctly concentrated on the magnitude of 
cesium, iodine, and to some extent, tellurium releases. 
However, if the calculations predict releases of· cesium 
and iodine of less than a few percent of inventory, this by 
itself 9oes not ensure a small source term. Considerable 
attention must then be paid to releases of the nonvolatile 
elements (see Sections II.B and IV.Bl. 
VHI.C.4. There is a tendency to accept the premise 
that ~-~ontainment failure late in the accident will lead to 
small releases. However, some phenomena, not fully 
analyzed, might lead to higher releases than often calcu-
lated. These include the following. 
(a) Volatile fission products retained in the primary sys-
tem might revaporize from decay heating at a time when 
there is. less aerosol in the containment to scavenge these 
newly liberated species. 
(b) Deposited aerosols might be resuspended as a result 
of a sudden depressurization of the containment, or be-
cause of mechanical forces as3ociated with steam explo-
sions or hydrogen combustion. 
(c) The calculations for the core concrete interac:tion for 
some accident sequences suggest far larger releases of ha-
zardous nonvolatile radionuclides than were assumed in 
the Reactor Safety Study. At this time it is neither clear 
that the physical and chemical phenomena involved have 
been correc:tly modeled nor clear that the calculations 
have been done correctly. 
(dl The deposition of the aerosols may not be as rapid 
as calculated, as a result of thermal stratification or lack 
of complete mixing. 
(e) The airborne concentration:; of aerosols within the 
cont:1inment are sensitive to the time when condensed 
src::c<c-; are intrcxluced. Conclusions must ret1e..:t the un-
c:ertJ! nty in the mJss rde;l.Se rates and aervsoi characteris-
tic-; >sin~. density, and shape! of aerosols from both the 
pmnary system and the -:ore c:oncrcte !flteractlon {s.:e Sec-
i=;, \t._,! r:-.-.,J V:; :; ,"-J.: J PJ': 
l\'.Cl 
Il!C.5. D1rect Cl'f<lpu'~c c,-,l.'--, 
sn1ai1-s;.,"'~dc e.\perir:Jcnts, and largc-s..:JL· e\;eri::tc~:~) ,t;-·:_ 
all ne~c''-'~) to reso:,-: the source-te:-:~1 ::,. 1 f.,: 
rc:hti>e role of these nec:ds continual re~'Jltnt:orL In p:.::--
the lar,ge sca;e experirne:.ts su~h as BETA, 
DE.\!0:\'A, MAR VLKE'..', PBF, by their n .. m:ro:: u'<~ J. 
It is imponant to continu.Il!y ree>aluate their 
to be sure th:lt pro' ice 
the cornru~cr coC~-s under ~c~n .. ::c:c·r:::t J:-, 
to those in re:J2t'x Jccid~nts (se~ 
V and VHL 
VI!I.D. Possible implications 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has used the 
methodology and conclusions of the R.:acll'f Safc:y 
as the basis for emergency planning. The '..'RC has es:ab-
lished an emergency planning zone of te:1 mile-; radius 
primarily on the premise that beyond ten miles few, if 
any, prompt deaths would occur in even the worst calcu-
lated accident. A fifty mile zone was established for con-
. sidering health implications of contaminated food and 
drink. 
Although recent calculations indicate that the source 
terms for several radioisotopes in a number of important 
sequences are smaller than the values obtained in the 
Reactor Safety Study, other consideratior.s contribute to 
present regulations on emergency planning. Because these 
were not within its chaner, the study group takes no posi-
tion on the desirability of changes in those regulations. 
The methodology of the Reactor Safety Study has also 
been used to evaluate proposed changes in reactor and nu-
clear plant design and operation--either for future reac-
tors or for retrofits to existing reactors--to reduce the 
probability of accident. The study group bs not studied 
the question of reducing the probability of accidents in 
detail and, therefore, merely notes the obvious general 
point that it is desirable to prevent accidents as early in 
the chain of events as possible-for then the reactor may 
well stay int:1ct in addition to the public beinJ protected. 
The insights gained from source tem1 resr::arc:h and 
modeling should be reflected in the design and operation 
of light water reactor plants so as to minimize the scur-:e 
term-and therefore the risk to the public:-in cost-
effective ways. 
VIII.E. Major recommendations 
The study group believes that the source term re>earch 
cannot yet be regarded as adequate. 
VHLE.l. The NRC should continue to ensure a strong, 
integrated, program of experimental and analyticJI stud-
ies in order to provide a sound data base for ;,;akubricn of 
the source term. 
VUI.E.2. The '..'RC should undert.ake uncenai:tty J:t.J!-
yses so that calculated radionuclide rele:nc-; can be >t.l~d 
within e\plicit limns. 
X 
II, 
CJvrdinate system fvr G2 
at., 1980). 
cr1 are rncst rcli:!b1c for Li:sL:~-­
tc:ns of hi1umekrs. At large c:s~ :"x'::s, 
than m:;,ny kilometers, a1 can sometime-s 
of a temperature inversion Then additional 
terms in X are ne.::essary to c:-scrit-e tl1e containment of 
the radioactivity below this la:,-er. For distances ap-
100 km (or more\, the d!<persion parameters 
concentrations 1:x>CDme increasingly less ac-
1983b, pp. 9-23). Table AU describes 
conditions and Table AI.2 shows 
az for various meteorological 
and the probability of occurrence of these conditions aver-
over a number of typical sites. 
For any radial distance x from the release 
maximum ground level (z=O) time-integrated r.nnr.t'm 
downwind occurs beneath the center 
=0) of the cloud. The value useful as a conser-
vative estimate for the 
off-centerline positions, is 
Q exp(-h 2/2a;). 
1'i'Uxa1 a 1 
.::oncentration 
The X0(x)/Q, can be called the centerline 
tion factor (F) at ground level. It gives the time-
concentration at x at ground le•el per unit 
relea5e. For releases from an elevated point and for in-
distance, x, downv.ind, X0(x) first increases as 
rhe effhJe!lt toward after 
decreases v.ith :c J.S the cloud continues to 
both horizon~ally and \er'tically, wi!h the max-
imum approximately where az =h. Figure AL2 
illustrates the variation in position of the maximum for a 
of atmospheric stability cDnditions. 
noble gases, and mc>lcYdar iodine if 
as gases. 01her c2nstituents are 
as aerosols. Aerosol fallout l..-:1ds both to a ro.1uction of 
concentrati0n :1nd to the of a sur-
S per unit area, :~t ground Je,el. The 
builds until it r::.;;h~~ .l \alue Sc=¥0h'Vd, \\ 
:s called the \ ~bcity. TI1is 
po~;es a further exponenti:ll :ltknuation fa..:tor on effluent 
One can define an app;oxim:H~ Jttcr:ea .. 
=:1,:/Vd wh::re z is t\c: a> 
STATEMENT OF 
ROSS A. SCARANO 
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF RADIATION SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGION V 
BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY 
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE 
MAY 28 986 

Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 
I am Ross Scarano, of the Nuclear 
Walnut Creek, California 
Commission's Region V office in 
I am appearing before you today to provide you with a brief overview of the 
regulations governing emergency preparedness at, and in the vicinity of, 
nuclear power facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
In August 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission upgraded its regulations in 
order to assure that adequate protective measures could be taken in the event 
of a radiological emergency at a licensed nuclear power facility. A copy of 
these regulations are enclosed with my testimony. 
I would like to highlight some of the major provisions of the Commission's 
emergency preparedness regulations. First, no NRC operating license for a 
nuclear power reactor will be issued unless the NRC finds that there is 
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken 
in the event of a radiological emergency. The NRC bases its finding on (1) 
an NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are 
adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be 
implemented, and (2) a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local governments' 
offsite emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable 
assurance that they can be implemented. 
Secondly, the regulations extend emergency planning considerations into two 
"Emergency Planning Zones." One zone is related to direct radiation 
exposure, and the other to exposure via the food chain. The exact size and 
configuration of these zones surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor 
are determined by such conditions as demography, topography, land 
characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. 
The third, and final provision, of the regulations that I would like to 
mention is that which identifies the standards that both onsite and offsite 
emergency plans must meet. There are sixteen listed standards. These 
standards include a wide range of planning considerations that need to be 
addressed in utility, state and local emergency response 
includt, among other things: assignment or identification of primary 
emergency responsibilities; use of a standard emergency classification 
scheme; establishment of emergency notification procedures among affected 
organizations, as well as members of the general public; establishment and 
maintenance of adequate emergency facilities and equipment; and provisions 
for training of emergency response personnel to include the conduct of 
periodic emergency response exercises. The inspection and enforcement 
program to ensure ongoing compliance with the Commission's regulations is 
implemented by the NRC's Region V office. 
-2-
To summarize, it is clear, based on the public record compiled during the 
emergency preparedness rulemaking, that onsite and offsite emergency 
preparedness as well as proper siting and engineered design feat~res are 
needed to protect the health and safety of the public. It is also clear, 
from the accident at Three Mile Island, that the protection provided by 
siting and engineered design features must be bolstered by the ability to 
take protective measures during the course of an accident. The accident 
showed that onsite conditions and actions, even if they do not cause 
significant offsite radiological consequences, will affect the way the 
various state and local entities react to protect the public from any dangers 
associated with an accident. In order to discharge effectively its statutory 
responsibilities, the Commission must be assured (1) that proper means and 
procedures will be in place to assess the course of an accident and its 
potentjal severity, (2) that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the 
public will be notified promptly, and (3) that adequate protective actions in 
response to actual or anticipated conditions can and will be taken. The 
Commission's emergency preparedness regulations were adopted to provide these 
necessary assurances. 
This concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to answer any 




PART 60 e DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND 
Applndix C-A Guide for tM Flnanc:lal 
Dllt8 and Related information 
~To~ F1Mnd8l 
Qudfk::atlona for Fadlity ConslrucUOn 
Permlte 
GeMnl Wwmatlaa 
CommiHion fi~MfVH the riFt. howev~t, to 
require additions! financial information at 
the conttruction permit ttege. particularly in 
caaes m which the proposed power 
;pnerelil'l3 facility will be OOIDI:Iionly owned 
by two or mora exi11ting companiet or in 
which flnanc:ins dependa upon loll8-tarm 
lliTIIlllementJ _for llharin8 of tha power from 
the facility by two or mora electrical 
pnerating companies. 
Applic:anta are encourqed to CO!llu!l with 
the Commisaion with reapect to any 
question~ they may have relaq to the 
requiremata of the Commiation's reguistiona 
or the Information aet forth in this appendix. 
I. App&•nCIJ 'W1!idlluf8 ~
Orpalsatiaae 
A. Applications for COMtruction ptJrmitll 
1. &tilm::Jte of construction eot~lll. For 
electric utillliea. Ncb applicant's estimate of 
the total coet of :lae proposed facility llhould 
be broken down u follow~ and be 
accompanied by a atstement detel'ibqthe 
baaet &om which the ettimata II derived: 
$11TIIIIil ~~ ... --------
II!IT-~illlll .......... 
ee~-.:'*..-~lluol~ .. ---.,.-.----------·.:::= 
Tllllil~lllll-------
1'biJ appendix Ia Intended to apprise 
applic:anta for licren.set to conttruct 
production or utilization facilitiet of the types 
deecribed In l50.21(b) or 150.22. or testing 
fac:Wtiet. of the pneral kinda of financial ,... If the fuel ill to be acquired by leate or other 
data IIUid other related Information that will :!: arrangement than purchate. the application 
clemoutrata the financial qualification of the ~ llhould ao atale. 1'he Item~~ to be Included in 
applicant to carry out the activitiet for which a: these calegol'iet llhould be the same aa lhote 
the permit Ia aought. 'l'he kind and depth or IL. defined In the applicable electric plant and 
Information deterlbed in lhil guide Ia not ; nuclear fuel inventory aecounta preacribed by 
IDI«mded to be a rilld and abao!ute requirement the Fedaral ~Regulatory Commiaaion or 
In IOIH instance.. additional pertinent 111 explanation ~Pven u to any departure 
material may be needed. In any caae. the therefrom. , 
applic:ant llhould Include Information other 8ince the ll!OIDPO'ition or conatruction cost 
or dum that specified. if aucb mformation II atimlltes for production and utilization 
:;; pertiatmt to estebliflhins the applicanfa facilities otLer than nuclear powar reactora 
"" ll.oancial ability to COIUitrucl the propoaed will vary acx:orc:Una to the type of facility, no 
f facility. particular format Ia auaested for submitting 
.,. It il important to obeerve alao that both web estimates. 1'he estimate llbould. 
or 150-S3{flud lhilappendix diatinguiah Saowev~t. be Itemized by categories of cost In 
betwHD applic:anta which are estabU.bed !l'llfficient deteil to pmnllu evaluation of ita 
~ti011111!d lboaa which are uwly· reaaonableness. 
bmed. atities orpnlaed primarily for the 
pw'poee ol ~ in the activity for which r ~ Solli'Cie of COMti'IJction funds. 'l'he 
the permit II aougbt. Those In the former 1 application ahould include a brief stetement 
mtacorJ willll0ftll8lly have a b.i.ltory of "' of the applicant' a general financial plan for 
cpenting aperience IJid be able to IUbmlt ::;; financ:intthe coat of the facility. idenlifyins 
&anciaJ atatementa renect~na tha financial ::: tile IOUfC8 or 80U1'Ciel upon which the 
ranlta ol put operati0111. With respect. a: applicant reliea for the DeeetHry 
llowever. to the applicant which ill a MWiy IL. COIUitruction fw'uk.. e.a.. internal 80II1'Ciel 1ucb 
fcnMd company ntabU.bed primarily for tha ~ aa !llldiitributed eaminp and depreciation 
purpoae ol Cllll1')'lna out tha lic:e:nsed activity, L~ or extltDal80III'Ciel aucb aa 
with little or 1110 prior opi!f'&ting b.i.ltory, ~-
IICIIlii8VIhatmondetsileddataand~ r .. A-•· t' ,. . I ...... cloc:ume11tation will senenilly be~ .. '"''YJICOJI SII1!01!CI(J SIDtatmmtll. IUfl 
For thie NUon. the appendix deterlba · applicstion 111bould a lao include the 
lep!IJ'IItaiy the ecope of Information to be applicant's-latett publilbed an~~ual financial 
~ in applications by ncb ollhae two_ .... report. topther with any wmmt Interim 
._ of applicanta. ~ financial atetamata that are perlinenllf en 
In lhrtllll'lllini.nc an applic:ant'e Bnanclal :::; umual financial raport II not published. tha 
qwalification. lhe ~ will require the a: balance sheet IJid operatina atstement 
IIUIUmiiiiiiiiDOimt of Information ~ II. coverlna the ill tat complete accounq year 
for that purpc~N. No epedal forma are ~ topther with all pertinent notet thereto and 
pni!ICiibed for IRlbmittilll the Information. 1n C!ll'tifteation by a public accountut llhould be 
DWif caaa. the financial information unally fumilbed. 
CG~~tei!'ed In wmmt an~~ual fbwlcial reporta. 11 ~ 'W1!1d!Asf8 Newly FllftliiGd 
mdudi.ni IIWiliDilry data of prior years. will ~ 
be IIUi'Bcient for the Commiuion'e need&. 1'he 
App.E 
1. &timaUI of CI11!Strvclion costa The 
:Mormatlon thai will normally be required of 
appllcantll which are newly formed entities 
will not differ in scope from that required of 
eslabllahed orpni.utions. Accordmgly. 
applicantallhould submit estimate• as 
described above for established 
orglllnizatiO!ll. 
2. Sou1'Cie of COI!Struction funds. The 
application thould specifically identify the 
110urce or aoUI'Ciel upon which tha applicant 
relies for the fundi necetaary to pay the cost 
of conatructing the facility. and the amount to 
be obtained from each. With respect to each 
eource. tbe application should describe in 
detail the applic:ant'e legal and financial 
relatioDllhips with Ita 11tockholdera. corporate 
affiliatet, or otherl(auch ae financial 
,... inltituti0111 J upon which the applicant is 
;! relyillll for financial aesiatance. If the sources 
~ ol funds relied upon include parent 
a: companies or other corporate affiliates. 
II. Information to aupport the financial 
~ capability of each auch company or affiliate 
to meet ita commitmenta to the applicant 
llbould be aet forth in the application. This 
mfprmation ahould be of the same kind and 
ecope aa would be required if the parent 
companies or affiliates were in fact the 
applic:ant Ordinarily, it will be neceuary 
that copies of agreement~ or contracts among 
the companies be 1ubmitted. 
lu noted earlier in lhilappendix. an 
applicant which II a newly formed entity will 
DOmlally not be in a poaition to tubmit the 
usual typea of balance abeets and income 
atatementa refiecting the resulta of prior 
operations. The applicant should. however, 
~Delude in ita application a statement of ita 
alltlt>ta.liabilities. and capitalstructu.re aa of 
the date of the application. 
m. Annual Financial Statement 
Each holder of a construction permit 
for a production or utilization fadlity of 
a type described in I 50.21(b} or i 50.22. 
or a testing facility is required by 
l50.7l(b) to me ils annual financial 
report wilh the Commission at the time 
of issuance thereof. Thh~ requirement 
"' d~s not lo licensees or holders of 
~ construction permit& for mPdicaJ and 
~ research reactors.. 
a: 
II. IV. Additional Information 
0 ... ThP. Commission may. from time to 
lime. rP.quPsl the applicdnt. whether an 
esldhlished org:mizatkm or newly 
(ormf'd en lily. lo tubmil add ilion>~ I or 
more detailed information respecting its 
financial arrangements and statue of 
funds if such information is deemed 
necessary to enable the Commission to 
determine an applicant's financial 
qualifications for the license. 
Appendix 0 (Removed 39 FR 26279) 
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: Table of CanUtnlll 
~ I. Introduction 
., •D. 1'he Preliminary Safely Analysis Report ..,.LIII. The Final Safety Analyaie Report 
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!:be~ plu II lOOt utidectorily 
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NRC. In con.awtatlon with PEMA. t.l.llDot fll:ld 
lMIIOCIIlble ·~ thai adequate 
protlldlve lmQI!I.Ilft eu~ be tebn In the cmmt 
to 11 mdlolojpcal ~· 'I'M ntent of 
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L_ Grg Martin, (Jiealth Physicist 
By:·-Pa~ories 
~ R. Fish, Chief 
1~~ Emergency Preparedness Section 
~ Co; (q(-6 
Date Signed 
6~~5A; DatCs ined 
Inspection on April 2-11 and 21-25, 1986 (Report No. 50-312/86-14) 
Areas Inspected: Unannounced routine inspection of the licensee's emergency 
preparedness program including: knowledge and performance of duties, licensee 
audits, protective action decision making, emergency detection and 
classification, changes to the emergency preparedness program, notification 
and communication, and followup on open items identified during previous NRC 
inspections. Inspection procedures 82201, 82202, 82203, 82204, 82206, 82207, 
82210, and 92701 were addressed. 
Results: Of the 1 areas evaluated, 3 apparent violations (with multiple 
examples) of NRC requirements were identified. The violations concerned: (1) 
The licensee's failure to insure emergency plan training is provided to all 
appropriate personnel required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.; (2) The 
licensee's failure to maintain their emergency implementing procedures 
current, as required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.; (3) The licensee's 





(Closed) IN-85-62, Backup numbers for the NRC Operations 
Center. The licensee has followed the in this notice and placed 
backup numbers for the NRC Center on the ENS in the 
Control Room (CR), Technical Center ( , and the Emergency· 
Operations Facility (EOF). A physical inspection of the ENS phones in 
the CR and TSC demonstrated that the labels had been placed on the phones 
and the correct numbers were in place. 
(Closed) IN-85-77. Possible Loss of ENS Due to Loss of AC Power. 
According to the licensee's file on this issue, the information notice 
had been reviewed and an evaluation of the wiring for the ENS system was 
made. The licensee determined that the system was adequately wired and 
would remain operable if there was a loss of AC power. 
3. KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES (TRAINING) 
The Emergency Plan, emergency implementing procedures,and records of 
training were reviewed and interviews with plant personnel, Emergency 
Planning Personnel and the Training Manager were held. The following are 
the findings and observations. 
A review of the licensee's emergency preparedness training program 
revealed the licensee's contracted training program and related training 
procedure (Temporary Change AP 580) for emergency preparedness training, 
had expired on 12-31-85 and had not been replaced by the beginning of 
this inspection. When the temporary procedure was allowed to expire 
without being replaced by another procedure, an outdated 1983 procedure, 
which was not being implemented, became effective. The licensee 
currently plans to use the site training organization to accomplish EP 
training. On April 14, 1 , the licensee acquired an additional 
individual to help reestablish the emergency preparedness training 
program, and to update AP 580 (Training). 
The EP, Section 8.1.3.(a), states in part, "It is the responsibility of 
the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator to assure appropriate personnel 
receive Emergency Preparedness Training." In addition Section 8.1.3(c) 
also states "Records of the District's Onsite Emergency Response 
Organization training will be maintained by the Emergency Preparedness 
Coordinator (EPC) with a copy to be forwarded to the Nuclear Training 
Superintendent." The intent of Section 8 was to insure that someone in 
the emergency organization was tracking EP training to assure personnel 
maintained their required training. The review of training performed 
indicated the EPC was not maintaining training records or tracking 
required training. The EPC was in posse~sion of a box of records from 
the former contracted training organization. However, the EPC was unable 
to produce selected records of the onsite organization, which included 
Control Room staff, and did not appear to have a method to track required 
training. The discussions revealed the EPC was not cognizant of the 
status of EP training implementation. In addition, the licensee did not 
appear to be maintaining a tracking system to assure appropriate 
individuals receive timely training. The licensee committed to the NRC in 
a letter dated August 31, 1984, to establish a tracking system to assure 
that training is maintained. This review determined that the licensee 
had initiated a Nuclear Tracking list, but failed to maintain it, in that 
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4. CHANGES TO THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM 
Records of changes to the EP and 
interviews with licensee personnel were 
licensee's Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were examined to 
determine that the EP and implementing procedures are being adequately 
maintained, and changes to the Plan and procedures do not degrade the 
effectiveness of the EP. As a result of this review the inspector 
identified a number of instances where the EP and implementing procedures 
were not maintained current. The following are the inspector's findings: 
a) Prior to July 1985 The Herald Fire Department and lone Fire Academy 
were designated as offsite relocation points and provisions were 
made to store emergency equipment and supplies at these facilities. 
During July 1985 the licensee elected to remove emergency equipment 
from these 2 facilities. although they still remain offsite 
relocation points. AP 519, "Site Evacuation" was revised to reflect 
the changes made to the Herald and lone facilities. The revised 
procedure states in 5.2.2, "Radiation monitoring and decontamination 
equipment must be brought from Rancho Seco to the offsite relocation 
point." The following procedures were not maintained in that 
emergency equipment and supplies are still listed as available at 
these facilities. 
1) Section 7 of the EP still lists the Herald Fire Department & 
lone Fire Academy as a place where dedicated emergency 
equipment and supplies are stored. Emergency lockers, 
ambulance kits, and decontamination (decon) kits are 
specifically mentioned. 
2) AP 516, "Personnel Decontamination," Section 4 refers to 
decontamination kits which are maintained at the Herald Fire 
Station and the Ion Fire Academy. 
3) AP 552, "Activation And Operation Of The Offsite Relocation 
Points," Sections 1 and 5 also reference emergency equipment, 
protective clothing, survey instruments, decontamination kits 
and respiratory equipment, etc. 
4) AP 305-9D, "Personnel Decontamination," Section 3, still lists 
Herald & lone as an area where decontamination kits are stored. 
It should be noted that during a walkthrough with an individual who 
would fill the position of the Radiation Assessment Coordinator the 
individual was not aware of the removal of the emergency equipment 
formerly stored at the offsite relocation areas. The individual 
also stated he had not received emergency plan training in over a 
year. The matter of training necessitated by changes to the 
Emergency Preparedness Program was ly discussed in Paragraph 








Protective Action Guides, AP 
Dose Assessment Codes Jade. and 
Interviews with key personnel responsible for dose assessment in the 
Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Unified Dose 
Assessment Center (UDAC) were held. The interviews with plant and 
contractor personnel and procedural reviews identified several problems 
as discussed below. 
Radiation monitors Rl50044 and Rl50045 are the high range effluent 
monitors for the reactor and auxiliary building vents. These monitors 
were installed pursuant to item II.F.l of NUREG 0737 and provide the 
capability to measure gaseous effluents that might be expected during an 
accident. The licensee's procedures that utilize source term for dose 
assessment are contained in AP 509, "Control Room Dose Calculation,n AP 
511, "TSC Dose Calculation," and AP 512g "EOF Dose Assessment". None of 
these procedures contain reference to nor incorporate any methodology to 
convert high range instrument response to a source term. The importance 
of being able to utilize data from the high range effluent monitors is 
partially illustrated by a careful review of AP-509, "Control Room Dose 
Calculation". This procedure addresses release pathways from the 
auxiliary building stack. If a calculation is performed using the 
maximum reading from the normal range monitors (R15001 and R15002) and 
default values (most conservative) for vent flow rate and X/Q, the 
projected doses obtained are below the lowest range of Protective Action 
Guide values listed in AP 528. Consequently, the procedure as written is 
of limited value in assessing the dose consequences from a severe event 
with a release rate greater than the capabilities of the normal range 
monitors. From a previous NRC inspection (Report No. 50-312/86-06), it 
is noted that AP-501, "Recognition and Classification of Emergencies" 
also makes no reference to the high range monitors for purposes of 
classifying an event. The failure to update and incorporate instructions 
for use of the high range effluent monitors (Rl50044 and Rl50045) in 
procedures AP 501, AP 509, AP 511 and AP 512 represents an apparent 
violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.e which requires that written 
procedures covering the emergency plan to be maintained. 
Additional deficiencies were noted in procedures AP 509, 511 and 512 and 
are discussed below. 
a) procedures AP 509 and 511 only provide a methodology for determining 
the release rate from the auxiliary building. No methodology is 
provided for the containment (reactor building) vent. 
b) procedure AP 512 states, "obtain the release rate from Attachment 
7.1." Attachment 7.1 has a place for recording release rates (noble 
gas and iodine) but provides no methodology on determining what the 
release rate is from instrumentation readings. 
Paragraphs (a) & (b) above are additional examples of failure to maintain 
procedures. 
Interviews with licensee personnel established that computer based dose 
assessment is the principal method to be used the in 
procedures 
these procedures the 
techniques. AP 511, under 
states, "NOTE: These 
"RACODE". No further 
code, a 
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performed 
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is the correct reference 
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calculate doses from a 
for the represents 
6.8.l.e for failure to 
One apparent violation for failure to maintain pursuant to 
Technical Specification 6.8.l.e (with multiple examples) was identified 
in this program area. 
6. NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
The inspector reviewed A:P 506, "Notification/Communication" to determine 
that adequate provisions exist for notifying both offsite agencies and 
District personnel of an emergency event. This included a review of AP 
506.01, "Activation of the TSC", and AP 506.02, "Activation of the EOF". 
In addition, the inspector had discussions with one individual from 
security. This individual would be tasked with making notifications to 
activate the TSC during the evening and backshift hours. 
The inspector determined that the licensee has the capability, by 
procedure, to notify all appropriate personnel and agencies. However the 
discussion with the individual from security further substantiated 
weaknesses in the area of training. The individual indicated that it had 
been more than a year since emergency plan training had been provided, 
and he was unable to locate the proper procedure for notifying District 
personnel to activate the TSC. The individual was also unaware of proper 
record keeping procedures. AP 506.01 requires records of names of 
individuals contacted and the time of contact for planning purposes. 
No violations were identified in this program area. 
7. LICENSEE AUDITS 
10 CFR 50.54(t) requires licensees to provide for a review of the 
emergency preparedness program by persons who have no direct 
responsibility for implementation of the emergency program. 
A review of the 1986 annual EP aud1t was performed. From this review the 
audit appears to satisfy the regulatory requirements contained in 10 CFR 
50.54(t). An examination of the 1985 annual EP audit (audit 0-692) was 
also performed to ascertain the status of items identified as deficient 
during 1985. Emergency Preparedness Audit number 0-692, the 1985 annual 
EP audit, identified deficiencies in the Training Program, maintenance of 
the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, and the licensee's system 
for maintaining required records (Plaza 50 Files). The findings of audit 
0-692 were transmitted to Corporate and Plant management by letter dated 
March 22. 1985. The findings of this inspection and the licensee's 1986 
annual EP audit indicate that major deficiencies exist in the Training 
Program, maintenance of the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, 
and the licensee's record system. It appears that the licensee has been 
ineffective in correcting identified deficiencies (86-14-03). 
There were no violations observed in this area. 









(a) Lack of guidance in the procedures for a protective action 
recommendation based upon plant conditions. 
(b) General impediments in the dose assessment area. 
(c) Training deficiencies affecting the performance of key individuals. 
The capability of offsite officials to make protective action decisions 
and to promptly notify the public was discussed with licensee 
representatives. Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting 
responsible offsite authorities on a 24-hour basis. Backup 
communications links with offsite authorities were available. 
There were no violations identified in this program area. 
10. EXtT INTERVIEW 
An exit interview was held on April 25. 1985, for the purpose of 
discussing the preliminary findings of this inspection. Licensee 
personnel present have been previously identified in paragraph 1 above. 
G. Perez, acting Senior Resident Inspector was also present. The 
licensee was informed that violations were identified in a number of 
program areas, and that NRC Management would determine the specific 
course of action to be taken. The following observations were made by 
the inspector: 
1. Training was deficient for numerous personnel in the onsite 
organization, and the licensee's EP training program and 
implementing procedure for training were not current. 
2. The Emergency Plan and implementing procedures were not being 
maintained. District Personnel were also aware of this fact, This 
may have an adverse effect on their effectiveness during an 
emergency. 
3. The dose assessment program appeared marginal in several areas. 
4. The licensee had been ineffective in correcting problems previously 
identified by the NRC and their own audit program of the emergency 
preparedness program. 
5. The licensee does not have the capability to use their procedures to 
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Senator Leroy Green -2-
for various types of potential disasters. In recent years the 
County has committed hundreds of man-days and considerable 
resources to Rancho Seco emergency planning. This planning is 
an important aspect of the overall County effort, and 
considerable resources will continue to be committed to it. 
A full scale exercise is planned for October 1986. The main 
objectives of that exercise will be to test the coordinated 
(three county, State, utility) decision making process, and the 
procedures for issuing coordinated information to the media. 
Part of the problem in these two planning areas is the lack of 
adequate communication equipment to support the plan. The 
utility has given assurance this will be corrected after the 
exercise. 
The Rancho Seco Emergency Response Plans for Amador, Sacramento 
and San 3oaquin Counties were developed jointly to ensure a 
coordinated response to a radiological emergency. The three 
counties have worked together closely in plan development, 
exercise participation, and plan revision. Until recently, 
there was very little effort on the part of the utility to 
coordinate their plan procedures with county efforts. 
Since the State Nuclear Power Plant Plan is generic for all 
utilities, there are areas that lack coordination with county 
or utility plans. No coordination with FEMA plans has been 
demonstrated. The State Office of Emergency Services should be 
the agency to ensure that all Federal plans interface with the 
local plans. 
A final problem with the planning process is a lack of 
good-faith cooperation by the Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District. The over-all attitude of the utility has been to 
resist solving offsite jurisdiction problems as long as 
possible, particularly if the solution involves the purchase of 
equipment. More than once elected officials of the counties 
have exerted pressure by considering withholding or rescinding 
approval of a county plan. 
In conclusion, with the County plans nearing completion, the 
utility, State OES, and Federal agencies should coordinate all 
planning efforts to insure the public that a unified response 
will be made in the event of a radiological accident at Rancho 
Seco. 
New SMUD management policy purports to improve working 
relationships with offsite jurisdictions. In view of the 
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metal cable holding it broke. It missed the reactor mouth by inches, strik-
ing instead, a protruding flange and seal plate, shearing off a nut and bolt 
and c:1 using a leak of radioactive water. An unexpected, sudden shift in speed 
(from low to high speed) by the crane, caused stress to the cable and it snapped. 
Six days earlier a heavier seven-ton load was lifted over the highly irradiated 
used fuel assemblies - in clear violation of NRC rules. 
-SMUD claimed that radioactive iodine detected in milk from a farm near Rancho 
Seco was caused by fallout from Chinese nuclear testing in 1976 and not from 
the plant. Dr. H.W. Ibser (Physics professor, California State University, Sac-
ramento) claimed that odds were "one in 5,000 trillion" that a single atom of 
radioactive iodine still lingered from the blast and the NFC agreed with his 
calculations. 
-In 1981 the NRC rated bancho Seco below average in safety and,. performance, 
based on mishaps reported by 80 operating reactors. 
-A brand of circuit breakers used to shut down the plant proved 11 unreliable 11 and 
had malfunctioned at least fourteen times at Rancho Seco. 
-In November, 1982, SMUD General Manager John l,1attimoe told the NRC that the 
utility did not have time to provide information recuested for con~ressional 
hearings. He wrote, "No major steam genera tor repairs are anticipated for 
Rancho Seco for the next five years • 11 Two days later, a steam generator tube 
leak occurred at the plant. 
-Radioactive water was discharged into Clay Creek until 1984 when it was dis-
covered that s;,rnL had used calculations suited to release in an ocean or large 
body of water. Approximately thirteen million gallons of this waste water was 
released. 
-The normally non-radioactive secondary cooling system is now radioactive be-
cause of leaks. This causes additional exposure to workers and the rest of us. 
-Auxiliary batteries which would provide power to the plant in the event of an 
emergency were found corroded and of no use. 
-The Integrated Control System that balances heating and cooling at Rancho Se~o 
has failed time and again. 
-Faulty water-flow ga~es have caused control problems. 
-Rancho Seco has consistently been classified among the ten worst reactors in 
the U.S. The NRC cites poor plant and personnel performance. 
-SMUD did not implement all required changes after the Three ~file Island acci-
dent. 
-The utility downplayed to the public, safety and operating problems at r~ncho 
Seco. It also withheld inforrnation from the s:\mD Board of Directors and the 
NRC. 
Another problem at Eancho Seco deals with our high-level radioactive storase 
area. The spent fuel pool has been re-racked twice so that its capacity was dou-
bled and then doubled again to hold additional amounts. Ko EnvironTtental Impact 
heport '.vas prepared for this potentially dangerous 11 hot s_r::ot' 1 • Dr. Ibser states 
that it would take only a fraction of one percent of the cesium 137 in the pond to 
contaminate Sacra men to County to the point where it would be uninhabitable (1984 
figures). The potential for an accident increases as the spent fuel asse:nblies 
are packed closer. 
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for accidents in the General Emergency cate:;ory. Five of the ten "worst case" 
senarios involve either a 11 possible or ultimate failw'e of containmenV'. Despite 
this confirmation, s::.~UD General U:anager John Matti:noe (former general manager) was 
quoted many times as saying a failure of containment could not happen here. 
There is also a problem related to transporting nuclear waste. Spills and/or 
accidents on our freeways could be disasterous. The route taken by vehicles re-
moving radioactive waste from hancho Seco starts at the plant, west on Twin Cities 
Road (104), north on Hishway 99, north on Interstate 5, east on Interstate 80 to· its 
destination. During the recent meeting with the Sacramento Colli~ty Board of Supervis-
ors it was noted that the portion going through downtown on Interstate 5 is notori-
ous for accidents, especially near the J Street exit. An effort was made to help 
with this problem by having all large trucks stay in the lane nearest the center strip, 
however this is only a token action when one considers the consequence of a serious 
accident in the center of downtown, just blocks from the state capitol. 
The true costs of nuclear power have been hidden for years. In 1984 direct nu-
c~ar subsidies totaled $15.8 billion. This is nearly as much as the total retail 
revenue from 1984 nuclear output. This figure does not include the Price-Andersor: 
ceiling on liability for nuclear accidents. Federal loans and guarantees saved the 
nuclear industry $3.32 billion in financing costs. Tax breaks totaled $10.2 billion 
(source: The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 17, 1985). The liability limit of SUUD in 
the event of a major nuclear accident is only ~640 million. As a nuclear power plant 
operator S~UD could also be assessed up to $10 million in the event of a major acci-
dent involving any licensed nuclear reactor in the U.S. 
All these facts make one wonder how we ever got into this situation. And this 
is but the tip of the iceberg. Rancho Seco is connected to the entire cycle of radio-
active contamination. The land which is being mined for uranium is poisoning the 
environment around it. Mill tailiLgs are left in hu:;;h piles to irradiate the land. 
Workers have high rates of leukemia and cancer. Much of the land being mined belongs 
to Native Americans. One such place, Big Mountain, is a sacred religious place for 
them and they say, all people, 
Mined uranimn must be refined, enriched and fuel fabricated. In each of these 
processes there is a large potential for accidents and the release of radioactive 
materials, and it continues. Fuel is loaded at Rancho Seco and the release activity 
continues. F'ueJ is re:noved from the core. Some of it will be radioactive for hun-
dreds of thousands of years. At some time in the future (it keeps getting pushed fur-
ther away) this Spent fuel is supposed to be stored in a place where this living earth 
will not shift or roll •.• ever. 
There has been research trying to deal with informing future ~enerations so that 
ti:..:;y stCJ.y d.>'~i:::..Y from tr,e;ct.; wc.stes. Ed.vir,g been a 1-'rocic.ction director for c. graphic 
design studio (S~.!UD was our account at one time, the phrase "Your Electric S.ervice 11 
was my contribution) I consider myself adept at understanding illustration relating 
to comrnunication. However the most recent attempts to convey this message were all 
but in vain. This waste could contaminate our earth over and over and over again, 
past the ti.Tte where we could even kno·N the children of our children, of their children, 
of their cr.ildren and on and on. ·::e must be responsible consumers, caretakers of our 
world. 
tenance. 
fix it. 
and we 



